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Behold my Doom! This feather‟d omen, 
Portends what dismal times are coming. 
Now future scenes before my eyes, 
And second-sight forms arise; 
I hear a voice that calls away, 
And cries, The Whigs will win the Day; 
My beck‟ning Genius gives command, 
And bids us fly the fatal land; 
Where, changing name and constitution, 
Rebellion turns to Revolution, 
While loyalty oppressed in tears, 
Stands trembling for his neck and ears. 
 
 
                        -  John Trumbull, MacFingal (Philadelphia, 
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This thesis examines the experiences and impacts of the deployment of Highland soldiers 
to North America in the mid to late-eighteenth century.  Between 1756 and 1783, Britain 
sent ten Highland battalions to the North American theatre, where they fought for the 
duration of both the Seven Years‟ War and the War of American Independence.  The 
pressures of recruiting, utilizing, and demobilizing these men created powerful new 
forces in the Scottish Highlands, occurring, and in some cases prefiguring, the region‟s 
severe socio-economic problems. The impact of military contributions to the imperial 
state also had significant implications for Gaelic self-perception and the politics of 
loyalty and interest.  This thesis asserts the importance of imperial contacts in shaping 
the development of the Scottish Highlands within the British state.  Rejecting the 
narrative of a centrifugal empire based on military subjugation, this thesis argues that 
Gaels, of all social groups, constructed their own experiences of empire, having 
tremendous agency in how that relationship was formed.  The British Empire was not 
constructed only through the extension or strengthening of state apparatus in various 
geographical spaces.  It was formed by the decision of local actors to willingly embrace 
the perceived advantages of empire.  Ultimately, the disproportionately large Highland 
commitment to military service was a largely negative force in the Highlands.  This 
thesis establishes, however, the importance of political and ideological imperatives which 
drove these decisions, imperatives that were predicated on inter-peripheral contacts with 
British America.  It establishes the extent to which Highland soldiers willingly ensured 
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NOTES ON THE SOURCES 
 
 
In the completion of this thesis, I have attempted to remain as close to the eighteenth-
century format as is possible and still retain comprehension.  The original spelling of 
quotations, even where they are not standardized, has been left in their original form with 
corrections only if the meaning requires elaboration.  Throughout the text, names such as 
Macdonald and Macleod have been standardized, but in quotations or cited sources they 
remain how the author spelled them.  Mc and Mac are interchangeable in Gaelic and do 
not represent the common assumption that Mc is the Irish form.  For reasons of 
authenticity, Gaelic sources are quoted within the text.  If a short quotation, it is followed 
by the English translation in brackets.  For longer quotations, the English translation is 
placed below the Gaelic.  While it might have been helpful for bilingual readers to have 
parallel text, this has not been possible in order to retain the structure of the original 
Gaelic songs. 
The most problematic nomenclature of this thesis consists of the designations of 
British regiments.  Regiments in this period were often known by the name of their 
colonel, with Highland regiments increasingly known by the localities in which they 
were raised, ie., 92
nd
 (Duke of) Gordon Highlanders, raised in 1793.  There were, 
however, two regiments known as Fraser‟s Highlanders, the 78
th
 Foot (1757-1763) and 
the 71
st
 Foot (1776-1783), both raised by Simon Fraser of Lovat.  Numbers are also 
problematic, for disbanded regiments lost their designated number in the Establishment.  
For instance, during the Seven Years‟ War, the 77
th
 Montgomery‟s Foot was raised and 
disbanded.  A completely new regiment, with no affiliation to the earlier incarnation, was 
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raised in 1778 as the 77
th
 Atholl Foot.  I have decided to refer to all regiments by their 
number, ie. 78
th
 Foot, and, have provided a comprehensive set of appendices with details 
on the formations and leadership of all the Highland regiments raised in the period to 
ease comprehension. 
Several further pieces of military nomenclature require elaboration.  A regiment 
was an administrative unit consisting of one or more battalions of infantry.  Most British 
regiments consisted of just one battalion, making the terms regiment and battalion largely 
interchangeable for modern audiences.  I have referred to the military formations in this 
thesis as regiments, except where there existed two or more battalions within that 
regiment.  Battalions are referred to by a number in front of the regimental designation, 
thus 2/42
nd
 Foot is the second battalion of the 42
nd
 (Royal from 1758) Regiment of Foot, 
the Black Watch.  Soldiers‟ ranks have also been left in their original form.  The rank-
and-file consisted of the lowest ranks of the army, the men who made up the width and 
depth of the regiment in the line of battle, the ranks and files.  Above them were 
corporals and sergeants, the non-commissioned officers (NCOs), responsible for most of 
the daily organization of the rank-and-file.  Above them were the junior commissioned 
officers, the subalterns, access to which was largely the preserve of social or monetary 
elites.  These ranks consisted of the ensigns and lieutenants, the highest of which was the 
Captain-Lieutenant, a rank not used since the eighteenth century.  For ease, I refer to all 
grades of lieutenants as Lt.  Above the Lieutenants were the captains (Cpt.), generally 
responsible for the administrative leadership of a company of infantry, which at full 
strength would consist of 100 rank-and-file.  There were ten such companies, eight of the 
line (standard infantry companies) and two flank companies, one each of light infantry 
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and grenadiers.  Above the captains were the majors, responsible for a „wing‟ or half of 
the battalion. Then there was the Lieutenant-Colonel, commonly known as the 
Commandant, the senior officer in charge of the battalion on campaign.  Above him was 
a full Colonel, who administered the entire regiment, but rarely accompanied them 
overseas.  For example, Simon Fraser of Lovat was colonel of the 71
st
 Foot, consisting of 
two battalions.  He did not serve in America during the War of Independence, however, 
and the battalions were led by various Lt. Cols. during the course of the war.  Of course, 
these notes should be read as generalizations to make the designations used in this thesis 
comprehensible.  Variations were inevitable.  During the War of Independence, for 
example, the army had a propensity to use composite Grenadier and light infantry 
battalions drawn from the companies of several regiments.  This left the supplying 
regiment without effective flank companies. 
Regiments with numbered designations were described as being „on the 
Establishment‟, meaning they had a place in the army‟s list of regular regiments.  Every 
Highland regiment which was numbered was part of the establishment, though only the 
42
nd
 Foot was a permanent member of the peacetime establishment.  In addition, there 
were numerous non-regular Highland formations raised, most notably the Royal 
Highland Emigrants (1775-1778), who were „established‟ to the wartime establishment 
as the 84
th
 Foot in 1778.  Home defence units, militias and Fencible regiments, were not 
part of the Establishment and could not be sent overseas.  Establishment was most 
significant for the officer class, as it awarded them half-pay, a level of income which 
they would receive as long as they remained on the Army List.  Half-pay officers were 
required to volunteer their services in the event of a war but in peacetime had no further 
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commitments.  For Highland officers, half-pay was a vital injection of specie into a cash-
poor rural economy.  Most had no difficulty in volunteering in the event of war and, for 
many, farming was a stop-gap measure to more lucrative employments within the army.  
A commission in the Highland regiments was usually gained by recruiting a set number 
of men, though a commission could also be purchased (see Chapter 1).  As newly-raised 
regiments, rather than permanent regiments of the establishment, Highland officers could 
rise quickly through the ranks, having no long-term incumbents in the positions above 
them.  The advantages of these „New Corps‟ were bitterly decried by the officers of 
established regiments who, without the credit to purchase, might remain junior officers 




















This research would not have been possible without the assistance of doctoral funding 
from the Arts and Humanities Research Council of the United Kingdom, as well as 
generous grants from the Foundation for Canadian Studies in the United Kingdom, and 
the Eighteenth Century Scottish Studies Society.  I also benefited greatly from 
fellowships and assistance from the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress, 
the Robert H. Smith Center for International Jefferson Studies at Monticello, St 
Andrew‟s Presbyterian College at Laurinburg, the United States Military Academy at 
West Point, and from the International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World at 
Harvard University. 
 This research would have been nothing without the incredible staff at archives 
across the Atlantic region. All the staff at the National Archives of Scotland, the National 
Library of Scotland, and the National Archives at Kew, where much of this research was 
undertaken, deserve mention.  Equally, I would like to thank Alex Du Toit at the 
Highland Council Archives, Richard Cullen at the Dundee City Council Archives, 
Deirdre Sweeny of the Local History Library in Dundee, Jane Anderson at the Blair 
Castle Archives, and Tessa Spencer of the National Register of Archives Scotland. 
Across the Atlantic my thanks go to Jill MacMicken Wilson and John Boylan of the 
Public Archives and Record Office on Prince Edward Island, Leo Cheverie of the 
University of Prince Edward Island, Virginia Clark of the Nova Scotia Archives and 
Records Management, Elizabeth Smith of the Crown Lands Information Management 
Centre in Halifax, Denis Giguère and Mathieu Belanger at the Bibliothèque et Archives 
xi 
 
nationales du Québec, and Mary Lou Reker for her wonderful interest in my research at 
the Kluge Center in Washington, DC. 
 There should also be particularly special mentions for those people who permitted 
me access to their own private collections and gave up their own personal time to fill in 
the rather considerable gaps in my own knowledge.  I was graciously permitted access to 
the private collections held by Simon Blackett at Invercauld Estate, Mrs. Troughton of 
Ardchattan Priory, Argyll, and was extremely grateful to have been permitted to discuss 
the private collections of Kerry DeLorey of New Brunswick, and Genevieve Macdonald 
and Mary Galland of Prince Edward Island.  I am very thankful to Lorna Maclaine of 
Lochbuie for her permission to quote several letters from the Maclaine of Lochbuie 
papers.  I was also humbled by the kindness and hospitality of Mr. Malcolm Bell 
Macdonald of Rammerscales estate and Malcolm and Kathy Fraser of Reelig who kept 
me better supplied with biscuits than their own ancestor Edward Satchwell Fraser would 
have been while serving in America. 
 I am indebted to the many people who offered assistance and advice during the 
course of this research. Ed Macdonald, Donald Parker, Grant Grams, John Reid, Terry 
Deveau, Nick Aitken, and Jeff Turner made my research trip to Canada a hugely 
enjoyable experience. Various research trips and conferences over the last four years 
have put me in touch with the invaluable advice and kindness of Bernard Bailyn, Fred 
Anderson, C. Thomas Long, Christine Johnson, Patrick Griffin, Justin Liles, Alejandro 
Rabinovich, Gabriel DiMeglio, Christian Crouch, and all the members of the Atlantic 
History seminar. Also Gaye Wilson, Andrew O‟Shaughnessy, Major Joshua „Turkey‟ 
Bradley, Major Jason Warren, Jean-Francois Lozier, Robert Clemm, William Tatum III, 
xii 
 
and everybody at the Summer Seminar. Also to Aaron Graham, Anne Landin, Eve 
Watters, Scott Hendrix, Steve Pincus, Steven Wilkinson, „Sir‟ Larry Hatter, Martin 
Öhman, Jeffrey Wert, and Bill Caudill, to whom I owe special thanks for inviting me to 
Laurinburg for the Charles Bascombe Shaw Memorial Scottish Heritage Symposium in 
North Carolina in early 2010. I also owe thanks for the advice and assistance of Owen 
Dudley-Edwards, David Brown, Stana Nenadic, Ewen Cameron, Stephen Conway, 
Stephen Brumwell, David Dobson, Stuart Allan, Andrew Wells, Andrew Mackillop, 
Allan Kennedy, Jane Ridder-Patrick, Hisashi Kuboyama, Tawny Paul, Harriet Cornell, 
Rusty Roberson, and David Taylor. To all of these people, I owe a huge gratitude.   
Principally, however, without the unrivalled assistance of my supervisors, Francis 
D. Cogliano, Alexander Murdoch, and the humbling support of H.T. Dickinson, this 
research would have been a failure.  I hope this thesis justifies their faith and their efforts.  
It would be unfair to prejudice any single author or authors in terms of their influence on 
my work, but it should be obvious from the footnotes the debt I owe to a number of 
brilliant historians.  Of course, for all the assistance, any errors contained in this thesis 
are mine and mine alone. 
 Thoiream taing riutha sin ‟nan cànain fhéin a chuidich leis a‟chànain a‟ 
Ghàidhealtachd.  Tha mo Gàidhlig ás aonais, ach e a‟ fàs nas fheàrr.  Mu dhéidhinn a‟ 
Ghàidhlig ceart, tha a h-uile creideas aig na daoine seo: aig Oilthigh Dhùn Èideann, chiad 
Dòmhnall Meek ‟s Wilson Mcleòid airson luathsachadh dhomh a‟ eisgeach Gàidhlig 
nuair ‟s e lar-cheumnach a bh‟ annam.  Cuideachd Anja Gunderloch, Joan Macdonald, 
Ann Paterson, Chrisma Bould, Rona Wilkie, Ailean Turner, Michael Newton, Vincent 
xiii 
 
Morely, William Gillies, Peter Mackay, Robert Dunbar, Andy Macdonald, agus Stu(th) 
mhòr - Stiubhart Moireasdan Stone. 
Finally, I want to thank the people who have been closest to me throughout this 
work.  To Emma, the majority of this was done with you; it is yours as well as mine.  Lt. 
Col. R.B. Anderson showed me more of what it means to be a soldier, and a historian, in 
one morning at Yorktown than all the scholarly works I have read during this research.  
His family, Debi, Dane, Emily, Rath, Michelle, and Virginia, I count as my second 
family.  In their Appalachian tongue they are „good people‟, though this hardly does 
them justice. To Sarah, thank you with all my heart.  This thesis is dedicated to my 























On 16 January 1778, two men stood before a small table in the centre of the city of 
Glasgow.  Both named Macdonald, they were in one of the most urbanized cities in 
Western Europe, the key location for the Atlantic tobacco trade and soon to be a vital 
node in the industrial revolution; both were there to ensure their own social and material 
security.  They were, however, greatly divided by age, experience, wealth, and social 
standing.  One stood in the deep scarlet coat of a British officer, and a belted tartan plaid, 
the emblematic uniform of the Highland regiments; by 1778 there were eight such 
regiments, forming or already deployed across thousands of miles of ocean in what had 
become a global war for Britain‟s American empire.  The expensive uniform, replete 
with bearskin cap and gold-embroidered epaulettes, had been purchased at the owner‟s 
expense, possibly with money made through his brother‟s slave plantation, the product of 
which was refined a few streets away at the nearby Western Sugar House on Candleriggs.  
The man across the table came from a different world and stood in the dark clothes of an 
unemployed labourer from near Inverness.  One was thirty-five, a veteran of the Seven 
Years‟ War in Germany.  The other, at twenty-two, had been just five years old when the 
older man had first put on a redcoat.  
The older man leaned over, picked up the quill and, being illiterate, made his 
mark.  He was Alexander Macdonald and he was the fifth man that day to place his mark 
on the attestation sheet for the newly-formed 76
th
 Regiment of Foot.  The officer in front 
of him was twenty-two year old Lieutenant Allan Macdonald.  Over the next three weeks, 
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five more veterans would enlist, all much older than their officer.  Many of these men 
would serve three and a half years in the army, during which time they would fight two 
major battles.  In 1779, they would turn on their officers for the alleged breaking of 
promises made to them on that day in Glasgow.  In 1781, they would endure the 
humiliating surrender at Yorktown, where members of the regiment, some with tears in 
their eyes, threw their muskets to the ground with such force that the stocks split.    
In Allan Macdonald‟s possession that day was the long, triangular pennant that 
would accompany his platoon to North America.  It bore the emblem of Clan Donald, 
reflecting the familial identities which stood at the heart of conceptions of loyalty and 
duty in the eighteenth-century world.  It had been carried in the Jacobite rebellion thirty-
two years before, and, like many Jacobite flags, used images of the thistle, one in each 
corner of the central motif, to underwrite the anti-Union agenda underpinning the 
dynastic and religious struggle of Jacobitism.  Allan‟s Catholic father, Donald 
Macdonald, had supported Charles Edward Stuart‟s attempt to place his father James on 
the throne of Great Britain.  Donald had lost his estate on the Outer Hebrides as a result 
of the defeat of the rebellion in April 1746 and now the family lived in the Lowland 
weaving town of Paisley.  There had been a change, however, made to this particular flag.  
In the top left corner, one of the thistles had been unstitched.  In its place was a carefully 
reproduced Union flag.
1
  A former flag of rebellion was on its way to assert imperial 
dominion over another constituent part of the British Empire.   
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I   OUTLINE 
This thesis offers a major new assessment of the processes that brought Alexander and 
Allan together in 1778.  It assesses the reception of British colonialism in one locality, 
the Scottish Highlands.  De-emphasizing the fitful directing of such processes from the 
metropolitan centre, it asserts that the empire did not, as countless historians of the 
region have suggested, enter the Highlands through the barrel of a musket and the 
„punitive civilizing‟ of the region that accompanied the collapse of the last Jacobite 
rebellion in 1746.
2
  It entered through the state‟s demands for Highland manpower and, 
crucially, the embracing of these needs by peripheral actors to advance localized, but far 
from parochial, agenda.  The region‟s inclusion into the imperial state required a largely 
internal rather than external colonization of the Highlands.  State patronage was re-
directed toward the areas of the Highland economy which were most profitable, in this 
period the raising of military manpower, which as Andrew Mackillop has brilliantly 
shown was „Gaeldom‟s equivalent of Glasgow‟s tobacco trade‟.  A „patriotic partnership‟ 
between elites and government was the pre-requisite for the formation of the fiscal-
military state, and the building block of Britain‟s rise to imperial dominance in the 
                                                 
2
 For an especially powerful articulation of this argument, though one which does advocate the centrality of 
pre-1745 interactions, see Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce, and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788 
(East Linton: Tuckwell, 1996), pp. 211-12; other sources lack Macinnes‟s sophistication and use the terms 
genocide and even final solution with scant regard for historical perspective, see John Sadler, Scottish 
Battles (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2010), pp. 270-1; Magnus Magnusson, Scotland: The Story of a Nation 





  Most critically, however, this thesis goes further, beyond the social 
and economic arguments for these processes, arguing that the political identity of the 
Highlands at this critical stage was re-defined within the context of an expanding empire, 
not within the problematic domestic confines of the nation.  Embracing the potential of 
inter-periphery connections, Highland people constructed distinctly regional perspectives 
on the region‟s place within the empire and with North America in particular.  Historians 
have already shown that inter-peripheral links, rather than centrifugal forces, were 
defining features of the empire in the Atlantic region.
4
  The Highlands, in a regional 
variant of this, sought advantage from an a priori unequal relationship by using the 
potential of the empire, and benefiting from the new forces it placed on a region.  The 
benefits were political and cultural, collective and individual, and impacted upon almost 
every facet of Highland society.  These forces, not violent repression, made the Scottish 
Highlands an intrinsic part of the British Empire. 
This thesis outlines the processes of regional development in the imperial state 
within a core/periphery framework.  If we are to approach the experience of the Scottish 
Highlands in the second half of the eighteenth century as meaningfully as possible, the 
narrative of conquest and colonization, arising from the suppression of Jacobitism, 
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should not provide the only point of departure.  It is of course accurate that regional 
development was mediated through the institutional and commercial authority of the 
core, centred on the state and its representative proxies, men such as Archibald 
Campbell, third Duke of Argyll and Sir Adolphus Oughton.
5
  In any imperial 
relationship, there is always an element of colonialism, an exploitation of a weaker 
region‟s resources and a subsequent re-inscribing of cultural inferiority as a result.  This 
is different, however, from conquest and subjugation, which made the victim entirely 
subservient; little in the Highland experience describes the latter.  We are perhaps, in the 
post-imperial age, too influenced by notions of Orwellian anti-imperialism, an entirely 
justified revulsion against the imperial regimes of the twentieth century.
6
  The 
eighteenth-century empire was a different entity.  This is not to revise the deserved 
reputation of the British state in the eighteenth century as a body politic capable of 
horrific brutality.  It asserts, however, the limited totality of colonialism in the eighteenth 
century.    
The assumption of cultural colonization and suppression has blinded historians to 
the confidence and agency that was at the centre of Highland interactions with the 
imperial state.  By demanding that the Highlands and the metropolitan centre conform to 
a relationship of power, there has been a false imagining of the actual social and political 
boundaries between the two, reduced to the simplistic model of a strong imperial state 
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versus a colonized periphery.  This separation results in the Gael being placed beyond the 
dominant structure, without the agency to form localized reactions to it or to impact upon 
the nature of the relationship in any real sense.  These interpretations have served only to 
highlight the continuing attraction of victimhood in the Highland narrative and 
fundamentally distorted how the region saw itself. 
The primary vehicle for imperial integration was the British army, and this thesis 
reveals the intellectual, cultural, and social history of a region embracing the empire 
through the medium of military service.  As the principal means of Highland contacts 
with the state and its colonies, the Highland soldier serves as an invaluable subject in 
understanding the nature of imperial relations.  Studying the Highland soldier also offers 
the opportunity to embrace the clarion call laid out by Bernard Bailyn and P.D. Morgan 
two decades ago, that empire can only be understood through movements and 
interactions between groups, with common people and peripheries playing as dynamic a 
part as the metropolis.  It was the marginalized soldier who experienced empire and 
played an active part in its formation.  Indeed, as David Armitage has recently suggested, 
the notion that the empire could mean more to those who theorized about it, than to the 




To understand this imperial dynamic effectively, proper periodization is essential.  
Prior to 1756, the Highland contribution to the British army had consisted of just one 
battalion, the 42
nd
 Foot, formed in 1739 from the companies raised in 1725 to address the 
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„Highland problem‟ of lawlessness and cattle-thieving.  The famous mutiny of the 
regiment in 1743 and the refusal of the government to deploy it against the Jacobites, 
through fear of desertions, gave the regiment an ambiguous history prior to the Seven 
Years‟ War.  The opening of major hostilities in North America prompted the regiment‟s 









) Foot.  The processes behind the raising of the Highland 
battalions from 1756 until the end of the War of American Independence in 1783 are the 
focus of this study.  This twenty-seven year period was one of the most significant in the 
development of the Scottish Highlands, marking a period of profound social, political, 
economic, and religious change.  The recruitment of Highland regiments was a key factor 
in some of these changes.  There were elements of continuity, but this was a period of 
imperial departures.  Of course, this is not to be read as an entire rejection of structural 
factors.  Contrary to popular assumptions, the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 had been a bitter 
civil war in the Highlands.  Some eighteen Loyalist companies were raised by John 
Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, during the Jacobite rebellion and the strength of the 
Loyalist militia on Skye at the end of the rebellion alone was some 600 men.
8
  
Engagement with the fiscal-military state and the possibly deliberate overpaying of the 
loyal companies by local paymasters were well underway in 1746.
9
  The raising of 
multiple battalions from 1756, however, did create a new dynamic.  It is perhaps best to 
see this periodization as within Stephen Jay Gould‟s model of evolutionary theory, that 
of punctuated equilibrium.  Long periods of incremental change can be punctuated at a 
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tipping point, where the moment of inflection becomes a moment of genuine and 
definable change.  To call this revolutionary in the Highland context would be 
inaccurate, but it is clear that a long history of government centralization, integration, 
state-backed patronage, and social change, dating back at least as far as the reign of 







II   CURRENT HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The centrality of the army to the Highland experience is far from being an entirely new 
claim.  The publication of Andrew Mackillop‟s magisterial More Fruitful than the Soil: 
Army, Empire, and the Scottish Highlands (East Linton, 2000) marked the most brilliant 
study of the eighteenth-century Highlands to date.  Mackillop vigorously attacked 
traditional notions of the Highland regiment as an extension of the old clan system and 
stated that for landowning elites, military service was a lucrative diversification of estate 
economies, only marginally different to other improvements such as sheep farming or 
kelping.  Elites colonized various levels of the fiscal-military state as military officers, 
extracting benefits that conformed to individual or familial interests, a process mirrored 
among the lower orders.  The poor adeptly used military service as a lever to secure 
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landholding, often creating tensions as families who were willing to provide men for the 
army were privileged in tenancy agreements over other sub-tenant groups.
11
  Viewing the 
Highland military as a social and economic or gendered entity advanced a pattern that 
had begun in the late 1980s, but accelerated after 2000.
12
  Mackillop‟s book fitted well 
with a wider contextual historiography that privileged an economic interpretation of 
Highland history.  Due to its function as an efficient antidote to the scourge of romantic 
history in Scotland, the study of economics became central to many areas of Scottish 
studies.  Indeed, recent concerns have been raised that this revisionism has gone too far 
and that the Highlands no longer have a political or intellectual history between Culloden 
and the Crofters‟ agitation of the 1880s.  That these concerns were partly demonstrated 
through a study of the economic impact of politics on tenant / landlord relations suggest 
such concerns may be understated.
13
 
 The socio-economic narrative was, however, largely a domestic story.  Imperial 
commitments were recognized as intrinsic to the growth of the Highland military, but the 
impact was seen in purely domestic terms.  It lacked a focus on what Highland soldiers 
were actually required to do, allowing the distillation of the Highland military experience 
within the boundaries of socio-economic normalcy.
14
 Highland military service could be 
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equated to kelping because its domestic context missed the distorting impact of imperial 
service on identity, interest, psychology, mobility, and political allegiance.  Socio-
economic revisionism tends to obscure the enormous cultural impact of military service, 
and divorces the Highland soldier from important political contexts.  Portraying military 
service as a normal pursuit made sense within the context of enlistment in the Highlands; 
it is hollow when placed alongside the experiences of the Highland soldier in the empire.  
Furthermore, the socio-economic interpretation has proved seemingly insufficient in 
overturning traditional interpretations, which remain surprisingly resilient.  The idea of 
the regiments as clan levies still holds a particular appeal with publications issued from 
the National Museums of Scotland even stating that the regiments were „raised for the 
most part as “clan regiments” by the chieftains from their estates‟.
15
  The two most recent 
studies of the Highland soldier, one of which claims to be the most complete account of 
the subject to date, do not cite Mackillop and unapologetically continued to trumpet 
various shibboleths alongside superficial revisionism.
16
 
 A further problem which has stymied the study of the Highland soldier has been 
the very success of iconoclastic historiography.  Many historians have forcefully 
addressed the development of „Highlandism‟: the co-option of the image of the Highland 
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soldier by Lowland Scots.  In the early nineteenth century, Lowland Scots feared that 
their nation would become no more than an indistinctive cultural protrusion of 
Englishness, and needed an icon that could represent a distinctively Scottish contribution 
to empire.
17
  They found it in the Highland soldier, not by changing racist attitudes 
towards him, but changing the meaning of these racist attitudes to fit a new political 
expedient.  The skill with which various historians exposed the invention of the 
Highlander was welcomed and their sympathy for the Highlands was clearly evident; it 
had an unforeseen consequence, however.  It re-inscribed the place of the Gaels as 
victims of larger historical forces to which they could offer no reciprocal response.  
Recent historiography has become a post-modernist Highlandism, the study of the 
Highlands from an external viewpoint without the Gael being the subject of study. 
The meta-narrative of Highland engagement with the British state has been 
distorted as a result, and on the basis of privileging external sources, the meta-narrative 
of Highland defeatism has become powerful.  The suppression of Jacobitism in 1746 was 
deeply significant for the Highlands and for the British Isles.  Coming in the middle of 
the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), Gaelic Scotland was subjected to 
occupation; the improving zeal which sought to extirpate the cultural pillars of Highland 
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distinctness was as much about strategic security as improvement, though the two were 
largely inseparable.
18
  For this reason, it is hard to escape the assumption that, post-1746, 
the Scottish Highlands experienced an asymmetric relationship between the region and 
the imperial state, predicated on conquest, pacification, and subordination.  Eric Richards 
has argued that the Highlands had a semi-colonial relationship with the rest of Britain, 
and that Gaelic expressions of loyalty grew out of their „inferior, indeed conquered 
status‟.
19
  Most histories of the region underscore the causative link between imperialism 
and subordination.  Colin Calloway has recently posited that relations between Gaels and 
Amerindians in the New World owed little to shared cultural experiences, but much to 
the similar exposure of their tribal societies to colonial powers and capitalist forces.
20
  
The comparison drawn between the two, while highly sophisticated, relies on Anglo-
American narratives which conflated the groups on the external assumption of a 
relationship to the imperial centre.  The narrative of a „suppressed people‟ or the even 
more inaccurate „suppressed Scotland‟, occupies the centre ground of other comparative 
studies.  In Revolutionaries: A New History of the Invention of America (New York, 
2010), Pulitzer prize-winner Jack Rakove argues that the Coercive Acts passed on 
Massachusetts and the port of Boston in 1774 turned a political controversy into an 
imperial crisis, for, unlike Ireland or Scotland, American colonists claimed the rights of 
                                                 
18
 For one aspect of the international dimension of Jacobitism see Thomas Kaiser, „The Drama of Charles 
Edward Stuart, Jacobite Propaganda, and French Political Protest, 1745-1750‟, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 
30 (1997): 365-81. 
19
 Eric Richards, „Scotland and the Uses of the Atlantic Empire‟ in Strangers within the Realm, pp. 95, 
107-8; see also Mike Kennedy, „Is Leis an Tighearna an talamh agus an Lan‟: A Gaelic Settlement History 
of Prince Edward Island (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1995), pp. 8, 501-2 
20
 Colin Calloway, White People, Indians, and Highlanders (Oxford: OUP, 2008), pp. 10-13. 
13 
 
freeborn Englishmen and were not a defeated or subjugated people.
21
  Of course, it is not 
to be expected that historians of the early Republic understand the intricacies of Highland 
politics in the eighteenth century.  The assumption of defeat is, however, revealing, and 
such simplistic models distort not only the comparison, but the subject. 
The scope for a positive articulation of Highland identity has been completely 
absent from the historiography.  War has long been recognized as one of the most 
significant human activities in forging communal cultures and identities.  These 
connections are not confined to modern nationalisms, but inhabited the popular 
patriotism and identities of early modern Europe.  Linda Colley‟s Britons: Forging the 
Nation, 1707-1837 (London: Yale University Press, 1992) established that war, 
expansion and identity, while always contested, occupied synergistic intellectual 
ground.
22
  The widespread engagement of the British public in the imperial expansionism 
of the fiscal-military state underpinned levels of popular patriotism in the British Atlantic 
world rarely seen elsewhere in Europe until 1789.  Pre-existent chauvinisms were 
exaggerated by the acquisition of territory, and success against foreign markets bolstered 
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the attractiveness of expansionism.  Where this did not constitute a genuine attachment to 
„Britishness‟, it is evident that war helped define the culture and society of the 
archipelago‟s peoples during the long eighteenth century.  Despite the wealth of literature 
dedicated to studying the Highland regiments, however, there has been a lack of 
scholarly analysis of the interaction between war and identity in the Highlands.
23
  For a 
considerable time, historians have analysed military service as a major source of 
Highland integration into Great Britain, concluding in a polarized fashion that the very 
formation of armed forces inculcated identity or, conversely, that the regiments lacked 
the capacity to transmute identity at all.  Both have limitations which this thesis will 
address.  The first assumes that service in a major institution of the modern state was a 
sufficient mark of integration.  For Linda Colley, the Highland regiments were the 
channel through which an excluded region of the archipelago found acceptance, while P.J. 
Marshall believed that „little needs to be added to Colley‟s account of the importance of 
the Seven Years‟ War for the integration of the Highlands in particular ... into the British 
Empire‟.
24
  The second is entirely dismissive of „Britishness‟.
25
  It is teleological itself, 
however, to dismiss cultural changes that did not see evident long-term impacts.  Where 
this thesis adds to an impressive array of scholarship is in the assertion that loyalty to the 
                                                 
23
 Recent accounts have been compelling but follow the conventions of traditional military history, Ian 
Macpherson McCulloch, Sons of the Mountains: The Highland Regiments in the French and Indian War, 
1756-1767, 2 vols. (New York: Purple Mountain Press, 2006); the notable exception is Steven Brumwell, 
Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), pp. 264-89. 
24
 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London: Yale University Press, 1992),  pp. 103, 
120; P.J. Marshall, „A Nation Defined by Empire, 1755-1776‟ in Uniting the Kingdom: The Making of 
British History, ed. Alexander Grant and Keith Stringer (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 208-22; Richards, 
„Scotland and the Uses of the Atlantic Empire‟, pp. 91, 106; see also Duane Meyer, The Highland Scots of 
North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 131; Clyde, From Rebel to 
Hero, p. 153; T.M. Devine, Scotland‟s Empire (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 305. 
25
 Mackillop, More Fruitful than the Soil, pp. 204-33; J.E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815 
(Oxford: OUP, 1997), esp. pp. 3-13; see also Stana Nenadic, „The Impact of the Military Profession on 
Highland Gentry Families, c. 1730-1830‟, SHR, 85 (2006): 77, 97-8. 
15 
 
British state was accepted, adapted, even created at a local level, rather than being an 
entirely salient notion which was propagated by certain interested parties.
26
 
It is the ability of Highlanders to embrace or interpret ideas which were seen only 
as the preserve of freeborn Englishmen that makes this study different.  It was recently 
remarked that „The Highland Soldier was unlike any other in the British army ... 
differences set them apart – inherent national characteristics, background, clan system, 
even language.‟
27
  This narrative of Highland exceptionalism needs to be challenged.
28
  
Of vital importance, and a major theme running through this work, is that rarely in the 
medieval, early modern and eighteenth-century literature, is there any suggestion that 
two cultures, even two distinguishable nations could not inhabit the same political 
entity.
29
  Such ideas were the invention of later nationalisms.  As rejected from the 
civilized norms of Anglo-Scottish society as the Highlanders may have been, they were 
part of a British political structure.
30
  Indeed, the idea of Great Britain, from as early as 
the late sixteenth century, possessed a distinctly Scottish connotation.
31
  The inaccurate 
reading of the Highlands as an exceptionalist region within the history of eighteenth-
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century Britain is a major theme addressed in this thesis.  Viewed in this way, Samuel 
Johnson‟s disappointment at not finding an alien world in the region when he travelled 
there in 1773 seems entirely understandable.  This thesis sees the Highland region as a 




III   BOUNDARIES AND FOCUS 
Is the army an appropriate context in which to analyse dramatic changes in the Highland 
experience?  Military recruitment was the largest government intervention in the 
Highlands between 1746 and the Crofters‟ War of the 1880s.  Military service became 
central to the whole Highland experience in this period.  Between 1756 and 1783, at least 
twenty-two battalions of regular infantry were raised in the Highlands.  A newly-
established battalion in the late eighteenth century consisted of forty-two officers and one 
thousand men.  Supernumeraries (brought with the battalion to be distributed as 
replacements to the army) and replacements brought the figures for each battalion higher 
still.  A very conservative estimate would, therefore, put the number of Highlanders in 
uniform in this period at 20,000.  Not all twenty-two battalions recruited to its full 
strength and not all the men in Highland battalions came from the Highlands.
32
  These 
reductions were, however, more than offset by the vast numbers of Scots (up to fifty-six 
per cent of one regiment serving in America in 1757), who were enlisted in „English‟ and 
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  The population of the Highlands in 1778 was estimated by John 
Walker as 327,904, of which one quarter would have been eligible males of military age.  
This figure increased by three per cent per annum as boys reached military age.  If, as 
seems likely, the population of the Highlands stood at around 315,000 people in 1757, 
the total number of males eligible for military service between 1757 and 1783 will have 
been 169,832.  Around one in eight of the male population of the Highlands, therefore, 
served in the regular army in this period.  Stephen Conway has shown that during the 
War of American Independence, an estimated one in seven or one in eight of the total 
male population of Britain served in the armed forces.  Those figures, however, include 
naval enlistments (larger than the army by a third), as well as volunteer and militia units, 
which were more numerous, popular, and less prohibited in England and Ireland, than in 
Scotland.  If we were to compare enlistment in the regular army alone, during the 
American War of Independence around one in twenty-eight eligible males in the British 
Isles served.
34
  The statistical conclusion is a proportional Highland commitment to the 
regular army of at least three times what was seen elsewhere in the British Isles.  By 
1783, the Highlands were one of the most heavily recruited localities for the regular army 
anywhere in Western Europe.    
As a measure of the utility of cultural history to the present trend in privileging 
economics, it was the financial consequences which truly expose the scale of the army‟s 
impact, particularly in comparison to other imperial intrusions into the region.  These 
intrusions can broadly be divided into three categories: judicial, cultural, and economic.  
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Of these, the economic impact is the most difficult to quantify, consisting of multifarious 
„improvements‟ which were intended to improve the commercial viability of the 
Highlands and its people.  Judicial and cultural intrusions are easier to measure.  The 
post-Culloden Acts of Parliament, particularly the Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act 
(20 Geo. II, c.43), was designed to alter significantly the way in which the region was 
governed, removing judicial control of the localities from local landowners and replacing 
them with qualified and salaried Sheriff-Deputes.  While a vital change, finding suitable 
and committed advocates proved difficult, the combined salary of all Highland Sherriff-
Deputes amounted to less than £2,000.  In addition, most of the significant re-fashioning 
of Scottish feudal law in this period came from case law and new precedents, which 
would presumably have occurred regardless, rather than through parliamentary 
legislation.
35
  Also judicial were the confiscation of fourteen Jacobite estates under the 
Vesting Act (20 Geo. II, c.41) and their subsequent annexation by the crown in 1752 for 
administration by the Commissioners of the Forfeited Estates which began in 1755.  This 
huge effort was directed toward the „Purposes of civilizing the Inhabitants upon said 
Estates ... the promoting amongst them the Protestant Religion, good government, 
Industry and manufactures, and the Principles of Duty and Loyalty to his Majesty‟.
36
  Its 
annual rentals, designed to implement this grand scheme, however, was just over £7,000, 
and many of its schemes collapsed through lack of interest or funding.   
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At the centre of the cultural intrusion was the Society in Scotland for Propagating 
Christian Knowledge [SSPCK], established in 1709 with the aim of civilizing the 
Highlands.  The teaching of Protestantism was to go hand-in-hand with the teaching of 
English, there being a presumed link between the Highlands‟ barbaric culture and her 
language.
37
  Historians have tended to emphasize the impact of the Society on the decline 
of Highland exceptionalism.  Charles Withers presented an extremely sophisticated 
reading of the Anglicization of the Highlands in Gaelic Scotland: The Transformation of 
a Cultural Region (London, 1988), but stated, however, that the SSPCK was „the single 
most important instrument of Anglicization in the 1700s‟ which succeeded in „devaluing 
Gaelic in the Highland mind‟.  A linear and simplistic narrative of Lowlanders 
„impos[ing] Lowland understandings of culture on the Scottish Highlands‟ continues to 
permeate recent writing on the SSPCK, and only helps re-entrench the victim narrative.
38
  
The SSPCK‟s annual budget for salaries, however, was just £995.13.1, with a total 
budget not exceeding £2,000 per annum for most of the century.
39
  Principal donations to 
the Society from private individuals from 1709-1773 averaged just £326 a year.
40
  In the 
late nineteenth century, 250,000 people spoke Gaelic (almost as many people as lived in 
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the Highlands), with as many as one in five speaking no other language.
41
  Certain 
conditions may have been set in the eighteenth century, but we must not overemphasize, 
in the interests of a single narrative of declension, the cultural colonialism of the post-
Culloden period.   
The cost of raising and maintaining the Highland regiments, money which was 
often directed, perhaps co-opted, from the fiscal-military state into the hands of local 
actors was proportionally astronomical.  For the year 1776, the Treasury estimated that 
the cost of paying, let alone equipping and training, the proposed 2,000 men of 71
st
 Foot 
would be over £112 per day, or an annual figure of £40,880; add the regulation £3 
bounty which was delivered to each recruit upon enlistment, the pay for the 71
st
 Foot in 
its first year cost the government over £47,400.
42
  Half-pay to demobilized officers added 
to the specie being directed toward the region.  In 1765, there were some 274 Highland 
half-pay officers, whose estimated combined income, given their likely ranks if they 
were proportional to the distribution of ranks in a standard regiment, would have 
amounted to around £11,877 per annum.
43
  Even after raising a new regiment, the costs 
of deploying it were tremendous.  The cost of maintaining no more than 6,000 troops in 
North America in 1771-72, for example, was £377,468.
44
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Of course, this was not a regional subsidy.  When deployed, much of this money 
was not remitted back into the local economy, though there were enough cases of this to 
suggest a trend.
45
  In addition, as will be argued throughout, the Highland regiments did 
not simply mark the relationship of a periphery with the metropolitan centre; they were 
partly defined by the relationships within the region.  Much of the money which was paid 
to enlisted soldiers as increasingly inflated bounties came directly from the officer elite, 
transferring specie within a cash-poor economy, rather than having it injected from 
external sources.  Average bounties in two companies of the 71
st
 Foot in 1776 were 
around £4.3.0 per man, which if we subtract the £3 allotted by government means 
Highland elites were transferring £1,150 per battalion to the lower orders within the 
Highland economy; it is true, however, that the credit networks on which Highland elites 
drew often originated in the financial urban centres of the south.
46
  Military service, the 
most obvious example of the Highlands‟ involvement in the imperial project, helped 
bankrupt many elites while also eroding existing patterns of land tenure, making eviction 
and clearance more likely.
47
  These figures serve to demonstrate, however, the 
importance of an institution often overlooked as a significant cultural actor in the 
eighteenth century. 
What does this study understand as the Highland region?  There are two means of 
defining the Highlands, broadly understood as the explicit and the implicit.  The explicit 
consists of the geographical boundaries of the Highland region.  While there is a 
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geological fault line between the north Precambrian and southern Palaeozoic sedimentary 
rocks, the most obvious geographical difference is the variation in height and climate 
between Highland and Lowland.
48
  Compared with the rest of Scotland, the Highlands 
lack the quality of soil, the fair climate, and the natural resources of the south, and large 
areas of the region are either too high or too wet for arable farming.  The fertile green 
fields of Moray, Nairn, and Aberdeen-shire, as well as the coastal plains of Caithness, 
have generally been considered less „Highland‟ than the rest of the region.  The implicit 
form, which is considered of primary importance here, must be more situated in 
eighteenth-century understandings of customs and manners.  The cultural boundaries of 
the Highland line largely derived from Lowland and English commentators, from John of 
Fordun through James Wolfe and largely rested on the foundation of perceived Highland 
savagery.  That said, this ill will should not be interpreted as part of a single narrative, for 
all had particular contexts in which their opinions were formulated.  For this reason, this 
thesis rejects the imposed definitions of the region, a meta-narrative that implicitly charts 
the increase of Lowland values and thus civility into the region, and attempts to 
understand it only as contemporary Highlanders did.  Many Highlanders considered 
themselves as a distinct race.  James Thompson of the 78
th
 Foot and Captain Alexander 
Macdonald of the 84
th
 Foot both rested their definitions of the Highlander on hardiness 
and physical toughness.  Captain Donald Macdonald of the 78
th
 Foot instead stated that 
alcohol might be one distinguishing feature: „for a Highlander always takes two 
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  The Gaelic language significantly problematizes these boundaries.  In a work 
published posthumously in 1808, Rev. Dr. John Walker, stated that the Highland region 
was best defined „by the boundary of the Gaelic Language‟.
50
  Yet, non-Gaelic speakers 
had few difficulties in the period in defining themselves as „Highlanders‟ without 
possessing the language.
51
  Many of those young labourers who were recruited into the 
Highland regiments came from Nairn and Moray, where according to the Old Statistical 
Account (1791-1799), „The Gaelic Language has long disappeared‟.  In Moray, however, 
an estimated twenty-three per cent of the population in 1765 spoke Gaelic, while in Nairn 
it was 50.4 per cent.
52
  In the mid-1750s on the forfeited estates of Struan, which owing 
to its somewhat notorious cattle trade might have been expected to have widespread 
contact with the English-speaking Lowland markets, of the 1,235 people living on the 
estate, only 262 spoke English.
53
  For Gaels, the Highlands were the Gàidhealtachd, the 
limits of Gaelic and its distinctive culture.  Gaelic was Highland, but the Highlands were 
not necessarily Gaelic.  As a geographical line, this thesis follows the model of Walker‟s 
Gaelic speaking parishes, c.1765-1769, encompassing everything west of a line from 
Loch Lomond through Crieff, Dunkeld, Blairgowrie, Ballater, Strathbogie, and Nairn, 
excluding the tip of Cromarty, and six parishes of upper Caithness.  But this geographical 
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line is far less meaningful than the abstract self-identification of Gaels and non-Gaels 
alike as Highlanders.  And as a distinctive cultural identity was forged in a large part on 
the martial virtues of the Highland regiments, the regiments themselves serve as the most 
salient „regional‟ line within this study.  Lt. Colonel John Small of the 84
th
 Foot serves as 
a paradigm of the methodology behind this approach.  Born in Atholl, Small served in 
the 42
nd
 Foot during the Seven Years‟ War and commanded the 2
nd
 Battalion of the 
Royal Highland Emigrants from 1775.  He spoke fluent Gaelic and was a tireless 
advocate of his soldiers‟ rights.  Small, however, largely operated in an Anglophone 
world.  He spent much of his career in the 21
st
 Foot and was well integrated into British 
and colonial society, being a personal friend of Thomas Gage and Israel Putnam.  To 
reject Small from our analysis on the grounds of his primary linguistic context would 
only be to reinforce the ostracism of the Gaelic Highlands. 
While the term Highland or Highlands is used as the basic pronoun of this study, 
there were myriad differences across the region which were important and will be drawn 
out in the subsequent chapters.  Recruiting, for example, was most heavily focused on 
Argyll, upper Perthshire, and the eastern Highlands.  Military service developed from 
localized contexts.  Captain John Macpherson, a middle-ranking member of the fir-taca 
(lit. supporting men, sing. fear-taca) class who lived at Ballachroan near Kingussie, had 
a deserved reputation for violent coercive means of acquiring recruits, but rather than a 
sign of rigid social hierarchy, Macpherson‟s methods derived from looser social controls 
in places like Badenoch, compared with the Hebrides and west.
54
   As a significant 
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adjunct to this, it must also be noted that the eastern and central Highlands were the areas 
which saw the least growth in population in the second half of the eighteenth century, in 
contrast to Morvern, Moidart, Knoidart, and Torridon, where increases of at least fifty 
per cent were seen.
55
  While the exact interactions of population change and military 
service are beyond the scope of this thesis, it is safe to say that those areas most affected 
by military service were those going through massive socio-economic disruption.  
Rivalries between groups in the Highlands over military service, between sub-tenants, 
between different regiments, and between competing elites were also as important as the 
outward projection of Highland martial capabilities.   
This imperial narrative largely excludes the Indian sub-continent and is less 
concerned with Europe than with the empire.  Numbers are part of the rationale for this.  
Of the twenty-two battalions raised in this period, ten served in North America.  Two 
served in Germany during the latter stages of the Seven Years‟ War.  Five never left the 
British Isles and until the end of the Second Anglo-Mysore war in 1784, four battalions 
served in India.  Of greater consequence, the Indian sub-continent never held a place in 
the popular imagination of the Highlands to the same extent as North America, giving 
additional meaning to the dispatch of Highland battalions there.  A popular perception in 
the likelihood of death in the East Indies undercut its appeal among the landowning class 
and the rural poor, and for every Sir Hector Munro, who first returned to the region in 
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1765 much enriched by his service, there were hundreds who died or failed.
56
  A 
variation on Zipf‟s Law seems to have operated in this regard.  High levels of potential 
taxation, surplus native populations and a belief in the innate suitability of Indians as 
cultivators of the soil also meant that there was little support for land settlement in 
India.
57
  Without land, India could not provide long-term, respectable, and safe 
satisfaction of personal interest.  Worryingly for eighteenth-century Britons, it served the 
political nation with ambitious and corrupt men addicted to oriental luxuries and despotic 
tendencies.  These concerns were integral to the formation of empire and are part of this 
narrative, but they are less important in direct and physical terms in relation to the 
Highlands before 1783.   
This thesis is an explicit assertion of the force of imperial contacts in 
fundamentally altering political and social relationships within the Highlands.  It should 
not, however, be considered dogmatic in its privileging of imperial contacts; this thesis 
shares with recent historiography a regard for how important Europe and European 
concepts remained to the early British Empire.  A number of prominent works, each with 
their own exceptional contributions, have forced historians to reconsider the geo-strategic 
framework in which Hanoverian Britain operated.
58
  No longer can we see empire as the 
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dominant interest in eighteenth-century British foreign policy.  A cursory review of the 
personal letters, newspapers, and Gaelic texts of the period, which provides much of the 
source material for this thesis, demonstrates that Highland elites still looked to Europe.  
In one Gaelic poem, for example, it was reported that „Bithidh Breatuinn ‟s Erinn ‟s Eorp 
gu leir, Geur amhrac Ghàoidhl Albnach [Britain and Ireland and all of Europe will be 
observing the Gael]‟ when they went to fight in America.  News from Europe was much 
sought after and available in the Highlands.
59
  Where this thesis draws a distinguishing 
line is that much of this recent scholarship concerns the pre-Seven Years‟ War period, 
that is, before territorial expansion in 1763 determined a more dualistic, if far from 
discrete, divide between Europe and empire.  Even as early as the Glorious Revolution, 
as Steve Pincus has shown, Englishmen were investing in the empire and the Glorious 
Revolution was both a consequence of and driving-force behind Britain‟s changing 
relationship with her overseas possessions.
60
  This thesis is the exploration of the impact 
of imperial contacts during and after the Seven Years‟ War in microcosm, focusing on a 
small region in which military-driven territorial expansion served an important function.    
   
 
IV   SOURCES 
The use of source material in Highland historiography presents a particularly 
controversial problem.  Highland historiography remains an emotive battleground where 
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agenda-driven history often co-opts certain evidence to portray a narrative largely 
misrepresentative of the people such history seeks to commemorate.  The other more 
significant limitation remains the relative dearth of source material.  Illiteracy was 
prevalent in the region in this period and few sources written from the Highland soldier‟s 
perspective have emerged.  The Library of Congress catalogue contains some ninety-
three personal accounts by British participants in the War of American Independence.  
Only five, however, were written by Highlanders or men from the Highland regiments, 
none of whom was from the rank-and-file.  Compare this with the twenty-five personal 
narratives by soldiers of the German states which include officers‟ accounts and entire 
journals by enlisted men.
61
  Personal accounts by enlisted soldiers from the Seven Years‟ 
War are equally sparse.  One was written by an Irish recruit of the 77
th
 Foot, Robert Kirk.  
There is also a largely fictionalized account of one veteran, and another written down by 
the soldier‟s son, from his father‟s stories, in 1828.  All three are useful, but they hardly 
constitute a wealth of material.
62
  Kirk‟s memoir, for example, was seemingly more 
concerned with describing America and its indigenous population than with the conflict 
in which he had taken part.  From this, however, the utility of the source becomes more 
evident.  Kirk‟s overriding concern was not conflict but environment, a fascinating 
insight into eighteenth-century imperatives. 
This thesis attempts, where possible, to use the writings of enlisted soldiers.  In 
the absence of direct narrative accounts, and no more than a dozen written letters, this 
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thesis relies on the unenviable expedient of interpreting the soldiers‟ experience from the 
perspective of their social superiors.  Thousands of letters written by Highland-born 
officers survive in various archives across the Atlantic world.  These have served as the 
principal resource of this work, but they have been used as much as possible to support a 
bottom-up study.  The greatest concentration of letters is in the National Archives of 
Scotland, but I have tried to explore less-utilized sources.  Most interesting are sources 
from archives in North America, including Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa, 
Provincial Archives and Records Management, Prince Edward Island, and the 
Huntington Library, San Marino, all previously under-utilized by British historians.  I 
have relied as much as possible on the letters of young and junior officers as they were 
more intimately connected to their soldiers.  Owing to the widespread interest in the 
Highland regiments, few of these sources have not been investigated in recent memory, 
but there are notable exceptions which add much to our understanding.  The letters of 
James Maclagan, chaplain of the 42
nd
 Foot, at the Dundee City Archives, for example, 
part of which were written in Gaelic, are remarkable. 
Without consulting various Gaelic sources, for which I had immeasurable help, 
this thesis would have been much weaker.  The rationale for utilizing Gaelic texts is not 
simply to provide a veneer of bilingual history.  Vernacular song was still the main outlet 
for Gaelic public opinion during this period, the later notion of the writer as an individual 
writer not appearing fully until the nineteenth century.
63
  This was no stasis, however, 
and the change from the poet as sponsored-patron of the chief to mouth-piece of the 
community was a phenomenal cultural change.  As Wilson Mcleod has highlighted, 
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however, blanket acceptance that the artist represented the community is problematic and, 
at the very least, requires „elaboration and qualification‟.  The highly-stylized fashion of 
Gaelic song is, for example, a barrier to a literal understanding of song as a statement of 
fact.
64
  In analysing how the Highland soldier was interpreted in the region, however, 
Gaelic texts are essential.  These come in the form of printed material published during 
and after the period.  I have largely rejected songs attributed to the period, but published 
much later, there being the possibility of vast alterations to the original text.  The most 
successful printed books of Gaelic songs, the collections of John Gillies and Donald and 
Alexander Stewart, both contained a number of poems addressed or attributed to 
Highland soldiers.
65
  A special mention must go to Michael Newton, whose We‟re 
Indians sure Enough: The Legacy of the Scottish Highlanders in North America 
(Richmond: Saorsa, 2001) feature many of the poems and songs used in this thesis with 
translations.  I returned to the original sources for the completion of this work, but his 
vastly superior knowledge of the Gaelic world made my own meagre tapping of these 
resources possible.
66
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V   STRUCTURE 
The chapters that follow are an exploration of the experiences and impacts of Highland 
soldiers in British North America, emphasizing themes that are fundamental to any larger 
exploration of the army‟s role as a facilitator of empire.  The actions of Highland soldiers 
made huge inroads on the popular psyche of the Highlands, often at odds with the 
realities of imperial service.  For this reason, the division of this thesis into broad, but 
linked parts is essential.  Volume I focuses on the experiences of Highland soldiers.  
Chapter 1 examines recruitment and the political discourses that impacted upon the 
development of raising Highland regiments.  Analysis of recruitment helps establish just 
how invested the region as a whole was in the ideals of eighteenth-century British 
political economy.  Chapter 2 focuses on the experiences of combat.  It places particular 
emphasis on how Highland soldiers behaved in the new world, a subject with a 
problematic historiography.  Chapter 3 investigates social relations in the early Highland 
regiments, articulating the significant divisions which existed, individualizing the agency 
of the Highland soldier. Chapter 4 ends Volume I with a discussion of imperial 
settlement and the intrinsic role played by Highland soldiers in imperial conquest.  
Volume II focuses on impacts, particularly the use of the imperial environment to serve 
regional ends.  Chapter 5 examines loyalty and personal interest in a transatlantic 
perspective.  Through the availability of American land, land being central to Highland 
conceptions of place, the chapter investigates an emerging pro-government political 
establishment in the Highlands, formed in great part due to imperial military service. The 
thesis concludes with Chapter 6, an analysis of how the Highland soldier impacted upon 
Gaelic self-perception in ways which utterly dispute the established and popular 
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narratives of the region.  As a whole, the thesis centres military service in the empire as 
the single most important factor in the development of the Highlands in the late 
eighteenth century.         
 
 
VI   APPROACH 
This is a narrative of centres and peripheries, but one in which the imperial state is 
partially built in the periphery.  Highlanders articulated their place as within the 
boundaries of an imperial project.  James Maclagan, for example, described the 
Corrieyairack Pass as the highest in the „British dominions‟, excepting those through the 
Allegany Mountains.
67
  The empire was not the preserve of intellectual or political elites, 
but a meaningful concept to the many people who interacted with it.  This is not simply 
decentralizing revisionist history; the Highland / North American relationship had 
meaningful consequences for how Highlanders engaged with the imperial polity.  And 
there was never any single imposed metropolitan ideal of empire.   
Many Highlanders in the late eighteenth century were imperially-situated people.  
The region‟s experiences do not reveal exceptionalism, but a variant on a characteristic 
of many people in a global age of empires.  They did not, as a group, understand the 
empire through subjugation, but through their own myriad reactions to the emergence of 
empire.  In order to understand the region‟s development it must be placed in this 
imperial, rather than national, context.  The converse is equally relevant.  In order to 
understand the structural dynamics of eighteenth-century imperialism (if we can affix ism 
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to the underdeveloped theories of British expansion in the period) we must understand, 










































A PERFECT PURGATORY: NEGOTIATIONS OF AUTHORITY IN 
HIGHLAND RECRUITING 
 




The ministerial commitment to send large numbers of Highland soldiers to North 
America began in the office of Thomas Gore, Commissary General of Musters, in 
Whitehall on 4
 
January 1757.  On that day, William Pitt had signed his name to a warrant 





the first of two Highland battalions which would follow the 42
nd
 Foot across the Atlantic 
that year.
1
  It was events over 500 miles to the north, however, that truly mattered.  In 
mid-March, John McPhail, a 24-year-old Appin man stood before the local Baillie of the 
forfeited Locheil estate, and placed a mark next to where his name had been written.  
After being read the Articles of War, explaining the military discipline he was agreeing 
to now live by, and having taken an oath of loyalty to George II and the protestant 
Hanoverian settlement, McPhail was formally enlisted into the 62
nd
 Foot.  There may 
have been worlds of difference between Pitt, Montgomery, and McPhail, but all had now 
entered into a grand contract.  All hoped to gain in some way from the avenues of 
opportunity presented by the fiscal-military state and Britain‟s involvement in the Seven 
Years‟ War.  It would be easy to see these commitments as inequitable, of relative worth, 
dominated by the social, political and economic hierarchies of the eighteenth-century 
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world.  The inferiority of McPhail in this world was utterly assured.  It would be a 
mistake, however, to presume that the relative worth of their commitments operated in a 
vacuum.  In recruiting for the army, the interests of thousands of men like McPhail 
would prove just as important, if less well understood, than those of any of the men who 
considered themselves to be his superior.
2
 
 Hierarchy was an intrinsic part of the Highlands and the Highland regiments. 
To understand this as a clan-based system of military recruitment, however, seriously 
misrepresents the social and political systems operating in the Highlands by the late 
1750s.  Clanship, while it still held an enamouring appeal among Highland elites, had 
ceased to be a legitimate form of political authority in the region.  The Highland elite, 
particularly in the south and east, were commercial landowners whose primary concern 
was the financial viability of their ancestral lands, an imperative that relied on the 
payment of rent in specie.
3
  It was the perceived financial benefits of recruiting that 
meant that the needs of the fiscal-military state were thoroughly embraced by regional 
elites, for whom regiment raising was an attractive form of economic diversification, a 
rational response to the demands of a commercial society.  The middling and upper ranks 
of Highland society, providing the bulk of the officer class, utilized their dirigiste control 
over the lives of their tenants to enlist men, simultaneously cementing their own place in 
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the social hierarchy of the Highlands.  Metropolitan perceptions that the region‟s 
manpower could be quickly and easily mobilized, views fully encouraged by local elites, 
created a regional peculiarity with the Highlands as the recruiting ground par 
excellence.
4
  In recognition of this, there has emerged an emphasis on coercion as a 
source of Highland manpower in the historiography.  Coercion could be direct, involving 
the cynical exploitation of state-backed violence to enlist men, or passive, operating as an 
economic damoclean sword on the rural poor.  In an hierarchical society, all relationships 
were to some degree or another coercive.  Some interpretations, however, remain 
predicated on a more simplistic strict division of authority and marginality.  The 
subordination of the common soldiery to the imperatives of the inequitable world in 
which they lived has been overemphasized by the vague and ill-defined line between 
elite and government interest.  There was considerable overlap between government, 
civil administrators, regional elites, and army officers.  Justices of the Peace [JPs] were 
instrumental in enforcing the Press Acts, and many of those responsible for recruiting, 
and the officers and landlords benefiting from it, were tied to the same interest, or were 
even the same individuals.
5
   
As a result of this assumption of unity, historians have neglected the intimate 
processes of recruitment, and the relationship between recruitment and wider questions 
of authority, jurisdiction, civil liberties and the politicization of the Highlands.  
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Highlanders, to a greater degree than other marginal people throughout the British Isles, 
are seen to have suffered through the interaction of poverty and powerlessness, and a 
civil government fearful of further Jacobite risings and willing to co-opt them as cannon-
fodder for imperial expansion.
6
  Interpretively, there has been a conflation of authority 
with jurisdiction, combining them in the figure of the Highland landowner.  As we shall 
see, authority and jurisdiction were very distinct concepts. 
This chapter will confront the significant political debates in the Highlands over 
recruiting and the strictures which operated upon would-be recruiters.  The region was 
far from exceptional and the context of recruiting reveals the extent to which the 
Highlands were already integrated into the wider discourses of the British Atlantic world.  
To demonstrate this, this chapter draws the dividing line in recruiting between military 
and civilian interests, rather than between a unified elite operating on a marginalized 
rural poor.  While it is utterly correct to avoid ahistoric constructions of definable 
„military‟ and „civilian‟ spheres in the eighteenth century, to characterize involvement in 
the fiscal-military state as no more than an extension of economic taxonomy, is to miss 
the opportunity to confront the significant demands placed on the Highlands by 
recruitment.  The political utility of soldiering created conditions that were ideologically 
and culturally divisive as well as economically so.  The dividing line in this complex 
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phenomenon was advantage and interest rather than wealth or power; it was possible for 
all social ranks to be arrayed along either side of this more complex axis. 
In the aftermath of the Jacobite rebellion, traditional hierarchies and power-bases 
were increasingly antithetical to ministerial plans for the region.  This had immense 
consequences for how recruiting was conducted.  Elite engagement as part of a wider 
pan-British aristocracy reveals that while military service was a disproportionate regional 
response to the state, the depth of this engagement provoked concern as well as approval.  
There was no absolute correlation between state interests and local aspirations.  It is the 
role of the poor in recruitment, however, that is most remarkable.  The divide between 
military and civil interests was increased by the willingness of the poor to seek advantage 
from military service.  They were also instrumental and willing actors in facilitating the 
extension of the military entrepreneurship in the Highlands.  While the risk may have 
been greater, the potential gains relatively limited, the rank-and-file were adept in 
colonizing the fiscal-military state, at least within the allowed limits of their 
circumstances. 
Most significantly, there was a considerable shift in the negotiation position of 
various regional actors under the pressures of the fiscal-military state.  The change can be 
charted by the speed with which Highland people adapted to a new imperative and used 
military service as leverage in social negotiations that would continue long into the 
nineteenth century.  Given the right conditions, therefore, questions of authority and 
debates over the impact of the fiscal-military state could permeate the lives of some of 
the most marginal people in the eighteenth-century British Isles and directly contribute to 




I   THE ARMY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
Viewed as a linear process, it is perhaps easy to presume that a firm alliance existed 
between national and local interests over recruiting.  As Simon Fraser, colonel of the 78
th
 
Foot had argued, „[The] Strength and operation of government, is like the operation of 
fire, which burns from the centre outwards, rarely from the circumference inwards‟.
7
  
The interest of government could easily be translated into a given locality through the 
widespread overlap between landed interest and local administration, and most officials 
had strong ties to the county and local magnates.  All Commissioners of Supply 
(responsible for collecting land taxes and organizing local government) and JPs 
(responsible for law and order) were to be local freeholders with land valued at over 400 
pound Scots per annum.
8
  The value of the land was decided by those same 
Commissioners who, in turn, elected the officials from among their own number.  In the 
mid-eighteenth century, approximately three per cent of people paid land tax, ensuring 
that only a tiny minority could have been appointed as JPs or Commissioners.
9
  If those 
same individuals had a vested interest in the expansion of recruiting, legal power was 
easily manipulated to those ends.  
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An analysis of local conditions, however, questions the degree to which the 
Highland soldier was the victim of a coherent elite, operating in unison with government.  
Local government had never been designed to ensure that interested parties could raise 
men in times of war.  None of their functions offered the recruiting officer much in the 
way of assistance.  While attestations had to be made in front of a civil official, their 
power did not extend much beyond this.  Magistrates could send criminals into the army, 
but the criminal class of recruit only ever accounted for a small minority, and has always 
been over-represented in stereotypes of the British army.
10
  It would also be a mistake to 
overestimate the effectiveness of local government in carrying out any directives or 
interests connected with the state.  Corruption, rivalries, poor pay, ineptitude, and feeble 
legal backing ensured that local government worked effectively in the maintenance of the 
status quo, but did little else.  Perhaps more significant, the propertied qualifications for 
JPs were flagrantly ignored, owing largely to the unwillingness of resident landowners to 
accept a commission.  While still the preserve of elites, the office, therefore, was open to 
an increasingly wide spectrum.
11
  Most important, local government was increasingly a 
means of curbing the power of local elites vis à vis the state, not a means of facilitating 
the expansion of their interest. 
This was not an insignificant point given the extent to which the supposed „cruel 
and stupefying [sic]‟ „Tyranny of the Chiefs‟ had been blamed for the Jacobite rebellion, 
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prompting the abolition of Heritable Jurisdictions in 1747.
12
  The Heritable Jurisdictions 
(Scotland) Act (20 Geo. II, c.43) was considered by Prime Minister Henry Pelham as the 
most important statute for dealing with the Highland problem, eclipsing statutes such as 
the Disarming Act (19 Geo. II, c.39), the Attainder Act (19 Geo. II, c.26), and the 
Vesting Act (20 Geo. II, c.41).  The Disarming Act was designed to disarm entirely 
Scotland north of the Forth and to proscribe Highland dress.  The Attainder Act allowed 
captured Jacobites to be declared guilty of treason without recourse to trial, while the 
Vesting Act saw the forfeiture of the major Jacobite estates.  Prior to the abolition of 
heritable jurisdictions, landed elites had exercised judicial control over both civil and 
criminal cases as hereditary local sheriffs.  Hereditary jurisdictions had increased in the 
late seventeenth century and by the eighteenth century two-thirds of Scottish sheriffdoms 
were operated in this way.  It was estimated in 1748 that the value of all heritable civil 
appointments in Scotland was worth £589,588 to the incumbents.
13
  Such judicial power, 
it was thought, had created the conditions for chiefs to coerce their clansmen into 
rebellion against the Hanoverian regime.  Abolition permitted the crown to appoint 
salaried Sheriff-Deputes as their judicial replacements, with eligibility requiring 
qualifications as an advocate.  
There were inherent problems in the new system that had to be overcome.  The 
Inverness jurisdiction, extending toward Lochaber and to Skye, was the area of most 
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concern for the government and required a „young man of spirit‟ to enforce the laws; but 
such a qualified individual could not be expected to give up his lucrative practice in 
Edinburgh, the result being that he would be resident in the Highlands for only four 
months of the year.  In certain localities, the Sheriff-Deputes were, therefore, to be 
assisted by Sheriff-Substitutes, though they were not required to have legal qualifications 
until 1818.  In addition, the resigning heritable sheriffs were often called upon to 
recommend the new incumbents, which were accepted in Sutherland and Caithness 
(areas which had remained loyal in 1745), forging partial continuity with the old 
system.
14
  Local administration still consisted of the most significant landed elite and the 
significant number of Highland gentry in the legal profession still provided a close link 
between landed interest and the law. Nevertheless, judicial powers had been 
professionalized and local monopolies over the legal system weakened.  The crown had 
taken a significant step towards extending its jurisdiction in the region.  
What the Act had done was to draw an explicit line in the Highlands between 
authority and jurisdiction.  Authority implied the power, and sometimes the right, to 
enforce obedience upon other individuals.  The authority of Highland elites was 
entrenched through their control over landownership and was an entirely acceptable 
means of social governance.  Nowhere in elite Georgian society were there any 
suggestions that hierarchical landownership was not most preferable.  This was different 
from jurisdiction, however.  There was far less enthusiasm for Highland elites to possess 
jurisdiction, to have a role in the administration of justice, the declaring and 
administering of the law.  Elite jurisdiction was vastly reduced, except where they were 
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qualified advocates and subordinated to the court system and to the constitutional 
monarch.  This suggested two things.  First, that this was prima facie an extension of the 
policy of direct rule, subordinating local elites to central government.  Second, and 
partially contradictory but far more significant, local qualified advocates and their 
staunch Whig patrons were given a more central role in the administration of the region.  
Far from exposing the region to overwhelming imperial subordination, therefore, the 
Hereditable Jurisdictions Act recognized the continuing utility of local rule and 
patronage.  The region was not, therefore, a conquered and pacified region, devoid of 
agency in the construction of the strategic relationship between centre and periphery.  
The problematic institution in this process was the army.  It quickly became 
obvious to the military authorities that further subordination of the Highlands was 
necessary if judicial authority was to be the basis of local administration.  A succession 
of Commanders-in-Chief in Scotland complained about the inability of the military to 
root out rebelliousness in the face of civil obstinacy.  Their perception that all Scots were 
Jacobites was unquestionable wrong, but they were right that there was a great deal of 
resistance to military rule in the region.  Most British officers shared the belief that the 
army could act as a civilizing force in the Highlands.
15
  They found, however, that this 
would have to be done against the will of local magistrates, rather than in full 
cooperation with them.  Less than three years before the start of widespread recruiting in 
the Highlands in the winter of 1756-57, Scotland‟s Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-
General Humphrey Bland, complained that the greatest barrier to the military‟s 
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subjugation of the Highlands were local civil powers.  The army, Bland claimed, could 
only carry out effective measures to alter the region if civil administrators cooperated, 
„but there lies the difficulties we are to struggle with‟.  According to Bland, in the 
Inverness region, no JP was willing to assist the army in hunting down Jacobites or 
prosecuting tenants for violations of the post-Culloden acts of parliament.  As such, 
Bland continued, the military was „obliged to act frequently in points not all together as 
the law directs‟.  His solution was extra-legal and revealing.  There would be more 
British officers appointed as JPs in the Highland counties, especially Inverness, Lochaber 
and the Isles.  In pursuit of this, Bland attached a list of British officers (no longer extant) 
he deemed suitable to be made JPs in the aforementioned counties.  In effect, the army 
was to co-opt civil power to achieve its ends.
16
  The depth of this desire is difficult to 
ascertain; the army was an instrument designed principally to defend the state.  The 
aftermath of the Jacobite rebellion of 1745, however, marked a critical stage in 
ministerial thinking on the problems of loyalty and civility where there was scope for the 
army‟s application.  Bland‟s objectives concerned the suppression of Jacobitism, but, if 
the Highlands were to be changed, then occupation had to do more than raise the loyal 
and punish the disloyal.  It had to ensure that Highlanders were forever freed from 
slavery and dependence.  As such, civic failures to bring prosecutions were the 
metaphorical tip of the iceberg in a conflict that was seen as a problem of state security 
being threatened by entrenched localism and judicial foot-dragging.
17
  On the estates of 
the Duke of Argyll, for example, it appears as if the duke continued to exert control over 
                                                 
16
 TNA, SP54/44, f. 67, Bland to the Earl of Holderness, 13 Jun. 1754. 
17
 TNA, SP54/44, f. 73, Bland to Lady Margaret Macdonald, 12 Jun. 1754; TNA, SP54/44, f. 18, Bland to 
Holderness, 13 Apr. 1754; TNA, SP54/44, f. 129, Bland to Holderness, 13 Aug. 1754. 
46 
 
the appointed Sheriff-Depute and was confident that warrants for the sequestering of 
cattle in lieu of late rents would invariably be issued.  Alternatively, there can be little 
doubt that part of the problem was resistance to the imposition of parliamentary law onto 
the Scottish legal system, which was the most broadly popular and least divisive issue in 
eighteenth-century Scottish national identity.
18
  When recruitment for the Highland 
regiments began in earnest, in 1757, these tensions were very much current. 
Local elites were equally as mindful as Bland about the uneasy relationship 
between the army and local politics.  The resistance of local elites and magistrates to the 
military was intended to safeguard their judicial powers, but it would be an error to 
presume that Whig discourses on rights and liberties were absent from these regional 
problems.  Eighteenth-century British societies believed that the threat of military control 
was a very real possibility.  Not only were standing armies the portent of tyranny, but 
they denigrated society, made it morally weak and curtailed individual rights.  The 
British army, it was thought, introduced „brutal debauchery and real cowardice‟, as well 
as „venal haughtiness‟.
19
  The Highland elite were worldly and cosmopolitan, and if their 
urban lifestyles were the source of a great deal of criticism in the Gàidhealtachd, they 
identified themselves with the interests of the British landed aristocracy in a wider sense.  
Dominant themes of what it meant to be a member of the elite in British society were less 
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ethnically specific than was once thought, allowing widespread, if not uncritical, 
identification with the post-1689 constitutional settlement.
20
  James Grant, who would 
later serve as an officer in North America, informed his tutor in 1756 of his intention of 
reading Locke‟s „On Civil Government‟ [Two Treatises of Government (London, 1689)].  
The reply was encouraging: „The principles of Locke are the principles of Liberty which 
no man should be a stranger to ... God almighty never created 9 or 10 million of his 
creatures with saddles on their backs, and bridals in their mouths, & one man to mount 
them for no reason or view, but to use them as beasts of burden‟.  The tutor added that he 
should also read the „excellent laws of K[ing] Alfred, the father of English liberty‟.  The 
books possessed by Highland elites included works written by John Locke, David Hume, 
Samuel von Pufendorf, and Sir William Blackstone.  According to one Highland officer, 
Alexander Campbell, who was wounded at Breed‟s Hill in 1775, the rebellion of the 
American colonies was the product of an assault on liberty, not by Parliament but by 
„desperate men‟; this Highlander was not oblivious to the dangers of a populace ceding 
control of their affairs to a military and government more willing to „Calculate to oppress 
their country than protect them‟.
21
  As such, many Highland grandees were as 
hypersensitive to conceptions of liberty as most Anglo-American elites.  The third Duke 
of Argyll, for example, had objected to the Heritable Jurisdictions Act (which robbed 
him of the hereditary justiciarship of Scotland) on the grounds that decentralized 
jurisdictions were a check on the crown and therefore a bulwark of liberty.  Philip Yorke, 
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first Earl of Hardwicke, the head of the Council of Regency and the legal mind behind 
the Act, countered that, thanks to the Glorious Revolution and the imposed limits on the 
royal prerogative, liberty was secure in Britain and was most under threat from the 
conflating of local authority with judicial power.
22
  In a sense, the Highlands became an 
ideological battleground for the benefits of British liberty and a case study for the 
practical application of an imperial hegemony in which liberty was an essential 
component.   
This was not lost on the American revolutionaries of the 1770s, and the British 
state‟s treatment of the Highlands was marked out as evidence of the „wanton acts of 
cruelty‟, which were an insightful „reflection on the national character [of the English].‟  
One American contributor spoke to the fascinating fluidity of ethnic traits in the British 
Atlantic world when he argued that the Highlands of Scotland were a kinder and more 
benevolent place than England, the later being inhabited by people of great cruelty.
23
  
The key reason the post-1746 Highlands saw social engineering on an unprecedented 
scale was not necessarily fear of the martial capacities of the clansmen, but the 
misguided need to reorder Highland society, to modernize and improve it.  Most 
critically, the Highland poor had to be removed from dependence and the tyranny of their 
superiors, so that perceived martial capacities were not misused. 
What did this political context mean to the actual process of recruiting?  
Adherence to these politically contentious discourses circumscribed the limits of 
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arbitrary authority in the Highlands and defined the socially acceptable context of 
recruiting.  The most significant civil role in recruitment was the JP, who was legally 
charged to assist the military.  Historians have noted that the powers enjoyed by JPs in 
the period were precisely those most likely to bring them into conflict with the common 
people, and have taken a dismal view of the activities of JPs, particularly in the 
Highlands.
24
  In the case of regional recruitment, a more complex picture emerges.  With 
the JPs‟ primary consideration being the maintenance of order in their locality, it is not to 
be assumed that this consideration was easily relegated in the interests of recruitment.  
With late eighteenth-century recruitment being so infamous in its disregard for the 
welfare of the poor, the potential for recruiting officers to impede this primary role was 
massive. 
  This was exemplified in February 1762, when Duncan Campbell of Glenure, the 
Sheriff-Substitute for Killin in Perthshire, arrested a local man, Peter Ferrol, for a 
violation of the Disarming Act of 1746.  Ferrol had been brought before him for wearing 
the outlawed „Highland dress‟ and in accordance with the law, Glenure forcibly enlisted 
Ferrol into the army as punishment.  The case proved contentious, however, there being 
some question over whether Ferrol had actually worn tartan or whether Glenure had 
abused the legal powers of the act as a pretext to recruit for his relatives who held 
military commissions.  The objection came from Archibald Campbell, the presiding JP 
for Killin.  In his objections, Archibald pointed to his very real professional interest as a 
JP, stating, „It is my inclination to encourage the Recruiting of His Majesty‟s forces, & 
wou‟d very willingly give my assistance to any of your friends, for that purpose‟.  To 
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Archibald, however, it was entirely unacceptable to „make use of the Law to cover 
Irregularities … it is not agreeable to Law to seize a person, that wears a Cover of Black 
and White‟.  Of course, Archibald‟s concern was not simply the upholding of the law, 
but the prevention of unnecessary criticism of the Campbell family; as he explained, „I 
need not mention to you, that the manner of recruiting in the Country about you has 
made rather too much noise for some time past‟.  Even so, his local role as a JP 
conflicted with Glenure‟s methods and Archibald directed that, if Ferrol were not 
charged with any unlawful behaviour, „you will give him his liberty‟.  Perhaps most 
significantly, Archibald asserted that the release of Ferrol would actually be beneficial to 
Duncan „as it maybe obliging to him who wishes to be always esteem‟d‟.
25
  In effect, if 
Duncan was to be respected in the area, lawful actions were more effective than the 
abuse of arbitrary authority.  As H.T. Dickinson has observed, while governing elites 
accepted that active political rights did not extend to all subjects, they agreed that all 
should enjoy certain civil liberties and protection from potential abuses.  By this 
construction, elites became prisoners of their own ideological rhetoric, unable to use truly 
arbitrary power to suppress grievances against their policies.
26
 
Cases like this were replicated across the major recruiting areas of the Highlands, 
Argyll, Perthshire, and the Grant lands of the north-east.  While officially required to 
assist the army, magistrates often feared their occupational identity was being threatened 
enough to regret that they had done anything to help recruiting officers.  They could not 
„shut their eyes and permit his Majesty‟s subjects to be treated in [such] a manner‟ and 
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genuinely feared that war-time conditions would permit the military to dictate to the civil 
powers in a manner „never yet heard of‟.  Reports that men were being taken and charged 
by the military powers without recourse to civil law came from several jurisdictions.  On 
the fourth Duke of Gordon‟s estates, it had taken the officers of his step-father, Colonel 
Staats Long Morris, some time to find a compliant local magistrate who would enlist 
men after widespread coercion had been reported in the recruitment of the 89
th
 Foot in 
1759.
27
  Fears over the military‟s methods in the Highlands were taken up in political 
pamphlets and not everyone condoned direct coercion as an effective method of 
enlistment.
28
  There were even cases of prosecutions of soldiers for their coercive 
practices and the overlap between local administration and landed interest was 
sometimes employed not to ease recruiting, but to intercede in the lawsuits brought 
against recruiters.  Ewan Cameron, an officer in the 71
st
 Foot, asked his father-in-law, 
Duncan Campbell of Glenure, to intercede in a case in 1778, when the leader of his 
recruiting party faced a lawsuit over accusations of coercion in the enlistment of 
fishermen in Nairn.
29
  There was little that could be done, however, if, as in one case, 
soldiers brutally assaulted a local artisan and beat him repeatedly in front of a dozen 
witnesses.  Of this case, which was instigated when a rumour spread that the artisan had 
been a Jacobite, the official reported that he was „sorry those fellows who I‟m sure are 
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designed for the protection and peace of the country, should become Disturbers of it‟.
30
  
The extent to which civil officials actively worked with recruiters to a common end is 
questioned by a review of the origins of Highland recruits to the 78
th
 Foot in 1757.  Hugh 
Rose of Geddes, for example, was the Sheriff-Depute of Ross and Cromarty at the same 
time as his brother-in-law was recruiting a company for the regiment.  Geddes‟ area of 




JPs even took a proactive role in the safeguarding of local people who had 
enlisted in the army.  In Perthshire, JPs pressured the army to ensure that the personal 
effects and back-pay of deceased soldiers was delivered to their relatives.  In conjunction 
with letters written by local ministers, JPs made out certificates for the families of several 
enlisted men of the 42
nd
 Foot who had died while on active service in America during the 
Seven Years‟ War.  Such certificates, given to often illiterate siblings, ensured that the 
army could not avoid its responsibilities towards the families of dead soldiers or, as in 
the case of Sergeant James Grant, that other claimants would not supersede the rightful 
claims of his brothers to his effects.  When these certificates proved insufficient evidence 
for a claim, letters from JPs, or their assistants, were sent directly to the man‟s 
commanding officer.  In the case of Adam Stuart, whose credit had helped Lord John 
Murray raise a company of the 42
nd
 Foot, it appears as if the wife of deceased soldier had 
been so much trouble that the motivation for him writing was to give himself a reprieve 
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  The local minister of Glenorchy and two JPs would sign an 
affidavit in 1789 which requested that a returned veteran and his family were „real 
objects of Charity‟.  It was through such interventions that money was raised to allow the 




The army was aware of mounting criticism it received as the establishment 
expanded to deal with costly imperial wars.  In light of this, the army consciously and 
repeatedly subordinated itself to civil powers.  By 1780, recruiting instructions for the 
Highland regiments made it clear to officers that local officials had to be informed if 
recruiting was to take place and that all soldiers were to give „due respect to civil 
magistrates‟ during the process.  The consequences of illegal measures were indicated, 
the reputation of the corps being adversely affected and the potential for future recruiting 
damaged.
34
  Throughout the British Isles, the army willingly ceded authority in 
controversial matters to civil officials, and there was a fear in both civil and military 
circles of being held accountable for popular disturbances.  Sir Ralph Abercromby, for 
example, was forced to resign as the senior officer in Ireland after his orders that troops 
were not to open fire without the permission of a magistrate were rescinded by the Lord 
Lieutenant, Lord Camden.  This removed the army from civilian control and was partly 
responsible for the military excesses of the following year: 1798.  The subordination of 
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the army to civil officials was generally considered essential to the deployment and use 
of the British army.  The only exception that was made prior to 1783 was in the 
American colonies and, even then, permission for British officers to act against 
disturbances without the consent of local magistrates was only granted in March 1775, 
less than a month before Lexington and Concord.  This led to bizarre incidents such as 
the one Major Alexander Macdonald reported in early 1775; while attempting to enlist 
Highland emigrants in Nova Scotia to put down any potential rebellion, Macdonald 
found himself having to defer to, and act under, the direction of a local JP, who was 
himself, „as great a rebel as any in New England‟.
35
 
Bland did not get his wish, nor did the military overcome civil obstinacy.  While 
a far greater analysis of the role of the military in local government is needed, for the 
extent to which the Highlands became one of the most heavily recruited places in the 
western world, no alternative military hierarchy replaced or assumed the power of civil 
magistrates, and there was no conspicuous effort to co-opt or subordinate civil law to 
military interests.  There was an increasing influence of military men in local government 
and a number of the Commissioners of Supply for Sutherland and Inverness were half-
pay officers.  It was not unknown for the Commissioners to apply to the Commander-in-
Chief to have quartering parties placed on the estates of landlords who were in arrears 
until the debt was paid.  Of the eighty-three registered freeholders in Elgin in 1786, 
seventeen held commissions in the army; others, including Sir Hector Munro of Novar, 
held commissions in the East India Company.  The contrast with other provincial towns 
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such as Dundee, where in the late 1770s not one of the fourteen town councillors was a 
military man, is striking.
36
  The percentage of the electorate that were military officers in 
the Highlands was 25.8 per cent, outstripping the Lowlands whose corresponding figure 
was 14.5 per cent.  Entire estate economies and land use were also adapted to facilitate 
military recruiting, but this was because of the material and social benefits to landed 
elites from such conversions, rather than a concerted ideology of militarism.
37
  
Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that military influence in the local 
government of the Highlands was sufficient to cancel out civil suspicion of the army or 




II   ELITES AND THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY 
If absolute unity did not exist amongst recruiters and magistrates, it should not be 
imagined that common status caused Highland elites to unite in the pursuit of acquiring 
men.  Increased military recruitment in the 1750s entered the elite mindset as part of the 
enlightened notion of „improvement‟.  Highland grandees looked to the enlightened 
sciences for the tools to fashion the Highlands into a „prosperous internal colony‟, 
satisfying to commercial viability, intellectual constructions of modernity, and imperial 
vitality.
38
  While military recruitment re-inscribed certain aspects of traditional systems, 
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namely the advocacy of non-rationalized sub-tenancy (which kept surplus populations on 
certain estates for recruiting purposes) it sustained this essential trinity.  Recruitment, 
however, conflicted with other population-based policies that were equally important.  
Some landlords actively discouraged the people on their estates from entering the army, 
for the simple reason that it was nonsensical for another to benefit from the estate‟s 
manpower.  Recruiting officers, rather than targeting estates where they might exercise 
socio-economic control over sub-tenants and cottars, often targeted neighbouring estates.  
Fearing loss of income and depopulation, there being a recognizable link between service 
and emigration, some landlords sought to shield their tenants from the army.  Alexander 
Macdougall, the hereditary chief of the clan, advised his tenants and their sons on how 
best to avoid being „Persuaded‟ into the army, suggestions which were replicated in 
Sutherland.  James Grant of Ballindalloch, who was deployed to America when 
recruiting began in the region during the War of American Independence, reported „tis to 
be hoped, [the 71
st
‟s] officers will keep clear of any Estate – If I had been at home I 
should have defended it. Carron [probably Ballindalloch‟s factor] will do his best‟.
39
  
Even with the Press Act in place, the reaction of elites was not always predictable.  One 
officer of the 76
th
 Foot even returned from Ireland to protect his tenants, „There is for 
certain a press act to take place & it will be dangerous not to strengthen the tenants 
against the attacks of others‟, he wrote.
40
  If military recruitment did fit into the sphere of 
estate economies, it also had to rival attempts to industrialize the estates of progressive 
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landlords and the ever present demand for hands to work the ground.  A mark of just how 
Highland tenants conceived of themselves as intrinsic to the operation of the estate is 
found in the petition of John Robertson, a tenant on the estates of the Duchess of Gordon.  




The potential disruption of recruiting parties to the internal workings of non-
military orientated estates created a counter-intuitive pattern: the spread of recruitment 
over vast geographical areas and a want of familiarity between officers and their men.  A 
key, but entirely understudied, figure in this was the recruiting agent.  The most 
expedient solution to the balancing of recruiting interest against tenant safety was the use 
of vast networks of recruiting agents spread across the British Isles, often family 
members but also business contacts, merchants, creditors, and sympathetic individuals 
with no familial relationships.  These networks were critical to the successful enlistment 
of men.  Patrick Campbell, a young officer whose father, Duncan Campbell, was an 
important figure in the northern Argyll elite, utilized a John Rob at Dunblane when he 
began recruiting in 1775, specifically outlining the details of what bounty he was willing 
to pay over and above the legal figure of £3 sterling.  He later attempted, in recognition 
of the utility on non-estate recruiting, to secure a commission by having his father 
intimate to the Duke of Argyll that his son‟s residence in Ireland meant the he could 
recruit „without draining Argyllshire of a man‟.
42
  Colin Campbell of the 71
st
 Foot 
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employed his cousin, Donald Cameron, to recruit for him.  As Cameron was at that time 
based in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, a number of men were recruited there, and marched to 
Edinburgh in early 1776.  Twenty others, destined for the 71
st
 Foot, were recruited in 
London.  According to official instructions, while permission was given to recruit 
anywhere in Britain, Lord Barrington, the Secretary at War, and George III, both 
disapproved of Highland regiments recruiting in England.  Any potential resistance to the 
recruitment of Englishmen could be bypassed, however: „Donald Cameron ought to be 
wrote to change the place of the Recruits‟ birth to the nearest Scots County‟.
43
  
Recruitment by agents could spread recruitment patterns over extensive areas (see 
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Figure 1.2   Origin of Recruits (Exact) for Captain Maxwell's and Captain Skelly‟s 
Company, 71
st
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A further advantage to agents was that they could permit recruitment to begin 
before a given officer was prepared (or legally allowed) to, giving potential officers an 
advantage over other recruiters.  Captain Charles Cathcart‟s accounts suggest that the 
majority of his men, ninety-one in total, were recruited for his company of the 77
th
 Foot 
in 1778 by agents.  It is likely, however, that agents did not necessarily provide a good 
return on recruiting and of the ninety-one men only forty-nine were accepted or did not 
subsequently desert.  In Perth, hired agents for the 77th Foot trawled the streets to seek 
out the most vulnerable to fill out the regiment.  This was in addition to the city council 
and the town‟s corporations who procured men by „parade[ing] the streets at night with 
flambeaux, offering high bounties, and the freedom of the trade to all who would come 
forward‟.
46
  Details such as these directly contradict the prevailing notion that a natural 
attachment to particular individuals prompted Highland enlistments.  While agents did 
not undertake a clearly defined role, the reliance upon them led to their semi-
professionalized place in regimental recruiting. 
What the use of agents suggests is that effective recruiting required the 
abandoning of the arbitrary methods that were seen to typify social relationships in the 
Highlands.  A high demand for men, coupled with the absence of socio-economic control 
through the diffusion of recruiting networks, brought monetary interactions to the fore of 
Highland recruiting.  Some potential recruits, particularly those with prior military 
experience or those whose physical attributes fitted the military ideal, were able to dictate 
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terms to recruiters.  They demanded large bounties for their military labour and played 
recruiting parties off against each other.  Rival parties complained that some officers 
„ruined‟ areas for recruiting by offering massively inflated bounties, making it 
impossible for less munificent officers to enlist men.
47
  After the defeat at Saratoga in 
1777, Lord North‟s administration permitted the formation of thirteen new battalions of 
infantry, altering the system of augmentations to existing regiments which had prevailed 
in the first three years of the American war.  The demands for manpower prompted 
widespread abuses of the system, of which poorer men took advantage.  In 1778, every 
single one of the 911 men recruited for the 77
th
 Foot cost the recruiter more than the 
regulated bounty.  John Macmillan received twenty-one pounds as a bounty for 
enlistment, the equivalent of over a year‟s pay for the average labourer, but deserted 
within a week.  Another individual, having accepted the bounty money, was rejected as 
unfit, but still proceeded to enlist in another regiment.  With the average rental on a 
smallholding in the central Highlands at this time standing around ten to twelve pounds, 
there was a massive economic incentive for enlistment.  This holds, particularly, when 
we consider that these were people of limited economic horizons who were experiencing 
increased rents and recent famine.
48
  The demand for manpower, however, had created 
similar problems as early as the 1750s.  Recruiters for the Argyll Fencibles in Kintyre in 
1759 faced local sub-tenants demanding „high premiums ... some ten, some fifteen 
guineas‟ as the condition for enlistment.
49
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Reduced to pure economics, military service was not unappealing.  The Minister 
of Ardclach, a parish in Moray which was predominately Gaelic-speaking, noted in 1792 
day-labourers could be satisfied with 6d. per day.  Taking inflation into account, it would 
have assured that the 6d. per day promised by military service in the 1770s, appeared 
economically sound, particularly when placed alongside the regulation £3 in bounty 
money.
50
  It is thought that the relative poverty of the Highlands contributed to 
recruitment, though bounties distributed elsewhere in the Atlantic region do show similar 
levels of monetary incentives.  By 1778, it even appears as if bounties being paid for 
enlistment in the Continental Army by the Treasury of the State of Pennsylvania or 
recruiters in Connecticut, for example, were several pounds sterling below the average 
being offered to Scottish Highlanders.  The problems faced by Continental Army 
recruiters in a monetary-based market of military labour would have been easily 
recognized by Highland recruiters.
51
  In one increasingly criticized narrative thread of the 
War of American Independence, the Continental Army consisted of patriotic farmers, 
rustic but blessed with zealous notions of individual rights and liberties, and deeply 
conscious of the assault on both by the machinations of Parliament and its standing army.  
It is an error, however, to apply rigid ethnic or regional structures onto what was a 
remarkably homogenous British Atlantic polity.  In terms of mobilization and concepts 
of military service, the Highlands were similar to Revolutionary America. Highland 
soldiers commanded a much higher price for their services than the supposedly worldly 
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and independent soldiers of the Continental Army.
52
  The Highlands were relatively 
impoverished, but the assumption that the region bred good soldiers exaggerated the 
value of Highland military labour.  This is not to say that all of the rural poor embraced 
the economic advantages of military service.  The reluctance of many Highlanders to 
enlist in the army is well-known.  The very reluctance of the poor to enlist combined to 
exaggerate the value of Highland military labour.     
Contributing to this problematic context was the youth of Highland officers, such 
as Allan Macdonald, whom we met in the introduction to this thesis.  The junior ranks of 
ensigns and lieutenants were the least experienced of the officer class, and sometimes 
demonstrated a naivety that was not surprising for that station.  When Patrick Campbell 
received his commission and beating orders in 1775, his first inclination was to send 
them to his brother, who might be able to recruit for him.  It was only in his postscript 
that he reconsidered; he correctly assumed that he would look „mightily foolish‟ without 
them.  Analysis of junior officers in the British army suggests that the average length of 
service from first commissioning for a lieutenant in the 1750s was approximately five 
years.  Owing to the determination of Highland families to provide for their offspring 
through military service, this fell to approximately two years in the Highland regiments, 
and in the case of the 2/42
nd
, raised for service in America in 1758, it was just 1.7 years 
(see Figure 1.3).  
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 Lt.-Col.  Major Captain Lieutenant  
1757  
Army average 










 Foot   
 
- - 11.6 1.7 
1759 
 Army  average 
15 19 14 5 
1777   
Army average 
30 23.5 17 10 
 
 
Stana Nenadic has demonstrated that the army was looked upon as a cheap, quasi-
education for young elites that was not only socially acceptable, but offered a vast range 
of potential benefits; the pay was stable regardless of performance, it required no prior 
skills base, it offered networking opportunities, and it enabled sons to live in modestly 
respectable circumstances.  The known average age of an ensign or lieutenant entering 
the 78
th
 Foot between 1757 and 1763 was twenty-three.  Only six were thirty or older and 
almost half were younger than twenty.   Elder officers took on the role of educating men, 
or boys, who, „got no education before [they] left the country‟.  A Major of the 77
th
 Foot 
noted that when he took a young ensign into his charge, „he really could hardly read or 
write‟, and that at present he would go home as only „fit to be a companion for a 
ploughman‟.
54
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These young officers were as much part of a coercive system as the rank-and-file.  
The influence of a family‟s patriarch on directing a son into the army was an important 
one.
55
  Once in the army, to achieve rank, potential officers had to acquire a certain 
number of men to be fully commissioned.  A lieutenancy could be made by the 
enlistment of forty men.  Alternatively, after 1766, an ensigncy cost £400, a company as 
much as £1500.  As such, young officers had to use every possible expedient to ensure 
rank.  For this reason, recruiting was detested, particularly if it was done without the 
support of family or in an uncomfortable environment.  Writing from Ireland, Colin 
Campbell complained that:   
 
 
its [sic] not consistent with Reason that an officer who has been 
sent to a place against his will Recruiting, will exert himself as 
he would do otherwise & besides desertion is so common that 
its dangerous to inlist [sic] any person with whom you are not 






Campbell eventually decided on the expedient course of selling his recruits to 
another officer, so that he could take the easier option of buying his commission instead.  
He later called the system, „a perfect purgatory‟.
57
 
A money-orientated recruiting market was also, however, the result of the 
increased importance of recruitment in a national context.  The entire system of 
recruiting-for-rank in newly established corps was predicated on the ability of local 
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families to provide men for the forces.  Rivalry centred on an elite‟s potential to recruit 
vis à vis other parties.  In the interpretive framework of this rivalry pride was taken in not 
only the number of men enlisted, but the manner in which they were recruited.  The 
relations of Major James Clephane keenly presented the recruits as „volunteers‟.  In 
highlighting the voluntary nature of enlistments, Clephane‟s brother-in-law, Sheriff-
Depute Hugh Rose of Geddes, contrasted his own benevolent hold over the people with 
the methods used by other families in order to secure men.  Rose congratulated himself 
on the volunteers, given that, as he claimed, dozens of men were being forcibly taken 
from their beds at night to fill out companies being raised by the Frasers, Grants, and 
Munros.
58
  Of course, there was some inconsistency.  The Rose family bitterly decried 
the advantages possessed by Archibald Montgomery‟s 77
th
 Foot, whose officers 
allegedly employed coercion to acquire men, over their own patron Simon Fraser.
59
  The 
practical application of coercion was, therefore, seen as more effective in acquiring men.  
Significantly, however, it was far less satisfying to familial and intellectual sensibilities.   
In this way, Whig recruiters evidenced an ideological zeal in their chosen method 
of Highland improvement.  At the same time rentals were being adapted on some estates 
to facilitate recruitment, a partial mirror of sixteenth and seventeenth-century practices, 
Whigs could contrast their own modernity with the arbitrary and coercive strategies of 
Tories and surreptitious Jacobites.  There was an interpretative relationship in Whig 
circles between arbitrary power and Jacobitism and the very principle of recruiting-for-
rank was questioned by those who saw it as a means of preserving the authority of 
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Highland chieftains over their clans.  It was, to such individuals, a violation of the 
rationale behind the ending of Heritable Jurisdictions.  Equally concerning was that 
regional recruitment removed authority from central government and handed it to the 
localities; this could only strengthen provincial identity, weakening the „National 
distinction‟ that was Britain.
60
 
The cumulative effect was that military recruitment did not signal the 
overwhelming power of state and elites to enforce their will on a reluctant rural poor.  
Instead, this was an environment where the diffusion of power and interest through 
various administrative or personal rivalries, and the place of ideological considerations in 
the process, offered Highland recruits a degree of latitude and scope for the pursuit of 
their own interests.   
 
 
III   THE RURAL POOR: VICTIMS OR PERPETRATORS? 
The same imperatives that drove the elites to support the fiscal-military state, 
advancement, status, and security, also drove the enlisted soldier.  While the benefits 
were relative, it is clear that many rural poor realized the advantages that could be 
secured by fastening their own interest to the expansion of the military in the Highlands.  
It is entirely accurate that the poor and dispossessed were drawn to the army by 
circumstances, but this was not necessarily because it was their only option and such 
marginal elements evidenced a keen desire to secure social betterment.  This was most 
apparent among the non-commissioned officers.  Muster lists from a huge range of 
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Highland regiments show that most recruiting was undertaken by parties led by non-
commissioned officers, with only the slightest intervention by the officer class.
61
  
Enlisted men were brought into recruiting to ensure the highest possible returns for 
recruitment and 
 
intelligence on where to find potential recruits often came from enlisted 
men themselves.
62
  The actions of recruiting parties mirrored the stereotypes of the 
British army more generally, being an admixture of legitimate recruiting, persuasion, and 
direct and indirect coercion.  The wording of recruiting instructions went so far as to 
suggest that while officers could be trusted to conduct themselves in an honourable 
fashion, the actions of their parties were not so assured.
63
 
A system of incentives was established to promote the zeal of individual soldiers.  
To augment the 42
nd
 Foot for American service in 1756, Lord John Murray authorized 
the promotion of enlisted men to non-commissioned roles in order to assist recruiting.  
The agent of Major James Clephane recommended a nineteen-year-old private, 
Alexander Bell, to be made a non-commissioned officer for the assistance he gave in 
recruiting the 78
th
 Foot.  Money was offered to any person who brought in recruits, in the 
case of the 76
th
 Foot in 1776 the offer was one guinea, the equivalent of six weeks pay 
for a private soldier.
64
  With average bounties rising incessantly from 1775, it was 
recognized that, „the only way to cheapen them [the cost of recruiting] is to pay the Man 
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  A party of twelve men under one sergeant successfully enlisted fifty-
eight men for the 42
nd
 Foot in Blair Atholl in 1757.  While recruiting for the 77
th
 Foot in 
1778, a Sergeant Menzies received three cash advances for bounty money in the space of 
just three weeks, amounting to over £50.  With bounties by 1778 as high as £10-£15, the 
five men he recruited in that time serves to demonstrate that enlisted men could recruit 
men but with little more success than their officers, if money was absent.  Company 
commanders received an extra subsistence allowance to pay two recruits to assist in 
recruiting, though such were the abuses of this system that George II ordered it to be 
withdrawn in 1759 if a company was not kept up to strength.
66
  In this way, soldiers and 
civilians were brought into a system that unemotionally balanced cost against return.  It 
might be said that the poor were co-opted by self-interested elites with paltry rewards.  
The returns were far too significant, however, and the zeal of individual people too great 
for such an interpretation entirely to account for this process.  One agent became so 
distressed with recruiting that he knowingly kept a violent sergeant as his head recruiter 
so that the men would desert: „I heartily wish they were fairly off my hands,‟ he reported.  
As he explained to his patron, „my reason for continuing Brown [the sergeant] is, that he 
is a notorious rascall [sic], and the same principle that induced him to be so active in 
enlisting, will likewise prompt him to persuade some of the fellows to desert.‟  His 
distress must have been great because, as he recognized himself, he could get £10 for 
each recruit by illegally „selling‟ them to other recruiters.  Things got worse and it 
transpired that Brown had not even formally enlisted and the agent could not prevail 
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upon him to either enlist or return the pay he had been drawing for several months.
67
  
Most localities in eighteenth-century Britain had problems with overzealous recruiting 
sergeants and the Highlands were no different.  By the end of the period, the process of 
paying men who brought in recruits, „crimping‟, was being abused to such an extent by 
poorer sections of society that it caused deep concern.
68
   
The zeal of enlisted men cannot be entirely reduced to economic motives.  As it 
was for officers, the status of private men began to be reflected in their own assessment 
of their professionalism and ability.  Some pursued recruitment in such a way that 
demonstrates that it was not simply an economic issue, but a matter of personal honour.  
In February 1775,  Peter Mackenzie, a private soldier in the 42
nd
 Foot, entered a tavern in 
Strathspey and drank with a local servant, James Smith, before offering him a guinea to 
enlist in the King‟s service.  Standard procedure would have been for Smith to appear 
before the local bailie or JP at Grantown to be attested, but Mackenzie refused to take 
him before the officials and, instead, demanded with the threat of violence, that Smith 
accompany him to Nairn to be attested there.  Subsequent letters between the local JP and 
Lieutenant John Grant, Mackenzie‟s commanding officer, reveal that the reason had 
probably been that Mackenzie had no official permission to beat for recruits.  Without 
beating orders, pass or furlough, and with his officer more than twenty miles away, 
Mackenzie had taken it upon himself to recruit for his regiment.  Unwilling to condone 
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such illegal measures, the local JP took the bounty money and sent Mackenzie back to 
Nairn until the matter could be settled. 
Mackenzie was evidently not satisfied and, a week later, returned with several 
other enlisted men and again apprehended Smith and demanded that he come to Nairn.  
This was prevented only when Smith‟s friends intervened and prevented him being 
dragged away.  The role of John Grant up until this point is not known and it is unclear if 
he had directed Mackenzie to conduct illicit recruiting.  In April, however, he wrote to 
the JP and demanded that the bounty money given to Smith be returned.  This was 
refused, the JP having already handed it back to Smith and apologized for his treatment.  
As well as demonstrating the zeal of men like Mackenzie, this episode also supports the 
claim that civil government refused to allow its powers to be subverted or corrupted by 
recruiting.   
At the end of summer and unable to re-claim the money through civil avenues, 
Grant ordered Smith to be apprehended as a deserter and, demonstrating a complete lack 
of judgement, directed Mackenzie and his associates, Corporal Macdonald and Private 
Watson, to carry out the order.  Mackenzie, now a sergeant, presumably a reward for his 
earlier zeal, found Smith at his master‟s house and dragged him away.  His master went 
to the JP and again Smith was released.  An hour after Smith‟s release:  
 
 
A quarrel arose [in Grantown] between the soldiers and some of 
Smith‟s friends, which it‟s said took its rise from Corporal 
Macdonald who is a country man there and for a long time 
before he went into the army, was well known to be a 
remarkable turbulent man, and was frequently prosecuted and 
punished for his quarrels. In this quarrel some blood was shed, 
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but luckily no lives were lost owing to the intervention of some 





Even after this incident Mackenzie would not let the matter rest.  He continued to 
threaten Smith and his friends and reportedly threatened to burn Smith‟s house to the 
ground.  The JP at Grantown eventually sought a prosecution of the sergeant, although 
on the appointed day, Mackenzie did not attend. 
 Mackenzie had the authority to proceed as he did.  He had been invested with this 
authority by his appointment as the head of a recruiting party, giving him certain rights to 
enforce obedience.  As a soldier, he also held a partial monopoly of violence as a military 
representative of the state in the locality of Grantown, the most naked expression of 
power.  He did not, however, possess any jurisdiction.  His actions were correctly 
questioned by that jurisdiction, the local JP.  As disrespectful of that jurisdiction as 
Mackenzie might have been, he had been circumscribed by it and prevented from 
operating to the limits of what his authority allowed.  In the end, the JP sought to have 
the recruiting party completely withdrawn from the district.  Whether he achieved this is 
not known, but his efforts to prosecute Mackenzie point to the robustness of the 
Grantown authorities.  This was the essence of socio-political relationships in the late 
eighteenth-century Scottish Highlands, reflected in the deep divisions of authority, 
jurisdiction, and interest, and not in its socio-economic taxonomy.  To assign the label of 
victim or perpetrator arbitrarily to any one group on account of eighteenth-century social 
hierarchy is misleading.  Highland society was divided in more complicated ways. 
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IV   CONCLUSIONS 
Recent scholarship has placed the Highland soldier in a context that has served as an 
insightful corrective to an older historiography of clansmen inspired to military service 
by traditional notions of martial loyalty.  It has also been, however, the point of departure 
for a new emphasis on an overlap between government interest and local elites, between 
authority and jurisdiction.  Subordination of the individual Highland soldier to varied 
asymmetrical hierarchies has been the meta-narrative behind recent interpretations of 
eighteenth-century recruiting. 
 Contrary to this, wider processes were vital and shaped a more sophisticated 
environment.  Policy-makers and Highland elites were as concerned about the protection 
of liberties as their counterparts across the Atlantic region.  Attempts at engineering a 
less problematic Highland Scotland through the Heritable Jurisdictions Act were 
designed to negate the very processes historians have come to rely upon as the contextual 
setting for recruitment.  Fear of arbitrary power constrained the worst excesses of 
recruitment, ensuring a division of interest in and between the army, local elites, and civil 
government.  Through this, authority was dissipated across conflicting bodies, creating a 
contentious and ideologically problematic debate, which focused attention on the 
successes of the improvement of the Highlands, the survival of clanship, and the role of 
military service in those processes.  In essence, while clanship remained intellectually 
central to Highland elites, the physical collapse of clanship as a viable method of social 




This study does not question the established argument that imperial expansion 
cemented the place of the British ruling class into the nineteenth century.  Indeed, it is 
broadly supportive of such an interpretation.  The extent of elite participation in the army 
changed landholding patterns and social habits, solidifying local political and cultural 
authorities.  It does suggest, however, that we need to be careful in assuming that new 
laws and new ideas, derived from close participation with the British state, could not 
have a significant impact on the most localized interactions. 
For this reason, it is important to analyse the Highlands, despite their peripheral 
location, as a vital component of larger imperial discourses.  As a test case for the 
introduction of British liberty to a „conquered‟ region, the scale and sophistication of 
debate was infinitely greater than might be assumed.  The conspicuous presence of the 
military in the Highlands allied local problems to Whig theory.  Charles Lucas, a 
Member of Parliament for Dublin, had argued in 1768 that any legislator, though 
appointed to a small district, „becomes a trustee and a guardian for the whole kingdom‟.  
His writings, which made no mention of the Highlands, nevertheless spoke to the same 
problems being experienced in that region.  Lucas noted that in a free state it was 
inappropriate for the military to serve also as administrators of justice; their despotic 
tendencies might lead to a dilution of the rule of law.
70
  It was not simply, however, that 
commentators such as Lucas expended vast amounts of ink on the subject of law and 
liberty.  It was that these philosophies directly impacted on the way in which the 
extension of the fiscal-military state was conducted.  The processes outlined above ask 
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historians to reconsider the assumptive interpretations of the entirely accurate analysis 
that there was an overlap between government and landed elites.  In the most peripheral 
region of mainland Britain, this overlap did not necessarily mean a unilateral 
authoritarian elite operating on an enfeebled poor.  The extension of the state, and varied 
arguments on its ability to secure or threaten an individual‟s liberties, moved in 
conjunction.  The Highland variant of this conjunction suggests we should not see the 
eighteenth-century British Empire as the English-speaking world with exotic adjuncts.  It 
was, instead, an imperium of multiple peoples connected not just by the crown, but by 
alluring discourses that could alter ideas and policy in the entire body politic.  As 
throughout the British Isles, the Highlands were witnessing the vestiges of a slow shift 
from aristocratic to a bureaucratic system of government.  Ultimately, it was not the clan 
system that made recruitment a perfect purgatory.  What gave it this appearance was the 
partial abandonment of traditional methods in Highland recruiting, in large part because 
of an engagement with pan-British discourses.  But the sins of these young men, such as 





 COMBAT, IMPERIAL SAVAGERY, AND THE EXPERIENCE OF WAR IN 
NORTH AMERICA 
 




The perfect purgatory of recruitment preceded the violence and brutality of imperial war 
in North America.  Colonial warfare was an unnerving and unworldly experience, for 
which the average Highland soldier, despite the suggestion that he possessed an innate 
martial culture, was utterly unprepared.  War enforced the distance between the soldier 
and his origins, severely testing the notion of military service as within the normal 
boundaries of existence.  It is clear from the extant letters that soldiers experienced acute 
displacement and disconnection from their normal lives. 
It is strange then, that Highland soldiers established a reputation that has 
overshadowed the practical experiences of their actions in the colonies.  Estimates of 
casualties, implicitly provided to support an established meta-narrative of the heroic 
Highland soldier, courageous in the face of appalling casualties, is particularly common.
1
  
The anecdote related by an observer of the siege of Québec in 1759, that he saw a 
Highlander lose an arm to a cannonball only to go on to kill nine Frenchmen literally 
single-handedly, bears far too much resemblance to the similar story of James Campbell 
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at Fontenoy in 1745 to be taken entirely seriously.
2
  Such indulgent anecdotes have 
helped define appraisals of the Highland regiments.  The very courage of the Highland 
soldier has disengaged him from a more wide-ranging discussion of his actions. 
Sustaining these debates is Gaelic exceptionalism.  In its most explicit and 
languid form, it focused on the „primitive‟ nature of the Highland warrior.
3
  The more 
insidious form, however, was the implicit: the false historicism of the Highlander as an 
enemy of the Hanoverian state.  In this narrative, William Pitt masterminded the return of 
Hanover to the Seven Years‟ War, succeeding in tying French troops down in Europe, 
allowing British naval supremacy to overwhelm the Bourbon monarchy‟s overseas 
dominions.  Critically, Pitt‟s blue-water policy created an opportunity to deploy 
dangerous Jacobites to North America.  The Secretary at War, Lord Barrington, moved to 
reassure the Duke of Cumberland in July 1757 that „it was agreed that both officers and 
men should go to America as fast as the companies were raised, and none of either [are to] 
remain in the Highlands.‟  With no small amount of glee, the Lord Justice Clerk, Charles 
Erskine, reported shortly after the victory at Québec that the scope for problems in the 
Highlands had been much reduced, potential Jacobites having been „happily of late ... 
thinned – by employing the greatest part of them as good food for our enemy‟s powder‟.
4
   
The merits of the blue-water policy, or whether indeed William Pitt was 
responsible for the vision which achieved victory in North America by 1760 is a subject 
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  The chronology of the Highland regiments also supports such scepticism, as 
rumours of the formation of Highland battalions were already rife by the time Pitt entered 
the Devonshire coalition in December 1756.  For our purposes, however, the narrative of 
Pitt‟s masterstroke, as well as ignoring the local motivations for military service, 
reinforces the suggestion that North America served as a means of ridding the British 
state of an internal problem, portraying the region as both different and disloyal. 
This chapter highlights the experiences of Highland soldiers in the colonies, 
forcefully challenging Gaelic exceptionalism.  While distinct in dress and language, the 
Highland regiments functioned as integrated units of the British army.  What is more, 
they were generally treated as such by senior officers, who, despite some misgivings, 
recognized them as a potentially effective military resource, to be safeguarded and 
employed to the greatest effect.  Military experiences did not rest on ethnicity but on the 
function and effectiveness of military formations.  This is not to say that cultural 
understandings were inconsequential to military imperatives; cultural understandings 
were part of how these imperatives were formed.  It is these cultural values, however, 
which need to be more fully explored and contextualized. 
This chapter begins by exploring the training, conduct, and combat experiences of 
Highland troops, demonstrating the considerable overlap of experiences with the rest of 
the British army in North America.  It explores the conduct and tactics of the Highland 
battalions which were closely similar to those of other British regiments.  The chapter 
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concludes with an investigation of savagery in North America, exploring how the 
Highland regiments were brought into an imperial system which emphasized the ill-
treatment of ethnic minorities.  In the experiences of North American warfare, the 
violence of imperial warfare was as disturbing to the Highland soldier as it was to 
English, Irish, and Lowland counterparts.  It did not take long, however, for Highland 
soldiers to embrace this decidedly political, rather than ethnic, view of empire. 
Why are exceptionalist arguments, particularly those based on martial courage 
and savagery, a misleading line of enquiry into the conduct of Highland soldiers in 
America?  They rely on a crude reading of two wars defined by an incredibly complex 
set of sociological, imperial, and environmental assumptions.  Geoffrey Plank argues that 
the senior British officers who suppressed the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 learned many 
lessons about punitive and civilizing actions against imperial minorities during the 1745 
rebellion.  These officers, primarily William Blakeney, Humphrey Bland, Edward 
Cornwallis, John Campbell and James Wolfe, went on to deploy military power in 
colonial possessions in the Mediterranean and North America, to replicate the civilization, 
commercial prosperity, and legal reforms thought to have been brought to the native 
Gaels of the Highlands.  Whether there is enough evidence to suggest an explicit link 
between lessons learned in Scotland and an overarching imperial design amongst high-
level military officers is questionable.  It is likely that such men were constricted by 
available resources and based their actions on a reading of localized parameters.  Plank is 
correct, however, in highlighting that military action against imperial minorities was 
viewed (and conducted) in a way that was fundamentally different from the wars waged 
against European states.  During the Jacobite rebellion, Gaelic-speaking elites could gain 
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immunity from prosecution if they could demonstrate they had been born in France.
6
  
When the Highland battalions embraced savage measures against imperial enemies they 
took on the arguments that justified the utility of such methods within an imperial 
environment.  The actions of young Highland soldiers reveal how invasive the culture of 
empire was and how easily it was embraced.  It was only by embracing such horrific 
measures, as fully-fledged participants in the imperial project, that the Highland 
regiments carved their place in the historiography of empire.  This chapter is not a 
judgement on the conduct of war in the eighteenth century, or those who carried it out, 
but an argument against continuity in the Highland experience and for the transformative 
impact of imperial military service.     
 
 
I   FIT FOR SERVICE? 
The reputation Highlanders were to acquire as ferocious warriors, repeated ad nauseum 
in historical accounts of the regiments, is a clear exaggeration of the innate militarism of 
the Highlands.  Militarized clanship had been in long decline, even prior to the 
Disarming Acts of 1716, 1725, and 1746.  Early eighteenth-century surveys of Highland 
estates showed the limited possession of arms in several localities.
7
  Coming of age in the 
post-Proscription era, Highland soldiers would likely have possessed little proficiency 
with weapons nor, given their relative youth, would many have experienced the post-
Culloden repressions.     
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Highland soldiers were young.  Of a company raised in 1776, the average age was 
twenty-one, though this does not convey the full extent of the men‟s youth; seventy per 
cent were below that age, over half were eighteen or younger.  In Archibald Campbell‟s 
company of the 78
th
 Foot in 1778, the average age was between twenty-two and twenty-
three.  Twenty-two years old was also the average age of surviving attestation papers for 
the 76
th
 Foot in 1778.  Limited data from the Seven Years‟ War show similar average 
ages, eighteen years old amongst a collection of men made for James Clephane of the 
78
th
 Foot in early 1757.  Scribbled on the back of the official recruiting instructions for 
an officer of the 77
th
 Foot in 1777, was written, „Boy‟s ... may be taken under the above 
age [18] … if broad shouldered well limbed and able to bear arms‟.
8
   
Youth has often been the mark of generations of servicemen; it is estimated, for 
example, that the average age of American servicemen in the Vietnam War was nineteen, 
compared with twenty-six during the Second World War.
9
  Compelling evidence, 
however, suggests that the Highland regiments were youthful compared with other 
British soldiers.  In the 8
th
 Foot in 1782, for example, the average age was almost thirty-
seven, and the men had been in the army for an average of over fourteen years.  Even 
allowing for seven years of active service in America, this was an older body of troops 
than ever appeared in a Highland regiment.  Other British regiments were not quite as 
experienced as the 8
th
 Foot, but still retained a large veteran cadre.  Drafts from various 
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regiments into the 4/60
th
 Foot in 1757 show an average age of twenty-eight while men 
recruited in Boston for the 47
th
 Foot the following year averaged over twenty-six years of 




Figure 2.1   Age brackets in the 77
th
 Foot, Sept. 1757.
11
 
Age Total in age-group in the battalion 





18 and under 62 
 
If they were young, Highland soldiers were also of necessity inexperienced.  The 
vast majority of the Highland regiments were raised for specific periods of service, and 
disbanded following the cessation of hostilities; unless willing men with previous 
military service came forward, the regiment severely lacked combat experience.  Even in 
the 42
nd
 Foot, a permanent regiment of the line, significant augmentations, raising 
companies from thirty-five to one hundred men resulted in an overwhelming number of 
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  The vast majority of the augmentations were raw recruits and 
when the 42
nd
 entered combat in August 1776, half the men had been in uniform less 
than a year.  John Adlum, a militia officer who faced the 42
nd
 Foot at Fort Washington in 
November that year, noted that, by the time the Highlanders received the order to fire, 
most of them had already discharged their pieces into the air as if it were a, „feu de joie 
[lit. fire of joy] … 99 shot out of 100 [going] a considerable distance over our heads‟.
13
   
Not long after the 42
nd
 Foot was first deployed to North America in 1756, Major 
George Grant produced a short exercise manual to provide inexperienced officers with an 
up-to-date and simple set of motions that would facilitate training. The New Highland 
Military Discipline (London, 1757) took it as read that combat was a terrifying ordeal, 
but with revealing insight into the youth and naivety of the Highland recruit, it warned 
officers to keep a close eye on their men, particularly while facing artillery: „for by eating 
Cannon and grape Shot at a Distance, throws a Panick [sic] upon the Men, that perhaps, 
never saw a Cat killed in their Lives‟.  Outside Fort Duquesne on 14 September 1758, 
„Fear ... got the better of every other passion‟ as a Franco-Amerindian force 
overwhelmed the 77
th
 Foot and supporting Virginia provincials.  The 77
th
‟s senior officer 
that day, Major James Grant of Ballindalloch, hoped „I shall never see again such a 
panick among Troops, till then I had no conception of it‟.
14
     
The inexperience of the Highland battalions was not helped by the rudimentary 
training they received before arriving in America.  The process of recruitment, from the 
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issuing of warrants to embarkation at Glasgow, was typically five to six months.  Prior to 
departure, the men were trained in marching, posture, and the simple evolutions of the 
musket drill, so called material training.  In Major James Clephane‟s company of the 78
th
 
Foot, each man received a „stick on his shoulder [and] a good sack On his back‟, 
providing some measure of uniformity, but nothing like the materials required to gain a 
working understanding of the soldier‟s duties.
15
  It was only after collection into larger 
formations that mechanical training began, involving the full manual exercise, firings and 
manoeuvres.  This seems to have been unusual, however, and Simon Fraser would 
complain that his regiment did not spend more than four days together prior to departure, 
and did not have time to learn the evolutions required to conduct a review.  The men of 
the extra battalion of the 42
nd
 Foot which was raised in 1758 before being sent to the 
Caribbean „were merely taught to march‟ prior to departure and only issued with firearms 
upon arrival in theatre.
16
  J.A. Houlding asserts that training in a given regiment was 
independent, and thus determined by the skills base of the officers in command.  With so 
large a proportion of inexperienced officers in Highland regiments, it is likely that the 
training was largely ad hoc, with officers only slightly ahead of the majority of their men 
on the learning curve.
17
 
John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, who served as Commander-in-Chief of 
forces in North America between July 1756 and March 1758, did not think much of the 
arriving 42
nd
 Foot.  He would report to Cumberland in the winter of 1756 that they were 
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mostly newly-enlisted soldiers: „five hundred recruits thrown in just now‟.  Loudoun 
refused to send any of the regiments on testing active service in the 1757 campaign, even 
refusing to allow the recently arrived 42
nd
 Foot to do garrison duty on the frontier, 
fearing their inexperience made them unfit for such a task.
18
  Simon Fraser was keen to 
put the best face on his battalion, the 78
th
 Foot, to Loudoun‟s replacement, James 
Abercromby, after the unit‟s first winter in North America.  But even he had to concede: 
„As soldiers, they are not what I would have them‟.  Some companies were so poor as to 
be a hindrance to operations; Fraser noted of his additional companies: 
 
 
In what I have said of the regiment I do not include the 
additional companies, they are not so good bodys [sic] of men, 
and till they came here most of their arms never were taken out 
of the chests, so that they know nothing. In this situation I 
should be sorry to rest the character of the regiment upon their 
behaviour ... most of the men of these 3 companies are really by 
no means fit for immediate service.
19
   
 
 
 So poor did Fraser believe these troops to be that he recommended that they be 
left at Halifax and not join the rest of the battalion. 
 
 
II   PROFESSIONALIZATION: CONDUCT 
The opinion of senior officers on the quality of the Highland battalions offers a revealing 
insight into how commanders considered the utility of the Highland soldier.  Officers did 
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not see anything innately agreeable to Highland capacities.  Lt. Col. Henry Bouquet, who 
served alongside the 77
th
 Foot in Charleston in 1757, described the Highlanders as „quite 
raw men‟, though appalling levels of morbidity was largely responsible for this 
assessment.  The following June, however, Bouquet informed John Forbes that „The new 
recruits [77
th
 Foot] will make you a thousand troubles; they need blankets, clothing, and 
so on – endlessly. Their officers haven‟t an idea of the service, and one cannot depend on 
them to carry out an order.‟
20
  The quality of a battalion had nothing to do with its origins, 
and everything to do with its experience and the quality of its officers. 
 Senior officers, from the Commander-in-Chief to the colonels of the Highland 
battalions, all believed that the regiments were of sub-standard quality.  They equally 
agreed on the potential for the regiments to improve within a year providing they were 
trained and disciplined.  Maintaining the Highland battalions as regiments on the 
establishment duly ignored, perhaps even challenged, the racialized hierarchy of the 
Atlantic world in the interests of military effectiveness.  The inability of the imperial 
state in America to feed, clothe, and quarter the massive influx of troops in 1756-58, 
brought the military into conflict with heavily-entrenched colonial authorities, 
particularly in New York, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, as the army sought to 
quarter troops and defray the expense of quartering onto colonial governments.  The 
arrival of the 77
th
 Foot in Charleston, South Carolina, in September 1757, brought troop 
levels in the town to over 1700, including a battalion of the 60
th
 Foot under Bouquet and 
200 Virginia provincials.  Despite the voting of significant funds by the Commons House 
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of Assembly and the generosity of the town‟s inhabitants in voluntarily quartering 187 
Highlanders, the available accommodation was simply inadequate.  Most problematic 
was the Assembly‟s refusal, at least until November, to provide bedding and other 
necessities, forcing expedient decisions in the interests of military effectiveness.  In 
October 1757, for example, Henry Bouquet gave the limited available straw to the 





  Similar quartering problems occurred in the north.  General 
Hopson at Halifax informed Loudoun that he did not have the facilities to accommodate 
the 78
th
 Foot in the winter of 1757, necessitating a move to Connecticut and a reliance on 




Highland soldiers desired to prove themselves as valuable additions to the fiscal-
military state by demonstrating their credentials as established British regiments of the 
line.  The acid test of the quality of a Highland regiment, to both its officers and men, 
was professionalism similar to that demanded of other British corps.  While largely 
inexperienced, many officers sought to educate themselves on the proper discipline of 
their companies.  Malcolm Fraser of the 78
th
 Foot purchased A New Exercise, to be 
Observed by His Majesty‟s Troops (New York, 1755) to drill his men.  Bennett 
Cuthbertson‟s System for the Complete Interior Management and œconomy of a 
Battalion of Infantry (Bristol, 1776) was used in at least one Highland regiment during 
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the War of Independence.  The publication of the New Highland Military Discipline 
(London, 1757) suggests a keen desire to regulate the martial skill of the Highland 
soldier; the emphasis the publication placed in its pictorial plates on learning the musket 
drills also suggests a strong element of consistent professionalization.
23
 
Officers attempted to replicate such professionalism amongst the lowest echelons 
by a system of internal monetary and professional rewards; evidence suggests that this 
was reasonably successful.  A scouting party of the Royal Highland Emigrants took three 
prisoners in February 1778 after Private Macdonald of the light company surprised them.  
Macdonald was promoted to corporal for his leading role and each man on the patrol 
received up to eight dollars for their part in the action.  The entire command structure of 
a battalion was predicated on seniority or a hierarchy of merit amongst both officers and 
private soldiers.  In action, the 71
st
 Foot was directed to deploy each company into four 
firing sections, to be commanded by the NCOs considered most meritorious, so that the 
captain‟s section would be commanded by the most highly-regarded NCO.  Two months 
later, the best private men were ordered to be delivered to the light company.  The use of 
ad hoc battalions formed from the elite light and grenadier companies of multiple 
regiments became extremely common during the War of Independence, undermining the 
growth of talent and skill in the companies of the line.
24
  In a statement given by Lt. Col. 
Campbell to the 71
st
 Foot, he appealed to their professional identity as „real soldiers‟, but 
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in a sentence which might be interpreted as nominally subversive, Campbell explained to 
the rank-and-file that:  
 
 
The road to preferment being open from the station of a private 
soldier to that of a general officer in his majesty‟s service every 
man of spirit has by that means an opportunity of Gratifying his 







The result of this attempted professionalization was a collection of battalions 
keen to exhibit themselves as fully fledged members of the British army.  Equality, not 
exceptionalism was what Highland officers sought from the fiscal-military state.  It 
would be wrong to assume, as some historians have, that rehabilitation was a major 
characteristic of Highland military service or that the Highlanders zeal for the service 
originated in atonement for the region‟s Jacobitism.
26
  The letters of Highland officers 
instead reveal a deeply-engrained private interest and the assumption that the advantages 
of seniority or half-pay were entirely justified given their service and stature.  The 
embodying of the battalions as regiments of the line was also an implicit admission that 
Highland elites were not generalized as closet Jacobites but as regional actors to be 
enticed by state patronage.
27
 
The corollary effect of this professionalization was an assertion, from within the 
regiments, of the praise they felt entitled to.  Chaplain Robert Macpherson would 
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complain in 1761 that while his veteran regiment, the 78
th
 Foot, sat idle at Québec, 
newly-raised and inexperienced Highland regiments were gaining laurels in Germany.
28
  
Equally significant was the experience of the 77
th
 Foot during the Anglo-Cherokee War 
of 1759-61.  Following a Cherokee attack on Fort Prince George, a retaliatory act for 
South Carolina‟s dispatch of an expeditionary force to the Lower Cherokee settlements, 
Governor William Henry Lyttleton appealed to Jeffrey Amherst for assistance.  Amherst 
dispatched the 77
th
 Foot to conduct operations against the Cherokee between April and 
August 1760.  Several Cherokee towns, including Estatoe and Echoe, were devastated 
and there were heavy casualties on both sides.  Commanding the 77
th
 Foot, Archibald 
Montgomery failed to push on to relieve Fort Loudoun, forcing his subordinate, James 
Grant of Ballindalloch, to resume operations in 1761.  Richard C. Cole has argued, with 
some justification, that Montgomery‟s failure was due to his expectation of retaining his 
regiment‟s integrity to fight French regulars at Montreal.  Fighting Native Americans, 
due to their assumed inferiority and the lack of legal restraint in conducting operations 
against them, ensured that neither glory nor honour, so central to military reputation, 
could be gained in such operations.  As Adam Smith would succinctly put it, „Nothing 
can be more contemptible than an Indian war in North America.‟  It is true that Edmund 
Burke did praise the qualities of the soldiers involved in suppressing Pontiac‟s rebellion 
in 1763 in The Annual Register of that year.  The Anglo-Cherokee war, however, 
because the Cherokee were not formal allies of the French, ensured that the campaign 
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could not be easily linked into a wider narrative of the Seven Years‟ War.
29
  
Montgomery‟s frustration was exacerbated by both his and Grant‟s recognition that the 
army was being used to further the parochial interests of the South Carolina Assembly, 
which was keen to suppress the Cherokee in an unjust and deliberate war of annihilation.  
It was an opinion probably arrived at through correspondence with another Highlander, 
Inverness-born Indian trader and diplomat, John Stuart.
30
  As we shall see, this in no way 
led to any great moderation in confronting the Cherokee, but in asserting their own 
deserved utility and frustration at the dubious ends of colonial regimes, Highland officers 
adjudged their position as one of professional equality within the fiscal-military state.  
As established regiments and equal partners, the pressures which affected other 
British battalions applied equally to the Highlanders.  While professionalism was 
attempted, the accompanying truisms of military life were alcohol, violence, and sexual 
misconduct.  Alcohol and alcoholism were degenerative parts of the military experience.  
In 1778, officers were forced to apply extreme measures to the 71
st
 Foot to prevent the 
continuing misuse of pay by the rank-and-file: „instead of using their money with 
desecration they continue to squander it on liquor and debauchery by which they injure 
their health ... their morals & sully that valuable character, they have already acquired as 
soldiers‟.  Under the provisions, accounts were to be settled more regularly to prevent 
soldiers acquiring too much money at one time.  Stoppages were also increased and of 
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the remaining pay, only one shilling, or less than half of a man‟s weekly pay, was to be 
given to him.  The rest was to be hoarded by the officer and given out, most probably at 
his discretion.
31
  But discretion was not always to be relied upon.  While at Isle aux Noix 
in 1777-78, the Royal Highland Emigrants (later 84
th
 Foot) were warned about the 
„notoriously practised‟ habit of NCOs and their wives selling large quantities of alcohol 
to the regiment, despite orders against it.  The habit of NCOs creating a monopoly of 
supply to the detriment of discipline was also reported in the 78
th
 Foot while it had been 





 Foot seems to have had a justifiably poor reputation for discipline.  
Within a few months of the issue of equipment to the regiment, its officers were 
reviewing the accoutrements twice a week, when it became evident that many of the 
soldiers were selling their government-issued equipment for profit.  Within a month, 
private men‟s pay had even been stopped because it was believed that they were not 
making proper use of it; instead their pay was being given directly to creditors to whom 
many of the men were already deeply in debt.  Things did not improve and, in 1779, 
Major John Nairne reported that he had never before „had so many complaints of riotous 





 Foot‟s discipline problems were, like all problems affecting Highland 
soldiers, a result of external parameters operating on an inconstant military culture.  The 
84
th
 Foot was unique among the Highland regiments for being recruited largely, though 
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not exclusively, in North America, in which they served as a Loyalist provincial unit, 
without the advantages conferred on other Highland regiments, until their establishment 
as the 84
th
 Foot in 1779.  Fears over whether the regiment would be established plagued 
officers for almost four years and created a deeply unstable command structure.  An 
internal culture of false promises also created the conditions for problems and it appears 
as if both officers and men were enlisted on the basis of promises which its colonel, 
Allan Maclean of Torloisk, had no authority to give.
34
  As the regiment was recruited 
among Highland emigrants in the colonies, many of its soldiers had friends and family, 
even wives and children, in rebel-occupied areas, a fact that unquestionably led to 
frustration and anger at the monotonous garrison duties the 84
th
 Foot was employed upon 
for long periods of the war.  One officer, „Spanish‟ John Macdonald requested that if his 
family in New York could not be quickly rescued, he would rather have a party of 
Indians bring him their scalps than „to linger any longer in misery‟.  Entire companies 
petitioned to be employed on more active operations to rescue their families from Upper 
New York.
35
  Dispersion also critically undermined unit cohesion and a sound basis for 
unified leadership.  The battalion was dispersed in penny-packets for most of the war, 
with sub-divisions in the vicinity of Québec, Montreal, Windsor, Amherst, Gaspé, New 
York, and Charleston, South Carolina at various stages of the war.
36
  It is true that the 
84
th
 Foot was more ethnically varied than any other Highland regiment, but the names of 
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the soldiers charged with misdemeanours and the early origins of the problems when the 
regiment was ethnically Gaelic suggests these circumstances were the pivotal factor in 
the appalling levels of regimental indiscipline. 
The 84
th
 were not unique, however, and it comes as little surprise that discipline 
problems always arose toward the end of hostilities or when a battalion had been 
stationed amongst a civilian population for long periods of time.  During the four years 
the 78
th
 Foot were at Québec, complaints were increasingly made that the men had not 
only begun to disobey orders from their officers, but that a culture of „personal 
resentment‟ had developed against some NCOs with outright disrespect for officers, 
particularly those from other regiments.  Stealing was becoming more common.  Officers 
began to put in place certain policies to prevent irregularities and, in August 1762, 
stopped allowing the soldiers to sleep outside the camp in order to limit the time soldiers 
spent with townspeople and beyond the watchful eyes of their officers.  Increasing 
punishments were delivered to stop the rot.
37
  Corporal Angus Macdonald was sentenced 
to 2000 lashes for engaging in an extortion racket among the French-Canadian 
inhabitants around Québec.  By the end of the 78
th
‟s stay in Québec, the problem of 
alcohol abuse resulted in camp women no longer being served rations, there being a 
misogynistic perception that women were the root cause of soldierly misconduct.
38
 
Similar attitudes predictably infused debates on sexual relations.  Venereal 
disease seems to have been as much a problem in the Highland regiments as in any other.  
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It was again the 84
th
 Foot who excelled in this particular regard.  While garrisoned at Isle 
aux Noix and Montreal from 1778-79, the regimental surgeon reported:  
 
 
that several of the men of the regiment, by their Debauchery 
with Whores, have brought Disease upon themselves; which 
being not only to the scandal of their own Characters, but to the 
prejudice of the king‟s service, there by disgracefully rendering 
themselves incapable to do their duty.
39




It was not the sexual relations which caused a problem and, indeed, the presence 
of wives and camp followers were accepted as inevitable and even good for morale; but 
the impact on effectiveness was a constant threat.  The same regiment had a Mrs. Daly 
removed from the barracks, warning the soldiers against „having any carnal Connection 
with her, as there is greatest reason to believe that she is Dangerously Disordered‟.
40
   
Stephen Brumwell has suggested that Highlanders appeared before courts martial 
with less frequency than other soldiers, something which may indeed be true.  To ascribe 
this to ethnic exceptionalism, however, is to misread the contextual parameters of 
Highland military service and the careful construction of Highland identity around a 
myth of good behaviour.  Alexander Macdonald, for instance, refused to administer 
corporal punishment to two drunken NCOs in 1775 on the basis of the impact it would 
have on morale in the garrison to see two Highlanders so punished.  Such attitudes 
appear to have been widespread, at least within the 84
th
 Foot.  Macdonald wanted a 
deserter by the name of Farquhar McQuarrie to be hanged or shot, but in a letter to Major 
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John Small he wagered that „you will send me word to let him at his Liberty for a bare 
reprimand because he is a Highlander‟.  There was just one execution and thirteen 
floggings for 140 convictions for capital and minor crimes in the 84
th
 Foot between 1775 
and 1783.
41
  The problems of discipline did not mark child-like misdemeanours or even a 
failure of Highland professionalization, but quite the opposite, a shift in the enlisted 
Highlander‟s professional mentality from socially proscribed labourer to semi-
independent veteran soldier.  Indeed, by simply becoming soldiers, Highlanders had to 
defend themselves from the warnings and accusations of relatives about drunkenness and 




Many of these problems might also be attributed to the enormous feeling of 
displacement and separation experienced by Highland soldiers after exposure to the 
imperial environment.  Professionalization should not be seen as singularly positive, for 
it forced acceptance of a brutal military environment for which civilian experiences and 
conceptions had inadequately prepared them.  Until the 1790s, it was often felt that a 
soldier dispatched overseas was lost to his native community, to be given up in a 
marginally less hyperbolic thought process than the mock funerals which accompanied 
nineteenth-century serf conscripts into the Russian imperial army.
43
  Men in positions of 
authority, officers and chaplains, had more opportunity for leave, but also felt isolated.  
Major John Nairne of the 84
th
 Foot asked his thirteen-year-old daughter, Madie, to 
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inform him, „if you have seen or heard of your mother since I left Quebec‟ three years 
previously.  Nairne probably saw his daughter only once between 1777 and 1782.
44
  
Nairne returned to Scotland after the war and his sister later commented that Nairne was 
a stranger to his daughter.
45
   
There did not have to be intimate family connections for soldiers to feel isolated 
by their service.  Chaplain Robert Macpherson seems to have been particularly 
embittered by the lack of correspondence from Scotland.  Lamenting the lack of contact, 
Macpherson played on the allegory of the Prophet Mohammed on the mountain and 
reported that if his friends would not come to him, he would have to return to Scotland.  
Four months later and still without having received a letter, Macpherson decided that the 
only expedient was to fill his letters home with incoherent nonsense in an attempt to 
elicit a response.  He would later complain of not having had a letter in two years.
46
  The 
effects were amplified by the logistical difficulties of epistolary correspondence in the 
eighteenth century.  One Highland officer in Halifax received a letter from a fellow 
officer in his regiment only after it was found on a road near the town.  Chaplain James 
Maclagan‟s reason for not replying to a letter from Scotland for at least several months 
was that he lacked his „wanted conveniences‟ while on campaign with the 42
nd
 Foot in 
1778.  He would eventually write to Reverend Hugh MacDiarmid of Glasgow from a tent 
                                                 
44
 LAC, MG23, GIII23/1, ff. 19-38, John Nairne to Madie Nairne, 18 Sept. 1780-13 Oct. 1782; Madie was 
looked after by the family of Nairne‟s fellow 84
th
 Foot officer, Malcolm Fraser, in Quebec while Nairne‟s 
wife continued to run the estate near La Malbaie further down the St Lawrence.   
45
 LAC, MG23, GIII23/1, ff. 70-73, Margaret Rowland to Madie, 26 Mar. 1784. 
46
 LoC, M 2267, reel 46, Robert Macpherson to William Macpherson, 16 Nov. 1758, 27 Feb. 1759 & 24 
Dec. 1761.     
99 
 
on Long Island, in which he had fixed four stakes in the ground and nailed a board to the 
top as a rest.
47
 
A sense of isolation was expanded exponentially by the brief, but terrifying 
moments, in which soldiers experienced combat.  Their civilian contemporaries may 
have assured their relatives that, „I think your face would rather be, to be envy‟d as pitied, 
for such honourable scares always become a soldier‟, but the extent of the horrors were 
probably lost on them.  It is unknown, for example, whether Lt. Alexander Campbell, 
who had his face „disfigured and is a good deal hurt‟ at Louisbourg would have thought 
it honourable.  John MacPherson, the younger son of George Macpherson of Invereshie, 




 Foot, reported the moment his 
friend, Captain Sir Alexander Murray of the 17
th
 Foot, was hit by a cannonball at 
Brooklyn in 1776, „in all my life I never saw a man so mangled – He was a gentle young 
man, deservedly regretted‟.  William Leslie, another friend who had attended school with 
Murray, similarly lamented the death.  Leslie was killed four months later at Princeton.
48
 
If soldiers perceived their service in the context of their civilian lives, the impact 
of war could be devastating.  Sir Alexander Murray‟s friend, John Macpherson, was 
himself wounded at Princeton, a musket ball tearing through the joint of his left hand, 
rendering it useless, and another passed through his chest.  He spent three months lying 
on his back, unable to turn over.  The chest wound reopened over the course of the next 
two years, giving him immense pain, something he kept from his future wife, though he 
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believed without much success.
49
  Macpherson probably kept the information to himself 
as it might have reduced his masculinity in the eyes of his fiancé.  Furthermore, wounded 
soldiers were primarily concerned about the disfiguring effect of battle wounds on their 
senses or extremities, which were most damaging to their continued ability to function as 
part of society.  The ability to maintain a trade was central.  Private John McNaughton 
enlisted in the 42
nd
 Foot in the early stages of the Seven Years‟ War and fought in most 
of the major actions until he was shot through both thighs.  He was discharged and 
returned to Scotland, but found that, at least, initially, he „was so weakly as to be 
incapable of any business, and his pension yielded but a scanty subsistence‟.  The 
problem of earning a wage involved McNaughton in a rancorous legal battle as he sought 
to establish himself as a shoemaker in Leith.
50
  Alexander Campbell, a member of the 
Argyll elite, was greatly relieved that, although a ball had taken an inch of bone from his 
calf at Bunker Hill, it was, „not disfigur‟d at all‟, and he „thank[ed] God I have made a 
most remarkable recovery‟.  Captain James Murray received his wound, a musket ball in 
the thigh shortly before the 42
nd
 Foot was obliged to retire from its doomed assault on 
Ticonderoga in 1758.  Doctors believed the wound looked as well as could be expected, 
and Murray felt confident three days later that he was out of danger, „as it [the ball] has 
only grazed the bone‟.
51
  In the ethos of the eighteenth-century elite, wounds could be 
honourable, but the primary concern remained functionality in the post-war world.  This 
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was something which mattered more to the labouring class than to their officers.  These 
problems and concerns, expressed by Highland soldiers, accompanied every British 
regiment to North America.  
 
 
III   PROFESSIONALIZATION: TACTICS 
The Highland regiments improved tactical efficiency in North America as part of their 
integration into the British army.  The British army in the period placed a premium on 
order and discipline and measured regiments on this basis.  During the Québec campaign 
of 1759, James Wolfe was determined to emphasize order and discipline as the key to 
success.  Rather than rely on vigorous assaults, Wolfe directed that disciplined platoon 
firing was to be employed in a „regular manner‟ until the enemy was defeated.  Before 
the battle on the Plains of Abraham, on 13 September, he encouraged the soldiers by 
emphasizing their professionalism as formed bodies and, if they remained as such, they 
would not be defeated by „five weak French battalions, mingled with a disorderly 
peasantry‟.  Impetuosity was discouraged until the closing stages of any action and any 
man who fired before being ordered to do so was to be put to death.
52
  A similar 
discouragement of irregular impetuosity was consequently enforced at the lowest levels 
in the Highland regiments.  Manual exercises were taken very seriously by Highland 
officers, keen to present their men as reliable and efficient.  Both officers and men were 
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rebuked for their failure to attend the exercises.
53
  The extent of Highland adherence to 
close order tactics in the early stages of the Seven Years‟ War is exhibited in the report 
published in the Pennsylvania Gazette following the disastrous action outside Fort 
Duquesne involving the 77
th
 Foot in 1758.  It reported that while the provincials had 
made a good defence by concealing themselves behind obstacles, „The Highlanders 
exposed themselves without any cover, and were shot down in great numbers.‟
54
 
 Highland battalions seem to have acted with regularity, impetuosity being seen by 
Highland officers as an aberration of slowly inculcated drills.  Orders to attack with 
bayonet or broadsword came from above in response to particular tactical circumstances.  
Lt. Malcolm Fraser of the 78
th
 Foot stated that on 13 September 1759 the Highlanders 
had been ordered to draw their swords by General James Murray.  Murray‟s rationale 
was to break French morale with an aggressive assault after exchanges of musketry had 
weakened their resolve.  Fraser, in fact, complained that the decision had saved many 
French lives, it being impossible for the artillery to do its work through fear of hitting the 
attacking Highlanders.  It is also highly likely that the 76
th
 Foot‟s bayonet charge at 
Green Springs on 6 July 1781 was likewise instigated on the orders of Charles 
Cornwallis.
55
  Officers of the Highland regiments were forced to walk a fine line between 
discipline and an aggressive response to the highly emotional circumstances of combat.  
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After the action at the falls of Montmorency on 31 July 1759, there was a good deal of 
recrimination over the failure, some of which was directed at the Highlanders.  Wolfe 
himself believed that the battle would have been won had the 78
th
 Foot been more 
aggressive.  In the aftermath of the battle, he made it known to the entire army that 
„Amherst‟s and the Highland Regiment alone by the soldier-like and Cool manner in 
which they formed, would undoubtedly have beat back the whole Canadien [sic] Army, if 
they had ventured to attack them‟.
56
  The link here between „Cool manner‟ and 
aggressive spirit was made clear, but this was little help to inexperienced Highland 
officers commanding largely inexperienced troops, trying to discipline them in the 
accepted ethos of the British army.   
The external praise that emerged for the Highland soldier was given precisely 
because their actions reflected a reading of skills and professionalism that was expected 
across the British military establishment.  The Morning Chronicle praised the actions of 
the 42
nd
 Foot at Piscataway in May 1777, when the regiment‟s piquet was attacked by a 
large body of rebels.  With support from a composite light infantry battalion the rebels 
were driven off, but there was no suggestion that „the very spirited and intrepid 
behaviour‟ of the 42
nd
 was in any way unique or different from the praise reserved for 
other British troops.  On this occasion the light infantry was equally praised for its 
„impetuosity‟ and the ardour of the troops was markedly British, rather than Highland.
57
  
With insight into how dominant narratives are created from the selective use of source 
material, an officer who wrote an excellent post-war history of the Seven Year‟s War 
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made no mention of the much celebrated role of the 42
nd
 Foot at the assault on Fort 
Carillon in 1758.  For Thomas Mante, an English officer who joined the 77
th




The regulars advanced with the greatest intrepidly, to storm the 
breast-work, which they now, when it was too late to retreat, 
found well covered with felled trees, extending one hundred 
yards in front, with the branches pointing outwards, and 
strengthened with logs, stumps of trees and every other kind of 
rubbish they could collect, that was fit for the purpose.
58




Although Mante was English, he held a commission in a Highland regiment.  His 
silence on the 42
nd
 Foot is interesting, however.  It may have been that this reflected the 
regimental rivalry of officers of the 77
th
 Foot.  If it did, it is suggestive of how much a 
unified „Highland‟ contribution to the army was a later invention.  Most significantly, 
however, was his opinion that Carillon would „prove a most useful lesson on the little 
consequence of the most consummate bravery, when not steadily directed by ability and 
experience‟.
59
  For this leader of Highland manpower, no extent of bravery could 
overcome an entire lack of regular military discipline. 
The efficiency of tactics was a two-fold process.  By seeking professionalization 
as British regulars, inexperienced Highland soldiers exposed themselves to disaster, as at 
Fort Duquesne.  Equally, however, they became more adept at combat in North America 
and, with the British army more generally, grew extremely proficient as a result.  John 
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Forbes reported from Shippensburg in September 1758, that the Highlanders were „ten 
times more steady and Cautious‟, following ten days of active operations against 
Amerindian war parties, sleeping in the rough the whole time.
60
  By June 1764, men of 
the 42
nd
 were able to conduct complicated manoeuvres at camps on the frontier.  
Returning to the garrison at Dublin following the war, the skeletal remains of the 
regiment performed the light infantry manoeuvres they had used at Bushy Run to on-
looking officers.  With the light infantry companies already disbanded, their ability to 
perform these manoeuvres suggests a great deal of proficiency across the regiment.  
Likewise, during the assault on Guadeloupe in April 1761, the regiment‟s second 
battalion „behaved, on this occasion, with the greatest coolness and resolution, keeping 
up, as they advanced, a regular platoon-firing‟.
61
 
During the War of American Independence, Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell 
described in great detail the standing orders for his men of the 71
st
 Foot.  Campbell 
clearly desired the deployment to be made according to regulations, though what exact 
regulations he was referring to is unknown.  He allowed, however, that in the case of 
„real action‟, order was to be structured by what was expedient, rather than by dogmatic 
adherence to regulations.  If combat was to take place in wooded areas, one or more 
sections per company would deploy as skirmishers „to occupy every tree stump, log, 
bush ... hedge, wall or in short any kind of covering‟. These men were to advance „with 
the utmost agility and continue to fire, load and spring [from cover] as they advance upon 
or from the enemy‟.  The versatility of non-specialized sections to operate in such a 
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manner suggests efficiency in open order tactics across the extent of the regiment.  By 
contrast, the reliance on close order tactics and Von Steuban‟s Prussian drills by some 
elements of the Continental army constrained revolutionary soldiers in the face of more 
adaptive tactics used by British regiments.  This was the case during the battle of Green 
Springs on 6 July 1781, when a bayonet charge by the Pennsylvania Line enabled 
Brigadier-General Anthony Wayne to extricate his force but (reversing the tactical 
narrative of the war) resulted in the Pennsylvanians being raked by the 76
th
 Foot from 
covered positions in the woods.
62
   
Open order tactics were in no way, however, unique to the Highland regiments, 
but evolved to deal with the tactical and environmental parameters of the American 
rebellion.  The notion that the British army failed to adapt to the requirements of the war 
is now largely accepted as fictive; the army‟s tactical versatility led to new approaches to 
combat, with more emphasis on aggressive charges.  British units used extended rank-
and-file spacings and, in the main, entered the killing zone at a measured trot, limiting 
the time they were exposed to rebel fire.  The assaulting formation accelerated as they 
approached the enemy position, placing a premium on the aggressive élan of a single 
volley followed by a bayonet charge.  With sufficient numbers it was often effective.  
General Orders issued shortly before the British occupied New York City on 15 
September 1776 reminded the troops of the success they had had at the battle of Long 
Island, „The soldiers are reminded of their evident superiority on the 27
th
 of August, by 
charging the rebels with their bayonets, even in the woods, where they thought 
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themselves invincible ... The general therefore recommends to the troops, an entire 
dependence upon their bayonets.‟  Orders given to the Royal Highland Emigrants by 
Major John Nairne in 1777 stated pointedly: „The bayonet is the weapon that must be 
depended upon.‟  It was not always successful, however.  The single volley was often 
ineffectual in physically incapacitating rebel soldiers and, while such aggressive tactics 
generally gave British troops command of the field, often in the face of a superior enemy, 
it resulted in heavy casualties.  A recent study of the combat efficiency of the British 
army in North America suggests that the army performed extremely well but that the 
topography favoured the Fabian tactics and political objectives of the rebels.
63
  What is 
important is that British tactics developed through an adaption to the political, tactical, 
technological, and environment parameters of the war.  To view the aggressive spirit of 
the Highland regiments in North America as an ethnically-based military culture, which 
referenced the Wars of the Three Kingdoms era „Highland Charge‟, is to entirely 
misunderstand the adaptation of the British army in the period more generally. 
While improvement in military conduct was evident, this does not mean, however, 
that Highlanders were ever uniquely effective in the North American environment.  In 





Foot: „Having observed on our march that the Highlanders lose themselves in the Woods 
as soon as they got out of the Road, [they] cannot on that account be employed as 
flankers.‟  By this point, after a horrific period of service, thirty individuals were simply 
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incapable of walking any further, much less skirmishing on the frontier.
64
  A remarkable 
assessment of the Highlanders‟ capacities was penned by an army surgeon, Dr. Richard 
Huck-Saunders of Philadelphia, at the beginning of the 1758 campaign.  He explained 
the „total Revolution‟ in the army since service in America and that „The art of War is 
much changed and improved here‟.  „Our hair is about an inch long; ... hats ... are worn 
slouched ... The Highlanders have put on breeches ... Swords and sashes are degraded, 
and many have taken up the Hatchet and wear Tomahawks.‟
65
  Many officers believed 
that Highland uniform should be converted to more utilitarian, indeed more pan-British 
formats, to ease efficiency.  During both conflicts, Highland soldiers were quick to 
abandon their plaids and swords as a burden, adapting to a regularized place in the 
British army in tandem with an adaptation to alien environmental conditions.
66
     In 
effect, part of the process of military effectiveness in the new world was the 
abandonment of the very signifiers of Highland military exceptionalism. 
Why then, did the myth of the Highland soldier as an innately exceptional soldier 
develop?  Part of the reason is the use of highly selective source material without 
contextualization.  Compare, for example, two accounts of the battle of Stono Ferry, 
fought in South Carolina on 20 June 1779.  To Alexander Garden, aide-de-camp to 
Continental general Nathaniel Greene, the 71
st
 Foot were „the elites of the British army‟, 
making their annihilation by a bayonet charge of the South Carolina Continental Line an 
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impressive feat.  The assault was so devastating that only nine men of two full companies 
of the 71
st
 Foot escaped.  This was not, however, how the battle was later interpreted by 
South Carolinian historian, Edward McCrady, for whom the engagement was „so 
obstinately maintained by the Highlanders that they did not retreat until all their officers 
were either killed or wounded; and of the two companies only eleven [sic] men were able 
to make good their retreat‟.
67
  Guillaume, le vicomte de Deux-Ponts, who commanded a 
regiment of Rochambeau‟s army at Yorktown in 1781, was told by captured British 
officers that at the opening of the French assault on Redoubt 9 on 14 October 1781, Lt. 
Col. Duncan Macpherson of the 71
st
 Foot and thirty others took the opportunity to 
abandon the Hessians defenders of the Redoubt and retreat to the main siege lines.  
Macpherson, who was to be the subject of a fawning Gaelic eulogy in 1792, was charged 
by his fellow officers with cowardice.  It is impossible to know whether this was 
genuinely a case of cowardice or a product of personal antipathies directed at 
Macpherson, or indeed, a later invention to serve an American grand narrative.  What is 
clear is that in a multiplicity of sources, there is a narrative tradition that does not put 
Highland soldiers beyond reproach.
68
 
There was, it has to be confessed, a pre-existing belief in Gaelic martial skill 
which sustained the myth of Highland prowess.  James Glen, the governor of South 
Carolina between 1738 and 1756, believed the 77
th
 Foot and George Washington‟s 
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„American Highlanders‟ to be the only solution to the massive superiority held by the 
French and their allies in petite guerre.  Underpinning Glen‟s assessment was the 
presumption that the Highlanders, both metropolitan and colonial, shared a military 
culture more akin to their savage opponents than to Lowland-born observers.  The spread 
of these assumptions of Highland exceptionalism was impressive.  Benjamin Franklin‟s 
Pennsylvania Gazette reported the Highlanders to be „spirited martialists‟.  On hearing of 
the dispatch of the 42
nd
 Foot to America, the Governor of New France, Pierre Francois, 
Marquis de Vaudreuil, requested a regiment of soldiers from Roussillon: „They will be 
very useful, if it were only to respond to the dispatch of the Scotch Highlanders by the 
English, and to excite the vanity of our Indians ... that no light infantry can beat them.‟  
Likewise, Louis-Joseph de Montcalm concluded that the English were weak and „when 
transplanted, are no longer like those in Europe‟.  But he warned, „We must look to my 
Lord Loudoun‟s Scotchmen, for it appears that general has arrived.‟  As early as 1744, a 
French officer had commented on a projected British fort at Wood Creek, New York: 
„that they [the English] were surely making this settlement to place there Scots, who fear 
the Indians less than the other peoples whom they get from Europe‟.
69
 
There is little evidence, however, to suggest that the regiments were employed in 
vastly different ways from other units; senior officers did not easily subordinate military 
decisions to ethnic interpretations.  Despite histrionic contemporary comments on the 
expendability of the Highland regiments, the Gaels were never utilized as cannon-fodder 
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in the wilds of America.
70
  A comparison of the service histories of the Highland 




 Foot reveal some startling conclusions and place 
Highland casualties in context.  The 35
th
 Foot left Ireland in 1756, and like the 
Highlanders, was considered ineffective by senior officers (including the Duke of 
Cumberland) due to the inexperience enforced by pre-deployment augmentations.  They 
were bloodied at Fort William Henry before seeing action at Québec in 1759, Sainte Foy 
in 1760, Martinique in 1761-62, and Havana in 1762, before being sent to Florida in July 
1763.  By August 1765, the regiment numbered just ninety-two rank-and-file.  It was 
reported in the Scots Magazine that of the 1000 men who had left Ireland in 1756, only 





Foot.  The 17
th
 Foot left Ireland in 1757 and was at Louisbourg in 1758, Ticonderoga in 




 was dispatched to the frontier 
during Pontiac‟s rebellion.  By June 1763, it was down to eight officers and sixty-eight 
men.  It returned to Britain in skeletal form in 1767 having already seen most of its best 
troops transferred to battalions remaining in America.
71
  Established English regiments 
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IV   IMPERIAL SAVAGERY  
High losses in North America help reveal a salient feature of war in the colonies: the 
savagery with which it was conducted.  Lurid accounts of brutality were a staple of 
contemporary commentaries and continue to fascinate modern readers.
72
  The colonial 
environment supposedly led to an „American way of war‟, which was distinct to 
European methods and in which one central feature was savagery.  The North American 
environment, it was believed, was a corrupter of values that could reduce even civilized 
nations to barbarity.  Lt Malcolm Fraser of the 78
th
 Foot, who participated in the Québec 
campaign of 1759, believed that members of the provincial Goreham‟s Rangers were 
„worse than savage‟ for killing a man and two boys they had taken prisoner: „[T]his 
barbarous action proceeded from that cowardice and barbarity which seems so natural to 
a native of America, whether of Indian or European extraction.‟
73
  As Jill Lepore has 
argued, the brutality of King Philip‟s War in the 1670s was inspired, in part, by the 
colonists‟ fear of losing their „Englishness‟ to the savage environment, prompting a war 
of extermination to expunge the Natives from their collective consciousness.
74
  The 
impact of location on all manner of human and animal functions was a view shared by 
leading intellectuals in the eighteenth-century Atlantic World.  Thomas Jefferson and the 
Comte de Buffon would famously challenge each other on the effects of North America 
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One hundred years after King Philip‟s War, environment was less of a central 
factor in the conduct of North American warfare.  What made American warfare 
different was its imperial nature, based on assumed imperatives, societal perceptions, and 
expediency.  The savagery of military action against non-white minorities (as they were 
understood by Anglo-Americans in the period) rested more on a complicated set of 
socio-political perceptions than the environment in which a society lived.  While the two 
were never discrete, class distinctions, labour use, military mentality, and an assumed 
place on the stadial scale, were privileged as marks of civility.  According to Scottish 
enlightenment thinkers, while environment was important, it was increasingly questioned 
as a reason for societal differences.  David Hume dismissed the „physical causes‟ of 
climate as of lesser importance than „moral causes‟, maintaining that Scots and English 
differed in character despite similar climates.
76
  Scottish thinkers still wrote about soil, 
terrain, climate, but were more willing to emphasize human drive to explain perceived 
differences in the ability to succeed.
77
 
As a result, Highland soldiers, like their Anglo-American counterparts, were 
predisposed to savagery in the new world.  When contact with Native Americans 
exposed Europeans to different military values, Europeans escalated the brutality of 
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warfare to eradicate civilizations considered dangerous and a threat to established 
order.
78
  This is not to say that savagery was purely North America, or even wholly 
imperial.  War in Europe, in which one side was defined as savage, different, or a 
challenge to legitimate political or religious authority, had always been fought differently.  
There was clearly overlap, however, as imperial war, whether it was against Native 
Americans, colonists, Black slaves, or indeed rebellious Highlanders, necessitated a 
similar reading of these conflicts.
79
 
Many of the brutal actions carried out by Highlands soldiers might have occurred 
on most battlefields in the eighteenth century.  Stephen Conway has clearly shown how 
soldiers‟ poor conduct resulted from material problems, poor pay, temptation, and from a 
general lack of regard for irregularities by junior officers, who ignored their men‟s 
actions for a variety of personal, professional, and political reasons.
80
  A major 
disadvantage of the army‟s response to the rebellion was that it conflicted with the desire 
to win over the colonists rather than with the need to treat them as enemies to be 
subjected to imperial violence.  „[F]orce does not Alter inclinations‟, General Robertson 
told his daughter on 15 September 1780 after the British victory at Camden and the 
advocacy of harsh methods usually only applied to private property.
81
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But it must also be admitted that imperially-based assumptions were vital to the 
expansion of savagery.  Tactics rarely considered between established European nations 
were legitimated during the colonial wars in North America.  Having led the expedition 
against the Cherokee in 1761 and, firmly believing in the ability of the army to resolve an 
internal crisis, James Grant advocated an approach to the American rebellion that had 
paid dividends in 1761: „Don‟t flatter yourself with hopes of submission or 
accommodation, till the Americans are crushed or forced to terms ... treat them with 
severity and you‟ll soon make them sick‟.  He had earlier argued for the burning of 
Philadelphia and noted, „Law subsides in a country where civil war subsists‟.
82
  Relatives 
of Grant residing in the eastern Highlands wrote to him suggesting the destruction of the 
harvests to starve the rebels into submission, a policy previously carried out in the 
western Highlands, and, to an extent at Québec.  For men like Grant, it was only too late 
that they realized the army alone could not solve the American rebellion.
83
  Not all 
officers condoned overt violence.  John Small suggested to the recently replaced 
American Secretary, the Earl of Dartmouth, on 26 January 1776, that naval methods 
employed during the Jacobite rebellions be used to prevent the landing of arms in the 
colonies by Dutch ships.
 
 But Highlanders recommended harsher methods with 
increasing frequency.  Lt. Col. Thomas Stirling of the 42
nd
 Foot became sick of the war 
and saw hard-line measures as the only solution to shortening it.
84
  The threat to 
established order, as we will see in Chapter 5, was central to Gaelic conceptions of the 
                                                 
82
 LoC, M 2267, reel 29, James Grant to John Harvey, 10 Aug. 1775 & 29 Nov. 1775.  
83
 LoC, M 2267, reel 35, Robert Grant to James Grant, 29 Jun. 1777; LoC, M 2267, reel 29, Grant to 
unknown, 12 Oct. 1778.  
84
 Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth, II, 413; NAS, GD24/1, f. 458, Thomas Stirling to Sir William 
Stirling, 3 Jul. 1777.  
116 
 
American rebellion and prompted the legitimization of certain methods, given the threat 
to order that the rebellion created. 
A presumption of inferiority in ethnic minorities was also responsible for the 
savagery of imperial war.  For the majority of Highlanders, including those who fought 
in North America, the Indians were „savages‟.  The superiority of the Gael over the 
Native American was political, ethnic, societal, and sexual.  Donald Cameron wrote in 
1762 of passing his time in Halifax by taking „squaws‟ into the woods.  He joked that he 
would probably leave his Scottish family some „savages‟ as relatives in America.  At the 
siege of Louisbourg in 1758, a naked Native American warrior was shot through the 
groin by a Highland soldier.  Having been buried, he was dug up and dragged through 
the encampment to the delight of some soldiers who were „passing their jokes upon it 
[the hole through the groin]‟.  James Thompson reported of this incident that it was 
thought by the Canadian women that he had been dug up to be cannibalized, though, in 
an irony probably missed by the author, they were assured that the Highlanders „lived the 
same as other civilized people‟.
85
   
The 2/42
nd
 Foot participating in the capture of Guadeloupe in 1761, during which 
time vicious tactics were employed to defeat the slaves who had been armed by their 
French owners in order to defend the island.  In one instance in February, „a body of 
armed Negroes had concealed themselves in the canes, and from thence annoyed the 
troops‟.  In response, British troops „set fire to the several corners of the field, and 
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burn[ed] the Negroes and the canes‟.
86
  Montgomery‟s expedition against the Cherokee 
in 1760 was conducted with equal venom and official reports suggest the 77
th
 Foot 
destroyed 388 hamlets or cultivations up to September 1760, an average of more than 
two a day.  In his journal, Amherst recorded his approval of Montgomery‟s methods, 
noting it was „the greatest stroke the Indians have felt‟.
87
  Even biological warfare seems 
to have been employed, and justified, with more frequency than the infamous use of 
smallpox by Jeffrey Amherst suggests.
88
  The very fact of such cruelty demonstrated a 
Highland interaction with British values. 
The advocacy of such measures was the product of investing the Highland 
regiments with a monopoly, or at least a legitimacy of violence.  Armed with the 
superiority of violence, Highland soldiers became agents of the state within an imperial 
sphere.  Furthermore, as Highland contacts with the imperial state were largely through 
the medium of military service, their natural reaction to internal problems was defined by 
military responses.  The result was a one-dimensional view of the empire and a 
legitimization of violence in its defence.  The violent agency of Highland soldiers also 
challenged the imagined hierarchy of the Atlantic world.  Violence was an essential way 
of defining hierarchy and Highland soldiers could interact with local populations in an 
arrogant and sometimes brutal manner.  In April 1778, Archibald Campbell had to issue 
a special order to his battalion, the 2/71
st
 Foot, reporting that he:  
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Can hardly give credit to the justness of the complaints that 
have been reportedly made to him of the irregular and 
unmilitary conduct of the soldiers of the 71
st
 regt quartered near 
the south shore of this island [Staten Island] so opposite to the 
wanted and well deserved reputation acquired by the national 






The previous night, one hundred men of the regiment had robbed fishing nets 
belonging to the local inhabitants and, when challenged, had beaten several individuals 
before threatening to kill them, using their bayonets as knives.  This was not an isolated 
incident in the battalion and Campbell directed that officers were to visit the encampment 
every night to prevent further incidents.
90
 
A sense of the bitter actions that typified North American warfare may be found 
in a report penned by an officer of the 84
th
 Foot, shortly after his return from a dawn raid 
in June 1779.  A detachment of the 84
th
 Foot was ordered to Caughnauga to take two 
Indians, who were known to be sympathetic to the rebels, prisoner.  Leaving Montreal, 
the party arrived in the village shortly before daybreak.  With dawn fast approaching, Lt. 
Maclean and four soldiers forced entry into a house from the front, while a similar 
section went in through the back door.  Inside, they found only women, children, and an 
old man. According to the report, the inhabitants told Mclean that if he wanted to find the 
men, he should do so himself.  Without the light of day, Mclean was unwilling to risk a 
search of the upper level of the house, instead attempting to coax down any who might 
be upstairs, with erroneous words explaining through an interpreter that the men‟s fathers 
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and the tribal chiefs wished to see them.  Getting no response, Mclean waited until the 
light was sufficient before proceeding upstairs; as he did so and with his escort in another 
room, when he was attacked by men with „knifes and tomahawks‟.  They were fought off 
in a confused scuffle.  Not willing to be arrested, however, and with the 84
th
 men almost 
on them, the assailants seized hold of their firearms and directed several shots at Mclean 
and his men.  One soldier was hit „two or three‟ times in rapid succession.  In the 
crowded confines of the house, the Highlanders returned fire, hitting both Indians, one 
„just a dying‟ in front of them. The other, severely wounded, jumped from the window 
into the yard, severely injuring himself further.  With the detachment‟s objective 
apparently met, one assailant dead, the other dying in the yard, „In this situation we left 
them and marched off,‟ Mclean reported, „Carrying our wounded man‟.
91
 
   There was a developing fascination among Highlanders with imperial exoticism.  
Alexander Farqharson sent a letter from Oswego to the eastern Highlands in August 1760, 
in which he reported he had „a few shells & other Indian Curiosities‟ to deliver to Lady 
Stair.  Contained in the letter was also:  
 
 
A small Indian present, which I got here, A French Indian scalp, 
and as it can add no great weight to this letter, I hope small as it 
is, you will accept it. I have several large ones which are rather 
too bulky to transmit in this manner, but I hope to bring those 
myself.
92
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Farqharson most probably had not participated in the act of scalping, but had 
acquired several examples and was keen that his relatives enjoyed such curiosities.  
Chaplain Robert Macpherson invoked scalping in complaining of the laurels the 
Highland regiments were reaping in Germany in 1761.  He reported that if „our scalpers‟ 




 Foot „would be no more spoken of‟.  Implicit in 
Macpherson‟s letter was the idea that the regiments in America had become scalpers by 
virtue of their theatre of service and that imperial wars in the colonies were being 
forgotten next to events in central Germany.
93
  In effect, whether it was fascination with 
Indian curiosities or the lack of attention devoted to their own prowess, Highland soldiers 
were defining themselves by their association with savage warfare.  One of the most 
revealing of these links is the portrait of Hugh Montgomery, twelfth Earl of Eglington, in 
the National Gallery of Scotland, by or after J.S. Copley, c.1780-1790.  Montgomery had 
served in the 77
th
 during the Cherokee expedition, but went on to serve in the prestigious 
1
st
 Foot, was Lt. Col. of the Argyll Fencibles, three times MP for Ayrshire and Inspector 
of Military Roads in Scotland from 1789.  Nevertheless, the backdrop Montgomery 
chose for the martial portrait of himself in Highland garb, was the burning of a Cherokee 
village in 1760.
94
  By the 1780s, imperial savagery had become a positively defining 
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V   CONCLUSIONS 
The culture of war in the Highland regiments was defined by imperial perceptions and 
professionalization.  They sought status within the imperial sphere, a demand which led 
to an embracing of professional skill and imperial savagery.  This was a transformative 
experience for the young officers and soldiers of the Highland regiments as they were 
handed a superiority of violence over peoples in far-flung parts of the empire.  If 
domestically the Highlander was exposed to cultural assumptions of Gaelic inferiority, 
on the North American continent, they were, as soldiers, offered full licence to 
expressions of agency, martial identity, masculinity, and conquest of subordinate peoples. 
Gaelic military exceptionalism did exist, but it did not originate in an innate 
Highland capacity for war.  Gaelic military exceptionalism rested on the assumptions 
attributed to the cultural group.  Highlanders and non-Highlanders alike continued to 
invest the regiments with distinct attributes even when their socio-economic origins and 
their functioning as soldiers were analogous to the experiences of other British troops.  It 
helped create the conditions for the highlighting of differences in military culture.  The 
direct experience of warfare in North America cannot be disconnected from the 
development of martial imagery in the Scottish Highlands.  His military experiences, 
made him in the eyes of others, a distinct and exceptional character.  It was this that 
allowed him to be later moulded to suit the imagery of the noble savage imperial 













The social make-up of the Highland regiments emerged primarily from the utility of 
military service as a means of economic security.  The most significant change to the 
historiography of the Highland soldier, in recent years, has been the rationalization of 
motives for raising the regiments.  Military service was a lucrative diversification of 
estate economies, only marginally different to other commercial improvements.  The 
army was conceived of as a normal means of securing private interest.  In characterizing, 
however, regional involvement in the fiscal-military state as no more than an extension 
of personal, familial or estate interest, historians miss the opportunity to confront the 
significant demands engendered by military service.  Indeed, the impact of these 
experiences are explicitly dismissed on the correct, but misunderstood, basis that short-
term regiments ensured that no permanent regimental culture existed to inculcate military 
life and corporate identity into the men who enlisted.
1
  As a consequence of this 
interpretive framework, an incongruity has emerged in recent literature.  The hierarchical 
nature of the army and Highland society has meant that deference and a strong 
attachment to superior officers remains important in accounting for social relations in the 
early Highland regiments.  At the same time, the role of coercion as a facilitating factor 
in recruitment is increasingly emphasized, being placed awkwardly alongside the 
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antithetical assumption that, „[t]he bond between a Highlander and his officer was … 
closer than the relationship between the English soldier and his superiors‟, and that „such 
men shared a common culture and heritage‟.
2
   
Citing the motivational and cultural bonds between officers and their men 
engages a long tradition in regimental historiography.  Its leading advocate was David 
Stewart of Garth and his Sketches of the Character, Manners and Present State of the 
Highlanders of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1822), a text which would become the foundation 
of the stereotype of the Highlander as a martial race in the nineteenth century.  Garth, a 
Highland officer in the 42
nd
 Foot who had served since 1787, tellingly interwove the 
history, language, and customs of the Highlands with accounts of the Highland regiments. 
Amongst a plethora of exaggerations concerning the martial prowess of the Highland 
soldier, Garth explained that a mythical force „spurred on the Highlanders to follow their 
chieftains to the cannon‟s mouth‟.
3
   Later historians are more nuanced, but describe 
variations on this theme - the direct and personal nature of regimental recruiting in the 
Highlands and the affinity promoted between respective ranks by a shared cultural 
context. 
In doing so, however, there was an unquestionable lack of adequate contextual 
awareness of the environment in which Garth‟s evidence originated.  The dominant 
emotional motif of Sketches of the Character was one of steady decline, from what Garth 
saw as the pure Highland regiments of the mid-eighteenth century to the ethnically varied 
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and inferior soldier of the 1820s.  That this decline had taken place within two 
generations made Garth‟s critique of social change clear and present.
4
  Garth‟s narrative 
necessitated the invention of an idealized Highland society, one in which martial prowess 
and military culture had underpinned all social, political, and economic functions.  As the 
clan system had provided warriors on the basis of hierarchy, Garth‟s understanding of the 
Highland warrior was predicated on deference and hierarchy, as well as on pure martial 
spirit.  But as well as engaging Gaelic concepts of social order, Garth‟s invention of the 
Highlander mirrored contemporary historicism.  In constructing a narrative of declension, 
Garth adhered to the model set out by Edward Gibbon, in making Tactiean claims about 
the emasculation of martial strength through social change.
5
  Garth‟s reading of Highland 
social order was, therefore, tied to these two mutually reinforcing intellectual traditions: a 
Gaelic tradition which stressed hierarchy as the basis for good social order and an 
enlightenment concern with the weakening of martial strength.  Revealingly, Garth also 
shared with Gibbon the proposition that religion was a major cause of this degeneracy, 
though Garth did not attribute the problem to religion per se, but to „fanaticism‟ which 
„tend[ed] to the most deplorable results in the Highlands‟, in promoting a culture of 
disbelief in superiors and a lack of respect more generally.  This ahistoric reading of 
Highland social order has coloured popular perceptions of the region and its people 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
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This ahistoricism is, perhaps, understandable, given that the original letters of 
Highland officers in the period also contained narrative constructions.   Elite accounts 
were prejudicial.  The advantages of securing access to the public purse of the fiscal-
military state rested on convincing the government, particularly the Secretary at War, that 
enlisting men was within the personal capacities of Highland elites.  All Highland 
regiments during this period, the 42
nd
 Foot excepted, were raised for rank during times of 
war, meaning that elites were commissioned to rank on the basis of recruiting a set 
number of men, risking having their commissions revoked if they were unable to secure 
the requisite number.  Pressure to fill quotas and local competition for the finite number 
of military commissions was inevitably fierce and prompted wild hyperbole on the part 
of families seeking commissions.  Ranald Macdonnell of Keppoch flattered himself in a 
letter to Lord Barrington that „I have so much the command of men‟.  The justification of 
appointing three men with no prior military experience as captains in the Royal Highland 
Emigrants was made based on their „great Weight & Influence with the Emigrants‟.
6
  In 
internal discussions, Highland elites were much more sanguine about the limits of their 
recruiting abilities and this rare honesty should be remembered.
7
 
This chapter is a re-evaluation of social relations within the early Highland 
regiments and an analysis of the role of imperial military service in those relationships.  
The Highland military experience was not based on personal or traditional bonds, but on 
contractual obligations.  The structural tradition of military service in the Highlands led 
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to the eighteenth-century British army being viewed as a labour-market, where men 
protected their value as labourers, forming a market-orientated definition of rights and 
duties.  As service was based on market-valued contractual obligations, far from dictating 
stronger bonds of traditional kinship, enlistment provided the impetus for the questioning 
of these traditional ties.    Highland men were unlikely to view their officers as cultural 
leaders when that leadership depended on a strict adherence to their obligations.  The 




What do we mean by a market-orientated definition of labour rights?  Markets, 
either in labour or produce, had a powerfully transformative impact on the development 
of social relations and political rights, providing the ideological impetus for the 
development of a moral economy of the poor.  The demand for soldiers created a military 
labour market in which enlisted men understood their own moral economy and what their 
rights and obligations toward their officers entailed.
9
  This was not a value system 
innately hostile to markets and capitalist forces.  Like many dispossessed poor in 
eighteenth-century Britain, Highlanders embraced the market because a value was placed 
upon their labour.
10
   It did not also mean a „crass economic reductionism‟ or mercenary 
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   The commodifying of labour resulted in a sophisticated reading of 
rights which was not static or tradition-bound.  Military labour was a national market 
within a pan-British moral economy.  This market strained pre-existent local assumptions 
as men selectively reconstructed the paternalist obligations they felt they were owed by 
elites.  Indeed, as this chapter will argue, it was exposure to a national market of military 
labour that defined the most intimate dynamics of the supposedly unique Highland 
regiments.  This interpretation of a moral economy of the poor, which became 
increasingly assertive during the century, fits with current understandings of social 
divisions within late eighteenth-century Scotland.  Social tensions ran deep and the 
paternalistic attitudes of elites were a fearful response to the lower orders, not the 
benevolent re-orientation of elite rule.
12
 
This chapter will begin by questioning the overly positive representations of the 
officer class that have existed in accounts of the Highland battalions and will 
demonstrate the significant structural barriers to such relations.  This is not to say that the 
enlisted Highlander was the victim of a pitiless officer class.  Soldiers expressed genuine 
attachment to commanders who demonstrated uncommon bravery and shared their 
privations.
13
  But Highland battalions reflected assumed social roles, creating theoretical 
barriers to personal bonds that were enforced by all sections of the regiments.  Subjective 
discussions of the personal qualities of Highland officers are misleading, for their 
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assumed roles and responsibilities created a form of paternalism, with as much potential 
for abuses as benevolence.   
A contractual dimension to Highland militarism is not a new concept and has 
been highlighted with great sophistication.
14
  The assumption that military service was an 
extension of civilian norms needs, however, to be elaborated and qualified.  Enlistment in 
the regular army for the Highland male was to enter an entirely alien world.  He may 
have conceptualized his service as a labour-market, but the civilian character of Highland 
identity was exposed to the hard reality of military life.  What needs to be added to the 
narrative of contractual service is the effect of war in the service of the British state on 
established notions of military life.  What needs to be added is the moral and cultural 
dimension to military labour.  The agency of the Highland soldier consisted of his 
increasing ability to negotiate as a minor partner in the relations created by a national 
fiscal-military state.  As a result, military service exacerbated the tensions produced by 
deteriorating social cohesion in the Highlands and led to the adoption of a language of 
rights that was not simply traditional, but consistent with an exposure to the political 
discourses of a wider British polity.  Highland soldiers not only articulated their rights 
with greater sophistication, but recognized the contexts in which those rights could be 
defended, to ensure that the value of their military labour was maintained, or even 
enhanced. 
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I   STRUCTURAL DIVISIONS 
The Highland battalions were often typified by mutual distrust and hostility between 
officers and the rank-and-file.  The two most obvious examples of this hostility, coercive 
recruitment and mutiny, do have an existing scholarship and do not require much 
elaboration here.  What does need to be questioned is the degree to which Highland 
officers had a direct and intimate connection with their men.  This assumption is entirely 
undermined by the distribution patterns of the Highland regiments which we saw in 
Chapter 1.  In one company of the 71
st
 Foot, recruitment covered an area of over 12,000 
square miles.  A muster roll of the 42
nd
 Foot from 1751 shows similarly widespread 
distributions.
15
  On campaign, many officers found themselves in possession of 
substantial sums of money owed to dead soldiers, awaiting their networks of 
correspondence in the Highlands to identify relatives.
16
  In addition, as we have seen, the 
effective running of an estate was not always conducive to military recruitment.  In order 
to avoid removing valuable labour from a patron‟s estate, officers might target 
neighbouring areas where they were often „troublesome‟ and reliant on coercive 
measures in the absence of any social leverage.
17
  Lieutenant Colin Campbell, based in 
Perthshire in 1780, asked his father not to repeat to anyone that he was deeply distrustful 
of his men.  While unwilling to elaborate in writing, Campbell believed the spread of 
such rumours would make it „very dangerous for me if they [the recruits] should know 
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that I had the least suspicion of them‟.
18
  Under these conditions, it is highly unlikely that 
officers would have possessed an intimate knowledge of the majority of their men, and 
the methods employed to bring men into the army was hardly conducive to loyalty and 
affection.  
 If there was distrust amongst officers of the common men‟s attitudes towards 
soldiering, it was fully reciprocated by the rank-and-file.  Highland regiments had a 
reputation for mutiny, with five major cases in regular regiments between 1743 and 1783.  
Highland mutinies generally began with a rumour that promises made by officers were 
not to be honoured.  A letter by an observer of the 77
th
 Foot mutiny in Portsmouth in 
1783, mentioned that „they [the mutineers] believed their officers had bartered them 
away‟ to the East India Company.  The rumour, erroneous or not, had begun when it was 
revealed that many of the officers would not be accompanying the men overseas.
19
  The 
high level of officer absenteeism, particularly when regiments were sent abroad, could 
hardly have inspired confidence amongst the rank-and-file.  Highland regiments which 
were raised for rank, owing to the desire of officers to advance through acts of bravery in 
combat, tended to suffer absenteeism to a lesser degree than other regiments.  That said, 
in the 42
nd
 Foot which was on the permanent establishment, absenteeism ran at one in 
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three, a comparable rate to other British regiments.
20
  From Fort Pitt in 1763, Henry 
Bouquet complained to the commander-in-chief of North America, Jeffrey Amherst, that 
the 42
nd
 Foot was suffering discipline problems due to the number of officers on leave, 
and that he had to prevent decommissioned officers from returning home due to the 
shortage.
21
  In a detachment of the 71
st
 Foot at New York in mid-1783, just four officers 
and the regimental chaplain commanded ten companies.
22
  
The conclusion reached about officer absenteeism by mutinous Highland soldiers 
reveals much about their opinions of their officers at such critical junctures.  In the case 
of the 77
th
 Foot at Portsmouth, when it was insisted that the soldiers embark on the 
transports, they violently beat their lieutenant colonel and several other officers.  The city 
of Edinburgh experienced four separate mutinies in the space of thirteen months in 1778-
79, all of which were accompanied by violence toward superior officers.  The mutiny of 
the 78
th
 Foot in the city in September 1778 was no different.  While no officer was killed 
in the disturbances, the mutineers had fired shots at several officers and threatened to kill 
Kenneth Mackenzie, first Earl of Seaforth, the man responsible for raising the regiment.  
One of their major grievances was the frequent recourse to corporal punishment, used by 
officers of the regiment.  With officers normally possessing the monopoly of violence, 
the rank-and-file took steps to ensure they maintained some form of protection.  In the 
year leading up to its mutiny in Portsmouth, the 77
th
 Foot lost twenty-two swords, sixty-
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six bayonets and twenty muskets due to desertion.
23
  Some officers, such as Captain 
George Mackenzie of the 78
th
 Foot, came to the Highland regiments from service in other 
regiments, sometimes bringing with them an elitist, but fully reciprocated, contempt of 
the private soldier.  Their harsher methods in dealing with private soldiers were often 
imitated by the young and impressionable Highland officers of their battalions.
24
 
Violence and coercion were extreme cases, but structural organization while on 
active service was the most telling factor in preventing close connections between the 
ranks.  Bennett Cuthbertson, who was a leading authority on the management of infantry 
battalions conceded that in sparsely populated areas a battalion could be distributed over 
a seven mile radius, making it next to impossible for officers to keep a close eye on their 
men.  Chaplain Robert Macpherson was only required to visit various detachments of the 
78
th
 Foot every two to three months over the winter of 1761-62, there being over 80 
miles between his quarters and the furthest detachment.  General orders at Montreal in 
the same period required captains to visit their companies just once a week.
25
  
Alternatively, some procedures were deliberately followed to prevent overly close 
relations.  Captain Robert Grant stated that just prior to his regiment, the 77
th
 Foot, being 
dispatched to North America in 1757 all the officers were transferred from those 
companies to which they had first belonged, a policy that prevented men serving under 
the officers that had recruited them.
26
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A different system prevailed in most regiments.  The 42
nd
 Foot transferred 
enlisted men between companies, transferring 58 men in November 1757.   The regular 
transfer of large numbers of men from one company to another was also a feature of the 
84
th
 Foot‟s service during the American War for Independence.  Captain Alexander 
Macdonald‟s company of that regiment, while stationed at Halifax in 1778, underwent 
frequent transfers of personnel.  At any one time, a fifth of Macdonald‟s troops had been 
under his command for less than six months.
27
  These transfers were structurally essential.  
The very integrity of the battalion, both on the march and on the battlefield, depended 
upon the ability of the formation to adapt to the losses and inconsistencies that were 
inevitable on campaign.  The equal distribution of firepower, being delivered by volleys 
from various platoons in the line of battle, necessitated the near equal distribution of 
manpower to prevent weak points in the line.  If Humphrey Bland‟s directions for 
platoon firings had been followed, the equalization of companies would have been less 
tactically necessary, the platoon being a distinct tactical body, differing from the 
administrative body of the company.
28
  But the broken nature of the terrain in North 
America rarely offered clear opportunities for platoon firing.  At Bushy Run, for instance, 




 Foot on 5-6 August 1763, it seems clear that the 
company served as the basic tactical unit in the battle.
29
  That said, some companies 
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transferred men for no numerical advantage, suggesting that something more than 
equalization for tactical effectiveness was influencing the minds of officers.
30
      
Officer losses and turnover further undermined an important connection with 
their men.  Less than a quarter of the officers of the 42
nd
 Foot who began the 1777 
campaign remained with the regiment in 1782.  Over a four year period, from 1778-1782, 
the 42
nd
 Foot saw a turnover of sixty per cent of its company commanders.
31
  As early as 
1771, Lord John Murray had to request a formalized list of all the officers of the 42
nd
 
Foot, „as so many new ones have come into the regiment and many changes [have taken 
place]‟.
32
  There were a small number of men, such as drummer Thomas Carroll of the 
71
st
 Foot who served under Captain Francis Skelly for the entire length of the War of 
American Independence.  Such individuals were only ever a minority, however, and a 
sample of names in various regimental returns suggest an almost complete turnover of 
enlisted men from 1776 to 1783, though the multiplicity of Highland names make firm 
conclusions difficult.  By the end of the war, some soldiers who were prisoners with the 
rebels were being listed in the returns without their Christian names, there being 
probably no officer who remembered who they were.
33
  The rigours of campaigning and 
the interior management of battalions in relatively inactive wartime garrisons resulted in 
such a high turnover of both officers and men, that establishing close relationships 
between company officers and their commands was a difficult, bordering on impossible, 
task.   
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If distrust combined with structural and operational requirements diluted the 
bonds within Highland regiments what of the shared cultural and regional identity of 
Highland soldiers?  Regional identity was an important part of combat motivation.  Yet it 
would be wrong to assume that such identities necessarily bound leaders and led.  If there 
was a shared cultural bond between Highland-born officers and privates, then the Gaelic 
language should have provided the most powerful example of this.  Evidence suggests, 
however, that this most salient of indicators was not shared, and reflected the different 
origins of privates and commissioned officers.  The Highland gentry, from which the 
officer class was drawn, was largely educated outside the Highlands and prided itself on 
knowledge of historical and philosophical works, not Gaelic oral tradition.  Chaplain 
Robert Macpherson of the 78
th
 Foot, who administered to the regiment in Gaelic, judged 
the officers in his mess on their „liberal education‟, reserving particular praise for Captain 
Alexander Campbell, who was, „universally knowing in ancient and modern literature‟.  
Educated officers were keen to display their knowledge of thinkers such as John Locke 
and explicit comparisons of themselves to historical figures were more liked to be made 
to men such as Xenophon than Gaelic or Scottish heroes.
34
  Indeed, the use of classical 
and modern historical analogies by one Highland officer in his analysis of Banastre 
Tarleton‟s History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces 
(London, 1787) was judged by an unsympathetic officer of the British Legion to have 
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been an attempt to „bewilder our judgement‟.
35
  Many officers lacked the linguistic skills 
to converse in Gaelic and supporters of the language found it abhorrent that positions of 
authority within the regiments should be inhabited by men who spoke no Gaelic; „Was 




 Sergeant James Thompson used Gaelic to explain the misapprehension of 
Highland soldiers about military service, and their misunderstanding of the orders of 
superiors.  When Highlanders breached discipline, or could not comprehend a given 
order, Thompson attributed it to their incomprehension of English, emphasizing a 
linguistic divide between officers and their men.  Instructions given to officers of the 
Royal Highland Emigrants in 1777 demanded that all orders be read to the men and 
explained in the case of those who did not understand English.
37
  Where Gaelic was 
employed by officers, it was often to control dissent.  Even a fluent grasp of Gaelic, 
however, did not guarantee the silencing of complaints.  Major Alexander Donaldson, 
who commanded the 76
th
 Foot in 1778, used Gaelic to harangue soldiers who objected to 
the levels of stoppages.  When that failed, Donaldson instead relied on other methods, a 
court martial and the flogging of the ringleader.
38
  Captain John Grant, who happened to 
be in Edinburgh during the mutiny of the 78
th
 Foot in September 1778, reported to 
General Philip Skene, that „Being a Highlander I thought I might have some influence 
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with these poor deluded men‟.  But Grant could not speak Gaelic, and failed to 
comprehend the soldiers‟ complaints until he dispatched his servant whose entreaties 
failed.  The dispatch of Grant‟s servant might also have been motivated by the fact that 
several of the mutineers were discharging their weapons at any officer who came within 
musket shot.
39
    
Regional or cultural loyalty was a secondary consideration to many officers, as 
they sought to secure the most advantageous access to the fiscal-military state.  Charles 
Campbell of the 71
st
 Foot told his father that due to the costs involved, his only avenue 
for advancement in the army was through preferment, „[L]et it be in what corps, or what 
country it will‟.  Campbell noted that he would serve in the „deserts of Arabia‟ if it meant 
promotion.  For men like Campbell, the Highland regiments were only important in as 
much as they were officered on the basis of appointments or recruiting for rank, a 
cheaper commission than one secured through the purchase system.
40
  For the 
overwhelming majority of elites, personal or familial interest trumped cultural loyalties.  
In 1775, Colonel Allan Maclean of Torloisk, a Jacobite veteran and a British officer since 
the amnesty of 1754, was given command of the disparate Loyalist corps, the Royal 
Highland Emigrants.  Maclean found his commission an unappealing one, complaining 
that after over thirty years of military experience, „I should find myself now only a [Lt. 
Col.] of American Provincials‟.  Officers in the Royal Highland Emigrants had no claim 
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to rank in the army and no entitlement to half-pay and consequently petitioned Guy 
Carleton for vacancies in other „established corps‟.
41
 
An example of the complexities of regional identity, and the more pressing 
imperatives that overtook such identities, can be found in the experience of Chaplain 
Robert Macpherson of the 78
th
 Foot.  Macpherson, according to one historian 
„represented an intellectual focus for the oral traditions of the Highlands‟, administered 
religious services to the men in Gaelic, and was apparently well-liked.  But his post-war 
experiences reveal that ethnic sympathies were only ever partial.  Macpherson requested 
the tacks of Aberarder and Tullochcrombe near Loch Laggan in Badenoch for his 
services during the war.  The tacks were occupied by Ronald and Alexander Macdonald, 
Catholic fir-taca who had supported Charles Edward Stuart in 1745-46.  On the basis of 
memorials submitted to the Court of Session and the House of Lords pertaining to their 
Catholicism, Macpherson received the tack at the same rent and immediately evicted 
over eighty tenants and cottars to convert the ground into a sheep-walk.  Despite armed 
threats against him, letters of support from Lt. John Macpherson of Phones, who stated 
that the Macdonalds were excellent providers of recruits, and the foot-dragging of the 
Sherriff of Inverness and the Court of Session to issue eviction notices, nine farms were 
depopulated by Macpherson.  It was the first clearance made for sheep in the central 
Highlands.  The tenants „could hardly persuade themselves that the mildness of 
Government would allow fourscore honest highlanders to be turned adrift, without 
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having anywhere to go … by a bachelor clergyman‟.  Macpherson cemented his hold 
over several other tacks in the area over the next few years, including nearby Gallovie, 
and even received a forty pound annual salary for „preaching in the Irish language‟, but 
he was not successful as a farmer.  The tack passed to a man Macpherson had brought 
onto the estate in around 1780, William Mitchell, an Ayrshire sheep-farmer who would 
briefly serve as the Duke of Gordon‟s factor.  Recent accounts of Macpherson‟s role in 
the 78
th
 Foot make no mention of these clearances, and his role in them suggests that 
support for the traditions of the Highlands did not preclude the altering of that society for 
private gain.
42
      
Much of what might have been considered as cultural identifiers which bound 
Gaels of all ranks together, had a much more practical utility, carefully noted by senior 
officers and theorists.  The emphasis placed on Highland dress did not simply reflect a 
cultural interest, but was considered important to the interior operation of the battalion.  
Military uniforms were used as totemic objects, inculcating pride, courage, self-esteem, 
but also subordination.  As Cuthbertson‟s tract made clear, „once a soldier can be brought 
to take a delight in his dress, it will be easy to mould him to whatever else may be 
desired‟, throwing off „the sullen, stubborn disposition which characterizes the peasants 
of most countries‟.
43
  Clothing was also deeply connected to modern commercial 
concerns, and to the balance of cost versus outcome.  As concerned as Lord John Murray 
was over the aesthetic appearance of his men, he demanded that regimental equipment be 
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made out of the cheapest materials, at least until garrison duty in an urban centre such as 
Dublin exposed the men to the public sphere, and the potential to embarrass his 
reputation.  The Deputy Adjutant-General of the Dublin garrison found in 1769 that the 
accoutrements of the regiment were „extremely bad‟, though Murray refused to replace 
them, arguing that he had done so in 1767, and paid more towards their uniforms than 
English colonels.
44
  This is not to suggest that officers such as Lord John Murray did not 
have a deeply engrained and genuine interest in Highland culture, but there was 
something distinctly contemporary about its use in the late eighteenth century.   Highland 
officers were entirely rational in their primary aims of familial security and military 
discipline, but this was not always consistent with notions of cultural loyalty to the 
Highlands or to the Highland regiments.   
 
 
II   CONCEPTUAL DIVISIONS 
Hierarchical tensions were unquestionably present in the Highland regiments.  The 
importance of regimental tension, however, lies in what it says about the different 
assumptions concerning rights and responsibilities, which broadly defined social groups 
brought with them into the army.  These assumptions were relevant to how people 
operated in the military, regardless of their unique individualism.  For the officer class, 
military service was deeply connected to the assertion of gentlemanly status and elite 
masculinity.  The actions of Highland officers cannot be explained without reference to 
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such masculine norms, which were pan-European and predicated on a code of honour 
and the essential quality of courage.
45
   
Nevertheless, Highland officers did have a unique social imperative within the 
Highland regiments, which provided an alternative reading of elite and gentlemanly 
status.  This was the cultural importance attached to military service as a means of 
establishing status, position and cultural authority.  The martial culture of the British 
army allowed access to a renewed form of Highland clanship.  The bulk of lower-ranked 
Highland officers came from the middling sections of Highland society, the fir-taca. The 
transformation of Highland society in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had 
given rise to new attitudes toward commercial landlordism, and significant changes to 
social behaviour.
46
  Commercial landlordism saw the low rents and security of tenure 
formerly enjoyed by the fir-taca under threat, and the collapse of his former role as the 
facilitator of military service.  From the 1750s, the army not only provided a vital 
external income, but reinvigorated a lost connection to their former place in Highland 
society.  As commissions were granted on the basis of patronage, networks of kinship 
were refigured in such a way that the illusion of clannish dependence was re-forged.  Of 
the thirty-nine commissioned officers selected for the 77
th
 Foot in 1756, twenty-six had 
no previous military service and had been recommended by relatives or patrons, and 
there was an assumed favouritism expected to be displayed by officers of the same 
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  Officers desired to see the Highland regiments as clan regiments; Lieutenant 
Donald Macdonald wrote to relatives in St John‟s Island that „There are Regts. of 
Mcdonalds, Campbells, McKenzies, McLeods, Hamiltons, Gordons, Murrays … raised 
in Scotland, in short … every clan worth the mentioning.‟  In 1777, Duncan Grant 
amused himself with the hope that one day there would be another war with the United 
States, so that his newly-born son might „carry the royal standard under one of his 
Chiefs‟.
48
  Clannishness in the regiments was no more than the operation of networks of 
patronage and, indeed, established English regiments were probably more clannish in the 
way long-serving colonels administered commissions to their clients.
49
  But given the 
dramatic changes in Highland society, and the quite intense feelings of betrayal that 
accompanied commercial landlordism, it was understandable the regiments were viewed 
in this way. 
Land and property also underpinned ideological views of military service.  The 
most effective social lever used in the recruitment of Highland soldiers was the promise 
of secure holdings or favourable rents made to willing sub-tenants who provided men.
50
  
By altering the nature of landholding patterns on Highland estates to facilitate 
recruitment, landlords ensured that, as in former days, control of land and rents was made 
the basis of military society.  To many, the acid test of authority was still control over 
sizable numbers of dependents.  According to one scion of the Grant family, Sir James 
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Grant of Grant‟s authority over 1500 dependents was enough to make a „man of some 
consequence in any country‟.
51
  
The myth of land, authority and clanship was also central to the outward 
expression of Highland status within a pan-British context.  James Grant of Ballindalloch 
(1720-1806) was keen to employ Highland soldiers to assist his claims on status as a 
member of the political elite.  From his house in London, Grant issued instructions to his 
relatives in Badenoch to find local recruits to augment the 55
th
 Foot, of which he was 
colonel.  Quality was imperative for the intended purpose, for as he explained, „I have 
pledged myself to Lord Amherst [from 1779 General on the Staff] to bring up a better 
company than has been raised during the war to be seen by his Lordship at London, 
perhaps by a greater man [the king] upon the road to Windsor‟.  Unfortunately for Grant, 
the recipients were unable to use their influence to procure even a few recruits.  Their 
failure left Grant with a dilemma.  He was unwilling to issue beating orders, his previous 
requests resting on a naïve assumption that the influence of men of status would succeed 
in the absence of bounties or written securities.  Such methods would undermine his 
claims on command of the people and expose his lack of authority.  As he wrote of the 
non-existent recruits: „If I cannot have the credit of getting them on the Banks of the 
Spey they are not worth having.‟
52
  It may not have been a coincidence that at the time 
Grant was seeking re-election after having been defeated in the parliamentary elections 
as the representative for Tain in 1780, a position he had held since 1773. 
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If images of clanship fettered the imaginations of Highland elites, their 
conception of their role within the social order was also firmly grounded in pan-British 
views of hierarchy.  David Stewart of Garth believed that the conduct of the soldiers was 
almost entirely dependent on the qualities instilled by superiors.  Writing of the 42
nd
 Foot 
in the 1770s, he noted „A judicious selection of officers‟, is vital, for though „[t]here have 
been instances, in which national spirit and patriotic feelings have existed amongst troops 
for years, independently from example or influence from superiors ... such instances are 
rare‟.  Archibald Montgomery, colonel of the 77
th
 Foot, agreed.  Combining elite 
assumptions with ethnic conceit, he explained to Governor Bull of South Carolina that 
the colonial provincials would perform better if they were led by men of better stature.  
To Montgomery, unlike in his own regiment, some of the officers were „worse than 
privates‟, leading to their perceived chronic underperformance.  For members of the elite, 
military quality was predicated on the prudent actions of hierarchical elites.
53
  This was 
the militarized expression of the prevailing aristocratic ethos of paternalism, in which the 
rank-and-file were divested of agency and required firm paternal leadership. 
Enlisted men envisaged an increasingly divergent view of military service and 
their dependent relationship with social superiors.  Like Highland elites, the rural poor 
would probably have seen society in distinctly hierarchical terms.  But the recognition of 
inferiority did not produce a submissive deference.  Enlisted men constructed their own 
conception of military service to face the ever increasing demand for manpower from the 
late 1750s.  The state had never called upon such high numbers of soldiers, which 
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resulted in a shift in the negotiating position of Highland men.  As we have seen, 
potential recruits began to demand huge sums for their military labour and quality 
recruits could effectively sell their services to the highest bidder. 
With recruiting concentrated disproportionately in the eastern, central, and 
southern Highlands, it focused on areas which had seen the most exposure to commercial 
improvements and, with it, a divergence from traditional hierarchies.  Landlord 
absenteeism, the turnover of middling tenants, and the payment of rent in specie was 
more common in the east than in the west.  The fir-taca-led mass emigrations which 
typified the western Highlands in the 1770s, for example, were not replicated to the same 
degree in the east.  Access to alternative means of material security was also possible in 
the east with the more varied commercial activities.  The result was that the labouring 
class which was drawn into the fiscal-military state was already conversant with 
disruptive socio-economic change and the demands of modern commercial society. 
It would be simplistic to assume that there was a strict class division between 
officers and their men.  Vastly differentiated levels of wealth and social standing in the 
Highlands, and the localized intricacies of client networks, often shaped recruitment.  
Nevertheless, it is evident that the rural poor entered into direct and forceful negotiations 
with recruiters and landlords, revealing a confidence usually ignored in the Highland 
narrative.  So great was the divide that one Gaelic commentator made the case that 
having officers sit on the courts martial of private men was an abridgement of a soldier‟s 
liberty; a man could be tried only by a jury of his peers, a legal process that the disparity 
146 
 
of status in the military did not allow.
54
  As the demand for men was the commercial 
response of landlords to the fiscal-military state, and the acquisition of men was 
increasingly predicated on the rising market value of military labour, Highland soldiers‟ 
understanding of their labour became similarly market orientated.  For the landless 
cottars, or the poorest sub-tenants, who were explicitly targeted for recruitment, military 
labour became their most valuable commodity, definable in market terms as land or 
money.  Recruits became less dependent on their superiors because, through negotiation, 
the recruit rather than the officer became the provider of social and material security for 
himself and his family.  This redefinition of military service as a commodified market 
product was not inconsistent with elite conceptions of clanship, but it did create the 
potential for distrust - the assertion of a moral economy by the participating recruit 
versus the paternal instinct of the officer class. 
If military service was a commercial market, the protection of that most vital of 
commodities, the soldier‟s labour, depended upon officers strictly adhering to contractual 
promises in a situation of great disparity.  The majority of Highland attestations involved 
an enlistee declaring that he was a Protestant followed by the swearing of an oath to the 
king.  A number of attestations in which written promises were made survive, however, 
to suggest a more dynamic relationship between the recruiter and the enlistee.  One „poor 
man‟ enlisted on the condition that his wife be allowed to accompany him overseas.  
John Macpherson, a labourer from Killin who enlisted in the 42
nd
 Foot aged twenty-five 
in 1780, received a promise he was to serve only for the duration of the war and that he 
would not be turned over to any other corps.  The common practice of moving soldiers to 
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different corps, to circumvent their terms of enlistment, was apparently well-known and 
something soldiers were protecting themselves from in writing.  A similar promise was 
made by Lord Frederick Campbell to Donald Kennedy when the latter enlisted in Lord 
Campbell‟s Fencible regiment in 1781.  Lord Campbell personally signed the attestation, 
a measure which showed the depth of personal guarantees between the highest and 
lowest.
55
  Interestingly, the attestations of Macpherson and Kennedy were printed, 
suggesting that by 1780, contractual obligations were increasingly official.  In these 
written, but rarely legally binding contracts, Highland soldiers were participating in their 
own variation on the attempts by crowds to sanction food riots by drawing reluctant 
vendors into written declarations of adherence to the crowd‟s demands.
56
    
Nevertheless, with literacy rates in the regiments generally low, the spoken word 
of officers in contractual negotiations became deeply important.  Lord John Murray 
demanded that his officers make it clear to recruits before attestation that they would be 
required to serve abroad.  Memories of the mutiny of the regiment in 1743 were 
undoubtedly important in reaching this decision.  Not all officers were as conscientious 
with their oral promises as Murray.  One recruiter received a promise from a deserter‟s 
father that he would return to his unit, all the while planning to have the deserter 
immediately transferred to a non-Highland corps, a move which directly contravened an 
explicit act of parliament.
57
  British and colonial military mutinies did occur on the 
breaking of promises, but were generally touched off by accompanying long-term 
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hardships, casualties, poor pay, and constant service.
58
  By contrast, Highland troops 
endured enormous hardships and were much better at maintaining discipline under such 
conditions.  During the Stoppages Mutiny of 1763, Captain James Robertson feared 




 Foot changes to the levels of stoppages; 
but the expected violence never materialized, unlike almost every other garrison on the 
American frontier, where there were widespread problems.
59
 
Highland soldiers could react with bewildering speed, however, in the absence of 
harsh conditions, if major promises were perceived to have been broken.  The most 
common reaction was desertion.  Major John Ross, commanding at Oswego where the 
Grenadier Company of the 84
th
 Foot was stationed at the end of the War of American 
Independence, experienced first-hand the problems created by soldiers‟ conceptions of 
their rights, and by the methods they used to protect them.  As early as November 1782, 
enlisted men had been petitioning him to be discharged, and he had begun to acquiesce.  
But after May 1783, and the announcement that active operations would cease, calls for 
discharges became problematic.  He informed his superior that „With respect to the 
young corps, they are very desirous to have their discharges and hearing of no limit to 
their services put the worst construction on things‟.  He also reported that, in the absence 
of discharges, desertion had become a frequent problem.
60
  There were similar problems 
in the 71
st
 Foot.  Over the course of ten days, between 7 May and 17 May 1783, a 
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detachment of the 71
st
 Foot under Sir Thomas Stirling at Newtown Creek, New York, 
was decimated by desertion; over forty men from various companies deserted en-masse.  
No evidence points to the immediate cause of this unprecedented event, but the previous 
month, much of the rest of the regiment had been disbanded at Perth.  Rumours of a 
coming peace were rife and the forty deserters probably felt that their obligations had 
been met and were taking the opportunity to remain in America.
61
  With the conditions of 
their labour as soldiers met, but no obvious end to their service in sight, these men were 
voluntarily withdrawing themselves from the labour market. 
Rather than desert, Highland soldiers could also turn on their officers if 
contractual obligations were not met.  Charles Townsend, Baron Bayning, and Edmund 
Burke both blamed the mutiny of the 77
th
 Foot in 1783 on the false assurances of officers.  
The contractual problem in the 77
th
 Foot is revealed by the claims for pay and bounty 
money to recruits that had yet to be received, and which in the year prior to the mutiny 
amounted to over seventy pounds.  Erroneous promises of land grants and preferment, 
made by Allan Maclean of Torloisk to his officers and men, caused festering problems of 
discipline in the 84
th
 Foot throughout the War of American Independence and even into 
the post-war era.  The use of the 84
th
 Foot as sailors at Fort Howe in late 1778 also led to 
the rank-and-file „Charg[ing] their officers with a breach of faith or promise which 
indeed was made to them‟.
62
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The independence of the rank-and-file and their differing, carefully guarded 
conceptions of their rights is most obvious in an analysis of post-war military settlement.  
Following the Seven Years‟ War and the War for American Independence, Highland 
soldiers were settled, under the auspices of the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763, 
on land grants in British North America.  The land was free land, creating property 
holders out of the cottars and sub-tenants who had served as rank-and-file soldiers.  It 
was first granted to the care of senior officers, and the knowledge and credit of former 
officers was essential for the establishment of successful settlements.  There can be no 
doubt that military settlement on the imperial frontiers was a hard undertaking, and for 
this reason it is unsurprising that many soldiers chose to remain with their settled officers.  
Nevertheless, the difficulties experienced in such an inhospitable environment, and the 
erosion of dependency through the provision of free land, ensured that enlisted men 
rarely remained close to their officers through slavish devotion.  Nor were Highland 
soldiers entirely dependent on their officers.  While expressing his desire to settle with 
Captain Murdoch Maclaine on the 2
nd
 battalion of the 84
th
 Foot‟s 81,000 acre grant near 
Windsor, Nova Scotia, piper Niel Maclean requested from his father that he be sent all 
available resources to assist the settlement.  Maclean was calling upon his own networks 
of interest to assist him and, though he remained in contact with former officers over the 
course of the next ten years, he operated with independent agency in the Atlantic world, 
being asked to play for the Highland Society of London in 1790, and becoming a 
member of the St Andrew‟s Society in Halifax by 1794.
63
  He was not the only soldier to 
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‟s grant.  The poor quality of the ground and the lack of supplies meant that 
former officers had great difficulty keeping their men together.  Half-pay captain Hector 
Maclaine, who laboured hard to ensure the success of his settlement and was the only 
officer who attempted to commence farming, noted that his men „shewd [sic] such 
evident signs of discontent and a determination to leave the settlement‟.  When he had 
asked his twenty or so former soldiers what they intended to do, „the greatest number 
walked out without a word‟, literally voting with their feet.
64
  Despite Maclaine‟s 
continuous efforts to improve and sustain the township, only a tiny minority of the rank-
and-file remained with him on the grant and the land was reclaimed by the crown in 
escheat in 1798. 
There does, therefore, seem to have been a social contract operating between 
officers and men in regard to settlement.  With the Treaty of Paris not yet signed, but 
rumours of imminent peace spreading through the 84
th
 Foot, a petition was delivered to 
Captain Murdoch Maclaine expressing the intention of unnamed soldiers at Fort Edward 
to settle with him, submitting themselves under the penalty of five pounds for failing to 
honour the agreement.  There was more, however, to this petition.  Knowing that the land 
would be granted via the regiment‟s officers and that this was a contractually-binding 
agreement, it warned that „the said Capt Maclaine should proceed on this business with 
all possible dispatch‟.
65
  Even with regard to the grants, enlisted men did not allow 
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themselves to be dictated to.  Several veterans also took to paid labour rather than 
farming.  This decision caused their former officer to complain bitterly that farming had 
become unprofitable, owing to the high price of labour in the township.
66
 
It is the experiences of one 84
th
 Foot officer, John Macdonald of Glenalladale 
(1742-1811), which reveals the extent to which Highland men viewed military service as 
a contract of labour and not as a clannish act of dependence.  Glenalladale was the son of 
a prominent Catholic Jacobite, Alexander Macdonald, who had served as a Major in 
the ‟45 rebellion, though Glenalladale appears to have had no Jacobite sympathies 
himself.  As a leading fear-taca, his own disillusion with changes to Highland society led 
him to agree to Bishop Hay‟s plan to lead an emigrant party of 210 people from South 
Uist and Lochaber to St John‟s Island in 1772.  For the South Uist emigrants, attempts at 
forced conversion to Protestantism by the landowner, Colin Macdonald of Boisdale, had 
been part of the decision and Glenalladale had financed much of the expedition through 
the mortgaging of his own estates.  There is little evidence to suggest, however, the 
Glenalladale‟s motive was an entirely altruistic protection of fellow Catholics.  
Glenalladale‟s relationship with other branches of the Clanranalds had been acrimonious, 
with Glenalladale increasingly embittered by the shift from paternalism to commercial 
landlordism amongst the upper echelons of north-west Highland society.  The collapse of 
the Ayr Bank in 1772 also destroyed his source of credit, making the problem of rack 
renting more acute and the family bankrupt.  Glenalladale hoped that emigration would 
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„very deservedly‟ destroy the Highland lairds.
67
  But for traditionally-minded middling 
tenants such as Glenalladale, emigration to North America was not undertaken in order to 
create egalitarian societies, built upon equal ownership of land.  Instead, paternally-
minded lairds in North America would create conditions for a benevolent form of 
hierarchical society, where lesser tenants would form dependent relationships with 
community leaders.  It was not a wholesale return to clanship, however, and Glenalladale 
thought of himself as an improver.  Revealingly, among the tenants on his Tracadie estate, 
Glenalladale attempted to limit the amount of grain produced in order to stimulate cattle 
rearing, replicating the economic response of fir-taca to increased rents in the Highlands.  
His vision for the new world was therefore a mixture of idealism, conservatism, and 
commercialism.  His own enlistment in the Royal Highland Emigrants in 1775 was also, 
in addition to being a genuinely patriotic response to the American rebellion, an 
economic choice, it being impossible to live well on St John‟s without the inflow of 
external capital, as was the case in the Highlands.  Like similar fir-taca, however, 
Glenalladale experienced the enormous distance between his own conceptions of what 
was beneficial to emigrant society and the conceptions of the emigrants themselves.  
Glenalladale found that his nominal leadership of the community and his control over the 
landholding patterns of his tenants was not enough to ensure male enlistment in his 
company.  Only fourteen men were recruited by Glenalladale or his brother into the 84
th
 
Foot, and while Glenalladale served in the colonies, over half of his tenants left his 
estates to take up better tenancies on neighbouring estates, or moved to available free 
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land in the north of the island.
68
  In North Carolina and New York, emigration leaders 
such as Flora Macdonald‟s husband, Allan Macdonald of Kingsburgh or Allan 
Macdonnell of Collachie, both experienced perennial difficulties in enlisting Highland 
emigrants, and were often left feeling abandoned, particularly after the defeat of the 
Highland Loyalists at Moore‟s Creek in North Carolina in February 1776, after which 
„the men were not to be kept together, and ... the officers had no authority over the 
men‟.
69
  The whole experience left Glenalladale, in particular, deeply disillusioned.  In 
unguarded moments to his sister he called the people a „damned tribe‟ and reported that 
„I am convinced that nothing leads to more hurt, than for a man to allow himself to be 
looked up to even by his nearest concerns‟.  In a revealing twist on the commonly held 
assumption that it was elite betrayal that broke the social bonds of Highland society, 
Glenalladale believed it had been he who had been betrayed by the failure of the people 
to keep their promises and remain with him.  He facetiously told his sister to „offer them 
my best thanks to these good people [his tenants], who after all I have done for them, 
making myself the greatest sufferer in every point, do not spare my character in my 
absence, but are foolish enough to run to these other gentlemen [neighbouring proprietors] 
with such stories [of misuse and the cost of the passage]‟.
70
  The social hold Glenalladale 
and others believed they possessed over their communities was entirely exposed as 
chimerical by the availability of free land and the pressures of the American rebellion. 
                                                 
68
 J.M. Bumsted, Land, Settlement, and Politics on Eighteenth-Century Prince Edward Island (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen‟s UP, 1987), p. 106.  
69
 NLS, MS. 2618 Misc., Memorandum of Flora Macdonald, pp. 82-83; Mclean, The People of Glengarry, 
p. 88;  Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783, ed. K.G. Davies, 21 vols. (Dublin: Irish 
University Press, 1979), XII, 116. 
70
 PARO, Acc. 2664, f. 16, John Macdonald to Helen Macdonald, 12 Sept. 1789; PARO, Acc. 2664, f. 5, 
John Macdonald to Helen Macdonald, 26 Jun. 1781.    
155 
 
While most Highland soldiers displayed a contractual understanding of military 
service to one degree or another, the men of the 84
th
 Foot were probably the most 
sophisticated in this regard; the radical step of emigration reveals a set of individuals 
willing to subvert traditional obligations in the pursuit of personal interest.  This 
commitment to material security produced a market-orientated contractual understanding 
of the duty of a soldier.  Demobilization removed him from any obligations he had 
accepted as part of this relationship, creating the potential for violence when conditions 





III   THE DEMANDS OF IMPERIAL WAR    
A market-orientated definition of soldiers‟ rights was the central component of Highland 
views of military service, made more, not less, acute by the particular socio-political 
situation in the Highlands.  This did not mean, however, that the mentalities of Highland 
soldiers were simply an extension of their civilian selves.  The platitude that an army 
reflects the society which produces it fails to account for the considerable impact made 
by military service on the internal dynamics of heavily recruited societies.  Claiming that 
the enlisted man viewed military service only within the confines of his civilian 
imperatives suggests stasis in a period of profound change and fails to integrate the 
soldiers‟ experience of imperial wars with that of the wider society.  The imposition of 
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regularized Highland regiments on the region created a constituent male population 
increasingly able to negotiate as a partner in the fiscal-military state. 
The army promoted a confidence that helped sever the soldier from his 
community.  Enlisted men became aware that the army was a discrete body distinct from 
the civilian population, with its own internalized system of rewards and punishments.  
Christopher Duffy has highlighted that even in the absence of a regimental identity, the 
corporate identity of being a soldier began to colour men‟s reactions to the civilian 
population, and led to the development of a distinct occupational identity.  
Commentators argued that a soldier should never be seen in public without side-arms as 
without them he is „at once reduced to a level with the vilest plebeian, and deprived of 
that which gives him an air of consequence, not only in his own opinion, but likewise in 
that of the common people, who are principally caught by outside shew‟.
71
   
The argument that Highland soldiers maintained civilian imperatives is based on 
two salient points: that enlistment was for a limited period of service and that it was seen 
as a means to the civilian end of material security.  This did not mean, however, that an 
intensification of occupational identity was impossible.  The evident pride felt by 
Highland soldiers is reflected in the accounts we have by their own hand.  James 
Thompson reported of his initial enlistment in 1757: „We staid [sic] some days at 
Inverness, walking about the streets to show ourselves, for we were very proud of our 
looks.‟
72
  Gaelic texts considered soldiers to be a distinct class of men.  Kenneth 
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Mackenzie addressed one poem to a recruiting sergeant, Donald Fraser, contrasting the 
author‟s lowly status as a poet with that of the sergeant, telling him „ ‟S math leam suas 
thu gun airce [I am glad you are elevated without poverty]‟.
73
  It seems likely that many 
Highland soldiers were more professionalized than previous historiography has 
suggested.  While most regiments were raised on the basis of short-term service, the 42
nd
 
Foot was an established regiment of the line, where enlistment was for life.  Even in 
regiments raised for short-term service, there were a number of long-term veterans.  In a 
platoon of Lt. Allan Macdonald in early 1778, forty per cent of the men born in Highland 
parishes had previous military experience.  Enforced transfers also occurred.
74
  Sizeable 
numbers of Highland soldiers were therefore, by choice or circumstance, far from 
civilian-orientated males in uniform. 
Professional attachments conditioned the enlisted men to create their own system 
of rewards and punishments.  A piper of the 78
th
 Foot was ostracized by his comrades 
following the battle on the Plains of Abraham in 1759 for not being present on the 
battlefield.  No one in the regiment would draw rations with him until his presence at the 
battle of St. Foy in April 1760 atoned for his previous absence.  It appears as if courage 
was a pivotal quality in the men‟s interpretation of themselves and their peers.
75
  
Disparaging comments on the fighting qualities of opponents, particularly during the 
War of American Independence, suggest that whilst the depth of British patriotism is 
difficult to measure among Highland soldiers, professional rivalry with the rebel army 
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was a large factor in their assessment of the conflict.  During the grounding of arms at the 
surrender at Yorktown in 1781, soldiers of the 76
th
 Foot, some of them in tears, threw 
their muskets down with such force that the stocks split.
76
  If they felt a professional 
superiority, and were deeply affected when that superiority was called into question, 
Highland soldiers had embraced a masculine corporate identity as military men.  
With the vestiges of an enlisted corporate identity in place, social divisions were 
not simply traditionally orientated, but were expedient solutions to the problems of 
hierarchy and authority in military life.  The relationship with officers, even in the 
relatively homogenous Highland regiments, did not entrench regionalism, but dragged 
Highland soldiers out of parochialism and into a complex imperial environment of 
alternate and conflicting authorities.  While Highland soldiers remained low in the social 
hierarchy of the imperial world, by no longer being dependent on local networks, he 
became a minor partner in the fiscal-military state, with access to wider benefits.  
Admission to the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, was the most obvious example of a national 
benefit derived from service to the imperial state, though recommendation still depended 
on the regimental colonel.  Highland soldiers recognized their ability to appeal beyond 
their immediate hierarchy, when those avenues of redress were ineffective.  Lt. William 
Grant of the 42
nd
 Foot, commanding Fort Pitt during the summer of 1764, found his men 
(including draftees of the 77
th
) in a „tumultuous manner‟ after a rumour was spread by 
„maliciouos [sic] villains‟ that the garrison was permitted a larger ration of flour than was 
forthcoming.  Grant was relatively sympathetic, given that arrears had not been paid for 
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almost a year and no new clothing had been issued for two.  What surprised him, 
however, was that the men were appealing above him.  As he explained, „The men said 
even to myself that they would memorial the general about it.‟  Private Andrew 
Macdonald of the 84
th
 Foot wrote to Guy Carleton: „That your excellencies petitioner is 
much wronged since I joined this Regiment notwithstanding I have often solicited the 
Commanding Officer of this regiment to be re-dressed which was still refused me.‟  
Macdonald had received a written promise from his officer, Captain Macleod, that he 
would be made a sergeant and receive one shilling a day pay, a promise which had not 
been honoured.  He demanded of Carleton that his arrears be backdated to the date of the 
agreement and he included a copy of the said agreement with his correspondence.
77
  It is 
unlikely that such petitions were effective, but Macdonald was willing to engage with the 
highest echelons of military hierarchy for the re-dress of perceived wrongs.  A unique but 
important example of wider sovereignties was the ghost-written narrative of Donald 
Macleod, a veteran of the Seven Years‟ War.  His account was allegedly written to raise 
money to allow Macleod to emigrate and he appealed to the readers‟ sense of justice and 
patriotism to assist a soldier who had so loyally served his country.
78
   
The extent to which soldiers were aware of their rights is revealed in a letter 
written in Nova Scotia in 1784 by Private John Macdonald of the 77
th
 Foot.  He wrote to 
Mariot Arbuthnot, former Lieutenant Governor of the province, to request land at Pictou 
as „your petitioner never has had any Lands granted to him in consideration of his service 
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during last war‟.  Macdonald hoped Arbuthnot would „take the case into consideration, 
and direct such further grant of Lands to be bestowed upon him as your petitioner may be 
intitled [sic] to agreeable to His Majesty‟s most gracious Proclamation [of 1763]‟.  While 
Arbuthnot had, by this point, been replaced by Sir Richard Hughes, what is remarkable 
was that Macdonald signed the letter with a mark.  An illiterate, retired emigrant soldier 
was fully aware of what was owed to him, under what provision it was owed, and had 
found someone capable of writing to Arbuthnot to claim it.  Discharged members of the 
42
nd
 Foot were similarly attentive and petitioned on the basis of „His majesty‟s Royal 
Bounty of Provisions‟.  Experience even dictated that the king might intercede on behalf 
of private men.  When the 42
nd
 Foot returned from America in 1767, it was reported to 
Lord John Murray that a number of men had deserted, owing to their being beaten by 
their officers.  In this particular case, the king offered pardons to the deserters, further 
cementing the link between negotiated military service and contractual promises.
79
  
Alternative hierarchies did not create new forms of indebtedness.  Rather they were co-
opted as a means of acquiring what the soldier, through his own military labour, had 
already provided for himself. 
The recognition of a wider imperial sphere in negotiations of contractual military 
service promoted the Highland soldiers‟ identification with the political loyalties of the 
British Atlantic world.  This did not amount to an embracing of „Britishness‟ as a mode 
of self-identification.  In constructing a market-orientated definition of labour rights, 
however, Highland soldiers increasingly called upon national symbols in defence of 
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those rights.  When the 78
th
 Foot mutinied in Edinburgh in 1778, among their demands 
was that „they [get] their colours‟.  The King‟s Colours had practical utility.  In its 
absence, the troops were not officially constituted as a regiment in the royal army, and as 
such, they believed they were more exposed to being sold to the East India Company.  In 
effect, the King‟s Colours provided a professional symbol of national benevolence, 
which would protect them from mistreatment.
80
  The confidence of enlisted men was 
heightened by the relevance of their plight to issues in pan-British discourses.  When 
Highland soldiers of the 76
th
 Foot mutinied in Portsmouth in 1783, their unlikely 
defender was Lord George Gordon, who encouraged their resistance and was the subject 
of an obsequious letter of praise, published in the Public Advertiser.  According to the 
soldiers, Lord Gordon had saved „almost a thousand men from slavery which to a Briton 
is far worse than Death‟.  It continued:  
 
Your name will ever share a record for the zeal you have shewn 
for the interests of your country, in defence of its laws, both 
civil and religious against all popish ... tyranny whatsoever; and 
which emboldened us to lay hold upon you. We glory to think 
that we have a countryman, so zealous for our rights and 
privileges.
81




In 1779, three discharged sergeants of the 42
nd
 Foot likewise employed military 
symbols in a defence of rights.  Even after being offered money, they refused to return 
their plaids.  They were primarily concerned with being clothed but the plaids may also 
have been an important mark of their distinction and a vital symbol of their status in an 
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increasingly militarized state.  In fact, the importance of these symbols reveals that 
symbols of an emerging national political culture were not simply elite devices.
82
  This 
was further evidence that military service, rather than being defined by localized and 
tradition concerns, was operating in a new environment, where imperial wars and 
national politics promoted an assertive reading of labour rights, privileges and 
obligations, available to even the most dispossessed of the rural Highland poor.  
 
 
IV   CONCLUSIONS 
Service in the British army did not mark a return to the traditional bonds of clanship.  
Military service was a labour market, and the fiscal-military state‟s demands for men 
made military labour a valuable commodity.  In order to protect the value of that labour, 
enlisted Highland soldiers defined their rights and obligations within a contractual 
framework; when the value of that labour was under threat, Highland soldiers reacted on 
the basis that the contract was in danger of being broken.   
 There were unquestionably some superb Highland officers.  Perthshire-born 
Colonel John Small was a universally respected officer who worked tirelessly to provide 
his men with the land grants they had been promised.
83
  Moreover, unlike notorious 
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 Foot, there is no example in the Highland 
regiments of institutionalized violence.
84
  But it would be wrong to assume on this basis 
that status relations were significantly better in the Highland regiments owing to 
regional affinities.  Such affinities were of secondary importance, and were more likely 
to promote tension than ameliorate it, underpinning a divergent reading of military 
service, as officers sought to re-instil authority, and enlisted men sought to shield their 
value as military labourers.  Small himself believed in a natural hierarchy, and felt a 
paternal obligation to his „officers and soldiers who look up to one for promotion‟.
85
  
Exactly those same instincts that prompted Small to defend his men‟s interests could 
also, under different circumstances, lead to conflict.        
These divergent readings did not entirely originate in localized and traditional 
concepts of military service.  Imperial conflict created many of the barriers to close 
relations.  Exposure to the empire demanded so much of the soldier that it separated him 
from his civilian experiences.  Even short-term service professionalized him, allowing 
him to call upon authorities outside the parochial hierarchies of Highland society.  By 
being no longer dependent on localized hierarchies, the Highland soldier became, more 
than he had ever been, the provider of his own security.  The combination of this, and 
nationalized symbols of higher authority, gave Highland soldiers more effective avenues 
to express their interest, and achieve their material security.  The national market of 
military service did make military labour a commodity and exposed Highland society to 
another type of capitalist tension.  Yet the market was also empowering and 
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commoditization, for all the justified historic and contemporary criticism of the free 
market, did not necessarily result in the eclipse of individualism.        
 All of this is not to say there was an entirely arbitrary division between officers 
and men.  Local networks complicated social relations.  Gendered, familial, or localized 
identities may have been as important as status or rank.  The error of a Marxist 
interpretation of soldiers‟ rights is that it assumes all soldiers shared a common goal and 
articulated their rights in resistance to a prevailing system.  Power is a relationship and 
these rights were constructed between constituent individuals, not by classes within a 
dystopian system.  Labour rights helped re-inscribe the subordinate position of the rank-
and-file as a class.  As individuals, however, it provided a vital means of self-protection.  
Not all Highland soldiers bore an evident antipathy toward their officers.  During the 78
th
 
Foot‟s mutiny in 1778, around a third of the regiment remained loyal, and fought the 
mutineers.  Some mutineers were prevented from surrendering by the coercion of those 
who were still disaffected.
86
  We also know relatively little about the violence that was 
unquestionably directed at fellow rankers by soldiers themselves.  The willingness of the 
loyalists to follow orders, however, was a mark of their professionalization as soldiers.  
Internal regimental tensions are vitally important, not because we can hold them up as a 
counter-point to an outdated historiography, but because they reveal that military service 
in the eighteenth century was not simply a story of hierarchy and deference, but of self-
interest, agency, and, at times, independence.  
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A’ TILLEADH DHACHAIGH (RETURNING HOME): EMPIRE, 




The end of hostilities in North America in 1783 precipitated the mass demobilization of 
the inflated war-time strength of the British army.  During the War of American 
Independence, the British army grew from an established strength of around 36,000 men 
to four times this figure.
1
  With the loss of thirteen North American colonies and the 
Floridas, the inundation of veterans at demobilization nodes back in Britain forced the 
soldier into the public consciousness, as an object to be derided, avoided or pitied, 
depending on the capricious sway of popular patriotism.
2
 
The significance of the demobilization of Highland regiments was 
disproportionately greater than elsewhere in Britain.  The Highland regiments on the 
army‟s peace-time establishment consisted of just one battalion, the 42
nd
 Foot, all others 
being raised on the basis of service for only the duration of the war.  This resulted in the 
most heavily recruited region of the British Isles (in proportional terms) seeing the most 
widespread demobilization of soldiers as a percentage of war-time strength.  The impact 
of Highland demobilization was intensified by the structural necessity of military service 
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to the Highland economy.  Military service served a crucial role by injecting much 
needed specie into the Highland economy and providing economic opportunities for 
economically surplus Highland men.  Demobilization, problematic for urban centres, was 
crippling for the rural Highlands, removing a major source of employment, while 
indirectly undermining job opportunities in other seasonal employments as Lowland 
veterans flooded the towns. 
While recognizing these considerable problems, this chapter analyses Highland 
demobilization in an imperial context, across a wide geographical space with conflicting 
imperatives.  The 1763 Treaty of Paris gave Britain an expanded territorial empire in 
North America, the management of which posed challenges not previously dealt with on 
such a scale.  Sound economic arguments in favour of retaining French possessions in the 
West Indies lost out to the irresistible desire to remove the Bourbon threat to the 
vulnerable colonies on the eastern Atlantic seaboard.
3
  Highland troops had an important 
place in these debates.  Not only had their service been instrumental in the conquest of 
Canada, but successive ministries recognized, for various reasons, the utility of Highland 
military settlement.  Naturally, ministerial objectives were prioritized, creating an 
imperially-situated context for Highland demobilization. 
Nevertheless, this chapter is also about agency.  Highland veterans actively 
carved out opportunities within this context.  The assumption that government 
imperatives were uniform and, that this unitary objective outweighed the desires of its 
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soldiery, seriously misunderstands eighteenth-century government.  Imperial government 
was diffuse, a product of both local actors and ministerial directives, which could conflict 
or align over a multitude of policies.  Demobilized Highland soldiers were actors with 
their own agencies, and their minor place in the empire did not necessarily relegate them 
to mere tools in that empire‟s expansion. 
To explore the extent of this agency, it is first necessary to investigate the context 
of imperial designs which regulated the opportunities offered to demobilized Highlanders.  
Various imperial designs helped promote Highland soldiers as vital participants in the 
creation of the imperial space.  For this reason, it is also important to quantify settlement 
as precisely as possible, investigating how soldiers chose to be demobilized and where.  
From this we can see to what extent the designs of imperial administrators conformed to 
the interests of the veterans themselves.  The following two sections focus on the 
development of individual settlement patterns and chart the rise in mobility and 
opportunity through demobilization.  Veterans were exposed to an unfathomable 
expansion of their horizons through their military service.  Military service, while far 
from uniformly positive, created a class of individuals, with variegated experiences.  The 
broad and generalized historiography, which posits that Scots made a huge impact on the 
new world, particularly North America, has for methodological reasons missed these 
individualistic experiences.  The historiography has, more importantly, missed how the 
individual soldier strengthened imperial dominance.  This chapter serves as a corrective 





I   IMPERIAL IMPERATIVES 
Imperial imperatives defined the context of demobilization.  The traditional reading 
maintains that senior figures feared the return of military-trained men to the Highlands, 
where they might ferment anti-government disaffection and provide the exiled Stuarts 
with a potent source of manpower for further risings.  Policy-makers were also motivated, 
the argument suggests, by the need to defend the new imperial frontiers from external 
enemies, viewing the „rugged‟ Highlander as a potent source of national defence, pre-
suited to settlement on a harsh frontier and innately willing to abandon farming for 
military service.  Military considerations of defence are assumed to have been the 
determining factors in settlement.
4
  This interpretation is entirely unconvincing and 
extrapolates assumptions of government policy across a dynamic period of imperial 
expansion. 
There was little substantial fear by 1763, among the upper echelons of the Bute or 
Grenville ministries, that returning Highlanders were a danger to the integrity of the 
Hanoverian regime.  The Duke of Argyll had commented when recruitment began in 
1756 that none of the Highlanders would be allowed to return to Scotland owing to 
government mistrust.  Nevertheless, this mistrust, expressed most vehemently in 1748 by 
John Russell, fourth Duke of Bedford, and, in 1756 by the Duke of Cumberland, had 
largely dissipated.
5
  The last major Jacobite attempt at supplanting George II, the Elibank 
Plot, had been uncovered ten years previously, exposing bitter divisions in the Jacobite 
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movement.  The failure of the Duc de Choiseul, France‟s Minister of Foreign Affairs, to 
include the Jacobite Prince seriously in plans for a French invasion of Britain in 1759 
also precipitated the complete collapse of foreign support for Jacobitism by 1766.
6
 
More significantly, contemporary English commentaries suggest a more complex 
view of the Highlander.  There was unquestionably Scotophobia in 1760s England, 
sparked by the perceived Scottish takeover and subsequent corruption of the British 
government and its values.  It is a mistake, however, to see the bigotry of Wilke‟s North 
Briton as entirely pervasive.  Samuel Johnson remarked that „England has for years been 
filled with the achievements of seventy thousand [sic] Highlanders employed in 
America.‟  The winning proposal by Joseph Wilton (1722-1803) for a statue of James 
Wolfe in Westminster Abbey portrayed the hero‟s last moments in the arms of a 
Highland grenadier, the design provoking a negative response from one English officer: 
„[F]or what reason Highlanders above any other people, are made the only attendants ... 
there were surely English as well as Scotch regiments present when that gallant officer 
was kill‟d.‟
7
  The press was often sympathetic and pitied the „incurable‟ wounded 
Highlanders after Fort Carillon in 1758, „so lacerated by the ... broken nails the enemy 
fired‟.  The pro-government journal The Briton reminded readers of „those swarms of 
miserable maimed Highlanders‟ on London‟s streets „with scarce any vestige of the 
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   Similar sympathies were expressed as memories of the panic which 
gripped London in late 1745 abated.  Oliver Goldsmith, who gained fame with the 
pastoral poem, The Deserted Village (1770), criticized the lack of „humanity‟ shown to 
the rebels.  The prefix of „Butcher‟ to Cumberland‟s name originated with an English 
alderman of the City of London after it was suggested the duke should be made a 
freeman of the city.
9
  A wonderful irony regarding a relation of the Duke of Cumberland 
emerged in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1783.  The Duke of Cumberland‟s regiment, named 
after Prince Henry, nephew to William Augustus, was a Loyalist corps raised from 
captured Continental soldiers in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1781.  They spent the last 
months of the war under the direction of Archibald Campbell of the 71
st
 Foot and, 
„Warmed with a generous glow of gratitude‟, thanked Campbell for the appointment of 
one John Macdonald as major to the battalion.  Two Highlanders serving as the senior 
officers of the Duke of Cumberland‟s regiment was a notion which thirty years before 
might have seemed laughable.  Perceived character and patronage, not ethnicity, 
determined respect, ethnicity often becoming an issue only if those traits were not in 
evidence.
10
        
Positive views of the Gaelic soldier were stronger in government circles, but 
popular praise for his actions was not unknown.  Benjamin Franklin‟s famous eulogy to 
the 42
nd
 Foot announced how the Highlanders had „restored a beneficial and 
advantageous Commerce‟ and gifted Pennsylvania the „Blessing of Peace‟, that they had 
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in effect, secured the colonies‟ liberty.
11
  The fact of positive representations of the 
Highland soldier lends itself to an alternative reading of metropolitan views.  As Linda 
Colley has astutely observed, while Wilkite anti-Scottishness was much more than a 
fringe element, „Scotland was coming to be seen by those in power as useful, loyal, and 
British,‟ and so as entitled to the safeguarding of its people and laws, as was England.
12
 
Government policy supports these readings.  In 1754, it had been the Duke of 
Cumberland who had first rejected the king‟s suggestion that the 42
nd
 Foot should be sent 
to America.  Hatred of the Gael did not preclude counter-intuitive reactions and 
Cumberland feared the men would be lost to the army‟s establishment if the soldiers 
were to remain in that theatre.
13
  The duke‟s attitude toward the newly-raise battalions in 
1757 differed from those toward the 42
nd
 Foot, demonstrating that cultural attitudes were 
not all-encompassing. There had in any case, by the early 1760s, been a swing away from 
ministerial anti-Scottishness under Grenville and Pitt, whose astute reading of the 
imperial polity had led to the praising of the Scottish soldier in parliament in 1766.
14
  The 
various ministries of the 1760s were too divided for an entirely negative policy toward 
Highland recruitment to emerge.  Bedford, who objected to Highland demobilization in 
Britain, was incensed when William Pitt stated he would take office only on condition 
that Bedford was excluded from the government.
15
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The proof of the ineffectiveness of anti-Highlandism in demobilization can be 
found in the details of government policy.  Jeffrey Amherst, commander-in-chief in 
North America in 1763, believed that it was the king‟s intention to have the Highland 
regiments demobilized in Britain.  Amherst‟s difficulty was that this clashed with his 
ongoing operations against Pontiac‟s rebellion.  In accordance with royal wishes, 
however, Amherst issued orders that the soldiers had complete freedom to „Return home, 
or Remain in North America, as they themselves Chuse [sic]‟; passages to return home 
were also to be provided.
16
  Highland battalions in other theatres were as free to return to 




 Foot, deployed to Germany, 
were both demobilized in Scotland, the officers of which recommending the majority of 
their men for privileged settlement on the annexed estates on the basis of their service.  
Over 700 men of the 78
th
 Foot returned to Britain to be demobilized in Scotland in 
1763.
17
  Tellingly, Sir Allan Maclean of Torloisk‟s 114
th
 Foot, raised by a former 
Jacobite who had accepted the 1754 amnesty, were left to return to their home districts. 
The governments of the day were reactive to concerted pressure and 
demobilization was an issue on which interest could make its presence felt.  The 
Highland elite, in particular, were extremely keen on having the regiments demobilized 
in the Highlands.  Many Highland elites, still seeking to improve rather than overhaul the 
existing landholding system, were wedded to the mercantilist vision of population 
retention.  For them, the war in America in 1775 was a god-send, halting the precipitous 
flow of migrants to the colonies.  Many landowners logically sought to have the soldiers 
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returned to their estates to provide sufficient labour.  Others correctly identified that there 
was a sequential link between military service and emigration.
18
  Landlords attempted to 
influence demobilization, either through resettlement schemes on their own estates or 
through correspondence with senior figures.
19
  In 1763, the „Nobility and Gentry‟ of the 
Highlands petitioned the then Secretary at War, Welbore Ellis, to disband the Highland 
regiments in Scotland.  Conscious of the need to justify their requests on grounds of 
national interest, the unnamed petitioners requested „the few remains of these gallant 
men [might] be sent home to re-people the Country, and Breed a Race of Soldiers who 
may emulate the actions of their Fathers in another war‟.  They reported that as the 
regiments had been reduced to a tenth of their original strength anyway, this would not 
be problematic and, besides, „the service of these poor men seem to merit this mark of 
public attention‟.  Still, the petitioners could not hide their real concerns that during the 
war they had given up „their own private conveniency [sic] for the good of the publick‟, 
but now that it was over, they needed „hands to labour the ground‟.
20
 
The overall success of this lobbying is open to question, but it did not clash with 
the ideas of officials and the policies of the Commissioners of the Forfeited Estates.  
Andrew Mackillop has shown that the apparatus of the annexed estates became as 
focused on Highland ex-military settlement as it had been on its original policy of 
improvement.
21
  Overall, the majority of the regiments were eventually disbanded at 
towns such as Perth, within easy reach of the Highlands.  Such broad support was less 
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enthusiastic in England where the overriding fear was the perceived inability of ex-
soldiers to gain honest employment: „In times of Peace, reduced soldiers are a burthen to 
the mother country, because for every one that takes to industry at home, ten take to evil 




These complex arguments could not, however, compete with wider imperial 
desires for the settlement of Highlanders in North America.  Demobilization occurred in 
the context of immensely complicated geo-political concerns of which actors such as 
individual landlords were minor players.  Highland demobilization in North America was 
not a mechanical consequence of a metropolitan impression that Highlanders would 
efficiently defend the frontiers.  Upper New York, Québec, and Nova Scotia were the 
principal areas of Highland settlement, but these were areas under little immediate threat 
from external powers by 1765.  The defeat and expulsion of their Acadian allies led the 
Mi‟ kmaq Nation of Nova Scotia to sign a treaty with Britain in 1761.  In New York, 
after the collapse of Pontiac‟s confederacy, the external threat was also of secondary 
consequence.  Sir William Johnson was instrumental in maintaining a nervous peace 
between Britain and the Six Nations Confederacy.  While never able to win over all of 
the Iroquois, his close relationship with the Mohawk had a beneficial effect for the crown 
on the other Nations, keeping most of them out of the rising, and securing peace with 
Pontiac at Oswego in 1766.
23
  While rarely amiable to British rule, the removal of French 
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power undercut the ability of pro-French Amerindians to conduct offensive operations 
against the colonies.  Where there was a more significant threat, in the southern 
backcountry, the scene of venomous relations with the Cherokee, no attempt was made to 
establish Highland settlements.     
Highland settlement was, therefore, not about a militarily potent counterpoint to 
an external threat to empire, but the effective management and growth of its internal 
vitality.  The temporary halt to westward expansion imagined in the Proclamation Line 
of 1763, as well as attempting to secure cordial relations with the indigenous Nations, 
was designed to encourage Protestant settlement into the newly ceded territories of 
Québec and East and West Florida.
24
  Facing a politically unreliable Catholic population 
of 75,000 people in the St Lawrence Valley, the Line‟s architects, men such as the earls 
of Shelburne and Hillsborough, envisaged an Irish-style solution to the problem, creating 
a Protestant ascendency that  would dominate landownership and office holding, and 
who would underscore the establishment of British rule in the province.  The pre-
requisite of this model was a large-scale Protestant settlement and to this end, military 
settlement was encouraged in the province by offering land grants to soldiers through the 
Royal Proclamation.  Grading these land grants to conform to military rank, 5,000 acres 
to field officers, falling to 50 acres for the private soldier, created a ready-made, 
hierarchical Protestant landowning class of both grandees and the yeoman farmers who 
would elect them.
25
 Demobilized soldiers would be paragons of Lockean individualism, 
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politically supportive of the Protestant interest and militarily capable enough to bear arms 
in the realm‟s defence. 
Highlanders were deemed suited to this process, revealing a sophisticated view of 
the Highlander.  Confidence in the qualities of the Highland fighting man, at first purely 
utilitarian, spilled over into a new cultural definition of the Gael.  This definition placed a 
premium on the ability of the Highland soldier to create the conditions for imperial 
vitality, facilitating the administration of peace and justice.  If correctly governed, it was 
believed there was no reason Highlanders could not provide, „a bulwark ... to liberty ... 
united to the constitution‟.
26
  There was also a societal reason for these attitudes.  As 
control of Québec‟s population necessitated a hierarchical Protestant landed elite, in 
effect, what was required was the transplanting of Georgian social organizations onto a 
colonial space.  Given the contemporary metropolitan views of Highland society, that it 
possessed strong bonds of social organization, Highland veterans were expertly placed to 
promote the Protestant ascendency in Canada.
27
  There was, of course, some 
inconsistency here.  The supposedly arbitrary nature of social control in the Highlands 
was the subject of a great deal of criticism in the period, largely associated with the 
problems of Jacobitism and emigration.  Yet in challenging contexts such as Québec, 
such concerns were disconnected from these domestic issues.  As much as Whig 
commentators did criticize clanship in the Highlands, they accepted without question that 
a landed-elite based hierarchy was to be fully encouraged at home and abroad.   
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It was no coincidence that one of the „frontiers‟ where Highland soldiers were 
settled was the problematic border region between New York and the New Hampshire 





 Foot near what became Vermont upon which New York had a claim, a claim 
rejected by the de facto government of the region under the Allen brothers and the 
settlers known as the Green Mountain Boys.  John Reid, a former captain in the 42
nd
 Foot, 
was granted land near Bennington, a Green Mountain Boys heartland, from where his 
tenants were forcibly evicted in 1772.  Governor William Tyron lamented to the 
American Secretary that no land grants could be fully confirmed until jurisdictional lines 
were fully settled.
28
  By the settling of Highlanders, it was hoped that law and order 
might be more effectively established.  By the inconsistencies of colonial administration, 
the white settlers of the New Hampshire Grants had become an internal threat to be held 
in check by Gaelic-speaking Highlanders, who were to enforce the dominion of English 
law.   
It was by the same logic that the 42
nd
 Foot were the regiment most involved in 
suppressing the colonial disturbances on the Pennsylvania frontier in 1765, an event 
which Patrick Griffin has called „the beginning of the end of the British empire in 
America‟.  On 6 March 1765, the regiment was called upon to take prisoner a group of 
local settlers known as the Black Boys, who had intercepted and burned crown supplies 
containing gifts for local Amerindians.  The Highlanders caught the men involved, but 
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were surrounded in their garrison at Fort Loudoun.  Charles Grant, commanding the post, 
sensibly turned the suspects over to local magistrates, who release them without charge.
29
 
Internal considerations were also at work in the southern colonies.  On 10 
December 1757, Governor William Henry Lyttleton of South Carolina requested the 
withdrawal of the German and colonial-raised 60
th
 Foot, under the command of Henry 
Bouquet, from his colony.  Throughout his time in South Carolina, Bouquet had 
reportedly been „measured upon all occasions by his views of establishing himself here 
and have seen so much of duplicity ... that it is impossible for me to repose ... confidence 
in him‟.  According to Lyttleton, Bouquet had conspired to have the 77
th
 Foot removed 
from the town thereby granting himself uncontested military command.  Lyttleton‟s 
solution was, however, revealing.  He wished the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Loudoun, 
to remove the 60
th
 Foot while retaining the 77
th
 Foot and, to have the latter demobilized 
in South Carolina at the peace: „[T]hey would, very many of them, perhaps the far 
greatest part become settlers here, which would be a most substantial and lasting benefit 
to these parts that want very much an addition of white inhabitants.‟
30
  From Lyttleton‟s 
point of view, the Highlanders were the more attractive subjects to secure the expansion 
of the white population, despite the questionable place of the Highlander in the taxonomy 
of imperial peoples. 
The inconsistencies created by imperial expansion could create some remarkable 
paradoxes.  As early as the 1670s, an anonymous author had suggested that 600-700 
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Highlanders might be used to combat Catholicism in Maryland.  Among the requests of 
the petition were calls for the establishment of Protestant churches and schools in 
Maryland and, for the colony‟s proprietary status to be revoked so that Protestant 
governors could be appointed.  In effect, Highlanders would be called upon to underpin 
the establishment of Protestantism in the colony, a remarkable assertion given 
contemporaneous believe in the intersect between the Highlands and Catholicism.
31
  In 
addition, as much as Highlanders had been selected to defend the frontiers of the Georgia 
Trusteeship in the 1730s on the basis of military potency, great efforts had been made to 
facilitate the development of commercial networks between the Savannah trustees and 
the Darien Highlanders, albeit within the implausible confines of the trustee‟s regulation 
of commercial growth.
32
  Nevertheless, there was a link within imperial thought between 
Protestantism, hierarchy, commercial progress, and militarism, irrepressibly intertwined 
in the North American context.  This recognition, implicitly, but not entirely, suppressed 
the association of Highlanders with savagery.  Travellers over the next few decades 
consistently highlighted the achievements of disbanded Highland soldiers in bringing 
areas of settlement into cultivation and civility.
33
  It is likely that metropolitan 
conceptions of these attributes in the Gaelic diaspora informed the choice of Highlanders 
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for imperial settlement and, that this was at least as important as government confidence 
in the martial capacities of the soldiers.   
To this end, policies were put in place to encourage Highland settlement even 
before the King‟s Proclamation was issued.  While ordering the strengthening of the 42
nd
 
Foot with draftees of the 77
th
, Amherst directed that Bouquet offer any of the disbanded 
officers and soldiers unstipulated quantities of colonial land.  All discharged men were to 
be given every encouragement to settle in America.  Revealingly, Amherst was also of 
the opinion that invalids and men rendered unfit through service should be discharged in 
America, even though such men were unlikely to be of much use in a martial capacity.  
He justified this on the grounds that the reduced men were more likely to find work in 
the expanding colonies.  According to Amherst, their remaining in the colonies was 
important to the development of commerce, a theme not unrelated to the Protestant 
interest.
34
  While problematic within the domestic confines of Scotland, not only had the 
Gael been rehabilitated through imperial conquest (an overemphasized staple of the 
existing historiography), but they had been imagined as acceptable pioneers of the values 
which needed to be extended within that empire. 
 
 
II   QUANTIFYING SETTLEMENT 
How many Highland soldiers were demobilized in North America?  The prevailing 
perception, then and now, was that the regiments that „went to the American war, went 
to their destruction‟.  It was Rev. Dr. Walker‟s opinion that the trickle of men who 
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We must not, however, confuse casualty rates with attrition.  Losses to British 
forces during this period were significant, but not all losses were caused by deaths, which 
occurred largely through disease.
36
  Discharges, owing to age or infirmity, were 
responsible for a large percentage of the attrition in this period.  The effect was that in 
wartime, regiments were required to recruit an average of 2.1 per cent of strength per 
month simply to maintain troop levels.
37
  Figure 4.1 demonstrates the levels of attrition 
for select months in the 42
nd
 Foot during the Seven Years‟ War.  Average discharges 
suggest that from June 1756 to June 1767, perhaps as many as 300 men were discharged, 
lost to the regiment, but likely to have survived the war.  This extrapolated figure would 
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Figure 4.1: Regimental losses of the 1/42
nd

















Oct 1759- Apr 
1760 
722 0 16 7 3.1 0; 70; 30 
Apr 1761- Oct 
1761 
645 4 0 1 0.7 80; 0; 20 
Apr 1762- Oct 
1762 
882 0 45 349* 
 
44.6 0; 11; 89 
Oct 1763- Apr 
1764 
435 3 33 8 10.1 7; 75; 18  
Oct 1766- Apr 
1767 
384 4 28 6 9.9 10; 74; 16 
*Siege of Havana 
 
Figure 4.2 gives similar statistics for the War of American Independence.  Here 
on average, thirteen soldiers were discharged every six months, for a possible discharge 
total of 234 men during the period the regiment was in America - eighteen per cent of the 
regiment. 
Discharges and demobilizations were, therefore, far more extensive than has 
previously been realized.  While these soldiers had no restrictions on their movements, 
save economic circumstance or the nature of their age or infirmity, it is impossible to 
track their movements once they were discharged.  Overall, figures based on the extant 
returns of the Highland regiments which fought in America suggest that between 
eighteen and twenty-five per cent of the Highlanders that went to the colonies were 
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discharged there, excluding those reduced when the regiments were disbanded in 1763 
and in 1783-84. 
Figure 4.2: Regimental losses for the 1/42
nd
















1030 2 19 80 9.8 2; 18; 80 
Jun 1777- 
Dec 1777 
1033 2 6 45 5.1 4; 11; 85  
June 1779- 
Dec 1779 
1050 6 1 43 4.8 12; 2; 86 
Jun 1781- 
Dec 1781 
871 5 4 28 4.2 13; 11; 76 
Dec 1782- 
Jun 1783 
804 18 24 28 8.7 26; 34; 40 
Dec 1784- 
Jun 1785 
385 2 37 5 11.4 6; 84; 10 
 
This is not an insignificant figure, for the propensity of Highland males to enlist 
must to some degree have been formed on the basis of the likelihood of survival.  Life 
was not cheap in the eighteenth century and we have seen how soldiers protected their 
rights as labourers.  Perhaps as significant, the entire concept of military service as a 
means to an end was predicated on the likely receipt of those benefits.  We are, of course, 
still left with the questionable extent of how far stories of success or survival permeated 
the minds of the rural population of the Highlands.  Rev. Dr. Walker‟s flawed statement 
that the majority were slain in America suggests that it did not.  Even so, Gaelic song 
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reinforced notions of reward through military service in this period, one poem told 
soldiers there would be „‟S le mòr chlìu a thighinn dachaidh le nì [Great fame and bounty 
to come home with]‟.  Another by Donnchadh Bàn Mac an t-Saoir made similar claims.
40
  
The hopes of what might occur at the end of military service were the militating factor in 
enlistment, and the fact that more survived military service than were killed or died of 
disease might have assisted the continual attraction of the service in this period. 
Where were Highland soldiers demobilized?  While the ideological 
underpinnings of land and military service will be explored in the following chapter, 
settlement in North America was emphasized to recruits as a reward for their service.  
Land settlement by Highland soldiers in North America, however, should not be seen as 
the expression of an unrestrained desire for new beginnings.  It was, instead, a 
demonstration of the speed with which individual Highland soldiers embraced 
opportunity.  According to the disbandment musters of the 78
th
 Foot in September 1763, 
170 men, including over seventy per cent of the regiment‟s NCO cadre, chose settlement 
in North America.  Of those, eighty settled in Québec, where the regiment had been 
stationed for the final four years of the war, the balance seeking lands in New York and 
Nova Scotia.  This was around one in five of the remaining rank-and-file.
41
 
Troops were generally offered the location of their demobilization as a choice, 
often with significant minorities choosing American settlement.  On 17 September 1783, 
the headquarters at New York issued orders that men „desirous of settling in Nova 
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Scotia‟ were to submit their names and those of their wives and children to the Adjutant 
General.  In all, 586 men and women of the 42
nd
 Foot left New York in October 1783 for 
Nova Scotia on board three transports; ten days later, 177 left for England.  Removing 
the number of men remaining in the regiment that was to be on garrison duty in Halifax 
until the late 1780s, this suggests around one third of the regiment chose colonial 
settlement.
42
  The figures for the 76
th
 Foot are among the most explicit.  By March 1784, 
there were 364 men left on the 76
th
 Foot‟s musters. Of these, 142 (thirty-nine per cent) 
remained in America, either through capture, desertion or by choosing to settle in Nova 
Scotia.  In some companies, the numbers that chose to go to Nova Scotia outnumbered 
those who decided to return for demobilization in Stirling.
43
 
Between 1756 and 1783, eleven Highland battalions served in North America, 
that is, approximately 11,700 men.
44
  Based on the extant muster lists of these battalions, 
thirty-six per cent, approximately 4,200, died in the fatal land.  Another 2,800 were 
demobilized in America, either to remain there or find passages back to Britain.  To this 
we may add the 1,300 who chose to remain in America when regiments were 
demobilized and the 1,200 emigrants of the 84
th
 Foot who remained in Canada in 1784.  
Around 2,200 returned with their regiments to be disbanded in Britain.  These figures 
have never been examined in such depth.  What is remarkable is that more remained in 
North America than chose to return home, excluding the demobilized of whom we will 
never know their eventual destinations.  Put quite simply, if only a tiny minority ever 
returned to the Highlands, it was not because of appalling losses, or government concern 
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and neglect, but because a significant number chose not to return to their original 
localities.  
It is revealing to compare the Highland soldier with the troops of the German 
states who served in North America during the War of American Independence.  Like the 
Highlander, German soldiers shared a fascination with America and invested much of 
their hopes in its aspirational potential.  More so than the Highlanders, German troops 
had a reputation for desertion and a desire to merge with colonial populations, where 
there were already substantial German settlements and an active German political 
community.
45
  Despite this, the majority of German troops returned to central Europe.  
We should not over-estimate the otherness of the Gaelic-speaking Highlander in the 
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Figure 4.3: Selected demobilization rates of American service troops, 1756-1783.
46
 












































Anhalt-Serbst 1,152 984 85.4 
Anspach-Beyreuth 2,353 1,183 50.3 
Brunswick  5,723 2,704 47.3 
Hesse-Cassel 18,970 10,784 56.8 




III   THE NATURE OF SETTLEMENT 
It was common in the eighteenth-century British Empire for policy to be enacted on the 
ground before systemized imperial ideologies had emerged.
47
  As we have seen, 
demobilization was hardly a government-orchestrated fait accompli and many veterans 
chose to remain in North America.  The result of this was two-fold.  First, as relatively 
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free agents, the system enforced the development of individualism as men left soldiering 
to become independent-minded settlers.  Success became entirely dependent on an 
individual‟s ability to manipulate personal contacts or government incentives.  Second, 
imperial policy was partially shaped by the imperatives of demobilized soldiers on the 
ground, who operated not as the meek tools of an imperial centre, but as active agents 
with their own role in the development of British North America. 
 The notion of individualism among Highland soldiers has been severely 
undermined by a historiography that asserts the Gael was an obtuse product of the clan 
system.  When Bernard Bailyn identified a „provincial‟ model of British emigration in 
the era of the American Revolution, consisting of small family units, in contrast to the 
individualistic economic migration of the „metropolitan‟ model, his conclusions mirrored 
the established interpretation of Highlands and Islands emigration.  Historians asserted 
that communal cohesion in the new world might be understood through a clannish desire 
to remain together.
48
  While easily challenged (many failed to recognize that Bailyn‟s 
„provincial‟ model applied to just fifty-four per cent of Highland emigrants) historians 
did not look beyond the fir-taca-led emigrations that appeared to typify the Highland 
exodus.  Such hierarchical approaches have influenced interpretations of military 
settlement.  It is accepted that officers were central to settlement, being the only persons 
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with sufficient credit to purchase equipment and form networks for commercial viability, 
and the skills to organize such ventures in newly-settled territories.
49
 
The distribution of land grants does not justify this contention.  Government land 
grants were issued to senior commanding officers who, in turn, distributed such lands to 
their soldiers.  The officers were free to sub-divide their lands among tenants but the 
land granted to a dependent soldier was entirely his own property, as long as quit rents 
were paid and the land was sufficiently cultivated.  This was consistent with the 
government‟s desire to create independent yeoman farmers within a hierarchical land 
structure.  As land was individual property, however, it had the effect of forging a direct 
link between administrators and demobilized soldiers, often to the detriment of their 
officers‟ influence.  In many cases, land grants were issued to NCOs on behalf of the 




This was assisted by the periodic institutionalization of settlement, where land 
grants became the accepted norm of state/subject relations.  In the period 1783-85, the 
settlement of Nova Scotia was a primary concern of Governor John Parr and, under his 
direction, a system of surveyors encouraged a veritable flood of petitions, which would 
eventually top 6,000.  Parr preferred small group and individual grants and was largely 
unwilling to grant huge tracts to would-be proprietors.  Delays were inevitable and not 
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all officials acted well, but petitioning individualized the land and made the provisions of 
the grants common knowledge to the meanest of ex-soldiers.
51
 
We must distinguish between communal settlement and collective settlement.  
Communal settlement implies a situation where pre-determined patterns subordinated the 
individual to the group.  The settlement of Highland soldiers was not communal but 
collective, a societal form determined by a collection of individual persons.  Individual 
success was predicated on group support but the individual was prioritized.  Few directly 
petitioned for land on an individual basis but logically coalesced into groups, often of a 
dozen individuals or fewer to petition for the lands they were due.  There was strength in 
numbers.  In North American settlements, it was foolhardy to begin the clearance of 
uncultivated lands as a single man.  An individual could clear only between two and four 
acres of uncultivated backcountry every year.  Requests to remain with comrades were 
common, but they were not exceptional expressions of Highland clannishness; instead 
they derived from a natural desire for networks of support.  In the same way that has 
been argued for the officer class, these networks provided information which allowed ex-
soldiers to make claims on land near demobilized friends.  This was the case with John 
Macleod of the 42
nd
 Foot, who received 100 acres in 1785 in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, 
having established there were still vacant lands near others of the same regiment.
52
 
It is also possible that the petitioners understood ministerial desires to create 
cohesive bonds in the settled populations and used joint petitions to suggest the necessity 
of acceding to the requests.  A sign of this understanding was that it was unheard of in 
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the petitions to promise future military service as an argument for securing the land 
grants.  Instead, petitioners emphasized their desire to „cultivate and improve that 
ground‟ or their „Hard working, labouring and Industrious‟ temperaments.  Scribbled 
notes on the petitions that „We know the above person to be an industrious Man‟ could 
mean the difference between success and failure.
53
  John Small, commanding the 2/84
th
 
Foot, in a letter to the commander of British forces in Nova Scotia, outlined similar 
arguments.  To justify the settlement at Windsor in 1784, Small employed the argument 
that the settled soldiers might be a source of future manpower, but this argument was 
second to his emphasis on the importance of cultivating the land and expanding the 
commercial vitality of this area of Nova Scotia.  John Small, in fact, was largely against 
communal settlement, recognizing that local material factors could destroy such 
cohesion.  He reported that forcing ex-servicemen to settle together was generally 
counter-productive, particularly close to winter, the provisions generally being 
inadequate to feed all of the soldiers.  This is indeed what happened and while Small‟s 
advocacy of a non-dictatorial policy to encourage free choice was ignored, his request to 
make Windsor the location of the demobilization was granted sixteen days after he wrote 
the letter by General Henry Fox.
54
 
  Some settlers became entrepreneurial manipulators of the land grant system, 
operating within localized military networks to accrue numerous tracts.  Private William 
Macdonald fought in North America during the Seven Years‟ War and settled on fifty 
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acres in Nova Scotia in 1763.  In 1777-78, he bought out nine other fifty acre grants 
awarded to Highland veterans in the Shubenacadie river valley before enlisting in the 
Royal Highland Emigrants.  Service during the War of Independence provided him with 
a further 300 acres which he received in 1783, giving Macdonald 800 acres of land in 
total.  With this he purchased sheep, cattle, and adjoining land before selling 400 acres to 
his sons James and Andrew.  By 1794, on the basis of military service in two wars, 
Macdonald had become a landowning entrepreneur, establishing an estate of 1,300 acres 
and successfully using the imperial system to establish his family‟s security.
55
  Robert 
Macdonald was similarly entrepreneurial.  When his neighbour died unexpectedly in 
1787, Macdonald quickly requested that he might take over this land near Shelburne on 
the basis of having „improved‟ four acres of his own land, a request which was granted 
by the Parr government.
56
  The scope of some individuals knew no bounds.  Captain 
Alexander Macdonald of the 84
th
 Foot had held several thousand acres of land on Staten 
Island prior to the Revolution, having been granted them for his service in the 77
th
 Foot 
during the Seven Years‟ War.  He lost these lands through his Loyalism and during the 
war he had been sentenced to death in absentia.  In 1783 he asked for land that had 
formerly been given to other proprietors, including his former commanding officer, 
Archibald Montgomery, but which had been unsettled and reclaimed by escheat.  In all, 
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Macdonald unsuccessfully requested 190,000 acres, almost double what the entire 
second battalion of his regiment received.
57
 
It was, on occasion, possible for Highlanders to manipulate the system for social 
self-aggrandizement.  One Macpherson, „a very great man‟, who settled at Chedabucto in 
1784, declared that the appointed surveyor of the new settlement knew nothing of his 
task and suggested his own candidate for the job.  Macpherson had also taken to 
conducting weddings without a licence, had declared himself the local surgeon, and was 
demanding to be made a Justice of the Peace and refusing to act under the official 
appointee.  For determined men, the new townships offered a remarkable opportunity for 
establishing new hierarchies though this did not stop Macpherson ingratiating himself to 
an arriving colonel who seemed determined, so it was thought, to become a local 
„dictator‟.  In this particular township, the best lots and the stores had all been secured by 
the first arrivals, with Macpherson and others dividing the lots as they saw fit, without 
consulting the surveyor.
58
        
The confidence of ex-soldiers is best seen in the high number of petitions that 
questioned the quality or quantity of the allotted government grants.  In a joint-memorial 
signed by eight enlisted men of the 84
th
 Foot, the petitioners described how they had 
been shown two of their allotted 100 acres in Canada, but found them woefully 
inadequate.  They asserted that settlement there „would only destroy their provisions 
and … seeing and perceiving no inhabitants near the place and that they could make no 
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use of their provisions thereof for the benefit of themselves and their families‟, they 
decided to petition the governor for equivalent lands elsewhere.
59
 
 In the absence of land grants, or prior to those grants being made productive, ex-
soldiers had to find the means of sustaining themselves.  The government issued 
provisions of seeds, tools, and supplies for the first year of settlement to allow planting.  
Even so, as in the Highlands, opportunities for wage labour were essential to the 
financial viability of new world settlement and many even sold their seeds and tools for 
specie.
60
  This similarly reinforced individualism by making the labour and credit of the 
individual settler the source of stability.  There were 400 military and Loyalist families 
in the Nova Scotian town of Shelburne by the end of 1783, a settlement adjoining the 
Free Black community of Birchtown.  Detailed by Sergeant John McVicar of the 76
th
 
Foot, 386 men, including ninety-five veterans of the 76
th
 were employed in cutting 
streets for the Shelburne township.  Such employment could not possibly provide long 
term sustenance and the lack of jobs and a perception that the Black Loyalists were 
undercutting employment resulted in the violent expulsion of the Blacks from Shelburne 
in July 1784 by groups of ex-soldiers.  The violence provoked by labour problems 
demonstrates that wage labour was not an adjunct to land settlement, but a symbiotic 
process to settlement.  During the race riot in Shelburne, the soldiers had threatened to 
hang Benjamin Marston, the chief surveyor, for the slow delivery of their lands.
61
  
Settlers did not pursue subsistence farming and specie from the sale of goods was the 
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ultimate objective of cultivating the land.  As such, Highland soldiers elsewhere in Nova 
Scotia linked disposable income to settlement.  Thirty-three veterans of the 84
th
 Foot 
under Evan McPhee offered money or their own day-labour to the Nova Scotia 
administration for the upkeep of a road linking their settlement near Nine Mile River 
with the wider world.  It was only with „the assistance of Almighty God, the aid of 
Government and their own very Great Exertions‟ that the road had been built, but its 
poor condition prevented the product of their labours on the farms lots being transported 






IV   MAKING THE EMPIRE BRITISH 
The empire was not an abstraction, separate from the lives of people in the Atlantic world, 
but was created by the vested interests of those who lived within its borders.  Nowhere 
was this more apparent than in the conquered province of Québec after 1763.  
Demobilized Highlanders carried out ministerial plans for a Protestant ascendency in 
Québec in pursuit of their own security.  Officers and men of the 78
th
 Foot shared with 
the government an equal distrust of what they saw as Catholic licentiousness and 
corruption, whether in Canada or elsewhere.  Both consequently trumpeted Protestant 
values as a morally superior imperative for the colonies.  Even those officers who were 
the sons of Jacobite elites, or Catholic themselves, were aware of the dangers to imperial 
stability from the influence of „papists‟ and were hostile to the influence of Catholic 
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priests on the lower orders.
63





 Foot, his experience of the Canadiens offered, „striking proof of the difference 
between a free and independent people, and an abject multitude‟.
64
  By 1791, around a 
third of the seigneuries in Québec were owned, or partly owned, by British residents and, 
during this time, Highland officers sought to establish social models consistent with 
security and their own social importance.
65
   
The enlisted men of the 78
th
 Foot did the same.  A number settled in Québec City, 
and the impact of this small collection of disbanded Highlanders should not be 
underestimated.  John Fraser, who was wounded during the battle of St. Foy in 1760, 
established an English language school in Garden Street, the first English school in the 
city.  The majority of the children of 78th veterans were educated there.  These veterans 
established a close community, which was an intrinsic part of the re-development of the 
city following the war.  John Macleod kept a hotel; his fellow soldier Lauchlan Smith 
kept a store.  Sergeant Hugh McKay also kept a store until it was demolished to make 
way for extended fortifications, following which he served as the First Sergeant at Arms 
for the House of Assembly in the 1790s.
66
  It appears that the Highland veterans were 
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  Much of this support probably emanated from resistance to the concessions 
allowed to Catholicism that were crucial parts of the Québec Act.  Religion was a key 
component of the relationship between Highlanders and Québec.  As noted, many 
veterans of the 78
th
 were extremely suspicious of the Catholic population and, in June 
1762, had to be warned to behave during a French Canadian parade in the city, and were 
explicitly warned not to break the windows of houses not illuminated to mark the king‟s 
birthday.
68
  Most of the veterans who settled did entertain thoughts of converting the 
local populace.  John Nairne attempted to bring a Presbyterian minister from Scotland for 
the task, but was disappointed, and the region remained overwhelmingly Catholic.  James 
Cuthbert, an Inverness man formerly of the 15
th
 Foot, did bring a minister from Scotland 
to educate his children and succeeded in establishing the first Presbyterian church in 
lower Canada at Berthier in 1786.
69
   
Protestantism underpinned a vital, but understudied, part of the machinery of 
empire: freemasonry.  Freemasonry was a key cultural institution in the spread of proto-
British values.  The lodges arrived with British troops, quickly initiating civilian 
members who cooperated with demobilized soldiers in founding more permanent 
institutions when the regiment was re-deployed.  This was the case in both Québec, 
where there was a travelling lodge with the 78
th
 Foot, and Montreal, where Lodge 195 of 




  Within two months of the 
victory on the Plains of Abraham, representatives of six regimental field lodges had met 
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to form a permanent institution in Québec.  Members of the 78
th
 Foot were prominent 
members, the chaplain of the regiment, Robert Macpherson serving the same role in the 
Quebec Select Lodge and Lt. Col. Simon Fraser serving as Grandmaster from summer 
1760.  The Lodge in the 78
th
 Foot maintained its military character from the disbanded 
veterans in Québec, changed its name to the St. Andrew‟s Lodge and functioned in its 
original form until around 1792.
71
  Amongst the Highland freemasons in Québec was 
James Thompson, who served the lodge almost continuously as Master, Senior, Warden, 
and Secretary.
72
  Thompson‟s stay in Québec coincided with a shift in the political 
repercussions of British freemasonry.  While, to a great degree, an international order, 
after about 1780, the inclusive ideals of global brotherhood in freemasonry gave way to a 
more limited, circumscribed order, with an increasing emphasis on political loyalty.  This 
was particularly important in Québec
 
where the staunch Protestantism of the order made 
freemasonry a pillar of British dominance.
73
  There is no question that membership was a 
deeply personal choice, but the strength of freemasonry in the Highland regiments during 
this time was a demonstration of commitment to British political and cultural institutions.       
These pro-imperial experiences have been ignored, in part because it appears to 
give the problematic suggestion that Scottish Highlanders made the Empire „English‟; 
they did not.  Their very participation and agency gave the Empire pan-British overtones.  
The early imperial world of seventeenth-century Britain and America demonstrates that 
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the ideology of altering customs through plantation was, contrary to previous thought, 
never a purely uni-national or uni-cultural phenomenon.  It was not just the Protestant 
Jacobean English who participated in plantation, but their efforts were part of a wider 
European phenomenon of attempted centralization at all levels.  Highland leaders sought 
to assert territorial control over clan territories and Catholic orders were planted in the 
western Highlands to cement Catholicism in the region at the same time James VI and I 
was looking for ways to extirpate the clans of the Western Isles.
74
  The administration of 
empire often consisted of variegated aims and conflicting objectives.  There was nothing 
paradoxical, therefore, in the Gaelic transformation of North America to a more „British‟ 
model of government, as long as those Gaels were integrated, as they were, into the 
ideology of modernization and improvement. 
John Macdonald of Glenalladale believed that ministerial interests might be 
conformed to Gaelic imperatives in the administration of the empire.  As a junior officer 
in the 84
th
 Foot, who had settled St John‟s Island in 1772, Glenalladale wrote to the 
American Secretary, George Germain, in the autumn of 1776 as the colonial rebellion 
looked to be on the verge of collapse.  In a forty-four page memorandum, Glenalladale 
outlined how to ensure the security of the colonies in the post-war world.  Glenalladale 
astutely observed that should the rebellion be crushed, and if its governance returned to 
normal, the colonies would soon grow strong enough to „support ambitious designs‟ for 
independence once again „never more to return to the same situation, but to swim, at 
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liberty, in the vast political ocean of the world‟.  Such a course could lead only to the 
colonists‟ conquest of South America, the West Indies and the eventual subordination of 
Europe to the United States.  „[T]heir ambition to be Lords of the Universe, must be 
corrected‟, he said.  To this end, in addition to the judicial murder of the principal leaders, 
the disarming of the general population and the forfeiture of landed estates, he considered 
the inherent paradox of American land.  If settlement was restricted, then Americans 
would turn to manufacturing and eventually out-trade Britain.  On the other hand, if 
settlement was left unrestricted there would be no barrier to the demographic triumph of 
the American Empire.  Schemes to prevent the colonists from engaging in direct 
competition with Britain had similarly occupied the minds of some parliamentarians 
throughout the crisis.
75
  These considerations had to be balanced against excess 
restrictions that would „in time [unfairly] reduce the Americans, to the poverty, wildness 
and barbarity, of the aboriginal natives‟.  His solution revealed the considerable overlap 
between his own interests, socio-economic assumptions and government policy.  
Highland emigrants were to be „usefully spared ... for the purpose of laying the 
foundation of a useful scheme for government‟ in the colonies.  Three or four isolated 
collections of people spread throughout the colonies would act as loyal „friends of 
government‟ and a check to American designs.  It was men like Glenalladale who would 
be the conduit through which government was ordered.  Simultaneously, he advocated 
the cultivation of islands in the north and south to supply the standing army that was 
essential for the governance of the colonies.  The economic development of his own 
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struggling estates on St John‟s could not have been far from his mind.  Glenalladale 
believed this natural order was predisposed to form a pillar of imperial dominion.  It is 
not known whether Glenalladale ever received a reply; his assertion that current 
ministerial plans to end the war „I dismiss ... as silly, & inadequate‟ probably did not help 
his case.
76
  Glenalladale‟s memorandum reveals, however, dynamism in the imperial 




V   MOBILITY AND IMPROVEMENT 
While helping to support individualism among Highland soldiers, service also helped 
expand the horizons of the Highland male.  Military service was a contributing factor, 
however, to a more complex process of transformation.  Large numbers of recruits were 
already mobile, literate, and commercially-minded when they entered the army.  
Seasonal migration was an intrinsic part of the Highland economy and it is unsurprising 
that many men enlisted far from their home parishes.  Indeed, enlistment may have been 
the most distinct phase of a migratory pattern that had been going on much of their 
young lives. 
 Already mobile, the soldiers‟ intellectual capacities reflected this.  R.A. Houston 
has estimated that illiteracy levels in the Scottish Highlands in the period were around 
sixty per cent; a little less than double the English and Lowland equivalents.  This rose to 
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as much as eighty-three per cent among the rural poor of the western Highlands.
77
  
Highland soldiers, however, were not the most marginal of the poor.  Estimates based on 
names written in army paybooks suggest that illiteracy in two Highland regiments during 
the War of American Independence was around sixty-five per cent, higher than the 
Highland average but below that of most rural poor.
78
  Active steps seem to have been 
taken, at least in some regiments, to improve literacy and promotion to an NCOs position 
necessitated literacy and a knowledge of book-keeping and arithmetic.  Bennett 
Cuthbertson recommended that a school be formed in every regiment, led by an old 
soldier and paid for by voluntary subscriptions from the officers, as was the case in the 
Scots Dutch Brigade.
79
  Highland soldiers, who desired to, could pay for their own 
education and a receipt by a John Fraser of the 84
th
 Foot to pay for seven weeks of 
schooling suggests that this happened.  While marching recruits of the 71
st
 Foot from 
their depots in the Highlands to embarkation points at Glasgow in 1776, accounts of 
expenses included „Paper spent for the use of recruits‟, enabling them to write to their 
families.  When Sergeant Jonathan Grant of the 42
nd
 Foot died on active service in the 
early 1760s, a bible worth three weeks‟ pay after stoppages was auctioned off, a system 
common in the army.  The bible was bought by John Grant, a private who signed for it 
with his mark.  A different Sergeant Grant‟s personal effects also contained „several 
books‟ which were similarly auctioned the same year.  In the two Highland regiments 
                                                 
77
 R.A. Houston, Scottish Literacy and the Scottish Identity: Illiteracy and Society in Scotland and 
Northern England, 1600-1800 (Cambridge: CUP, 1985), pp. 56, 72-4, 78, 81. 
78
 Frey, The British Soldier in America, p. 68.  
79
 Cuthbertson, Cuthbertson‟s System, pp. 8-9; Sylvia Frey, Michael McConnell and David Hackett Fischer 
have all mistaken the school in the Scots Dutch Brigade as being formed in one of the Highland regiments, 
though this does not preclude the existence of such schools, Fischer, Washington‟s Crossing, p. 48; Frey, 
The British Soldier in America, p. 69; Michael McConnell, Army and Empire: British Soldiers on the 
American Frontier, 1758-1775 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), p. 55.  
203 
 
serving on the Pennsylvania frontier in 1763, officers counted 120 letters addressed to 
the 273 soldiers remaining in the regiments.
80
  It would be inaccurate to suggest that the 
army was an education of comparable utility as apprenticeships, but for the Highland 
poor it was a more expansive intellectual venture than labouring.  Scottish males who 
gave their occupation as soldiers in legal depositions in the eighteenth century had a 
seven per cent lower illiteracy rate than those in England, suggesting that if soldiers in 




It might also be presumed that owing to the limited economic opportunities of the 
Highlands that the men were overwhelmingly labourers and lacked employable skills.  
The skills possessed by Highland recruits were, however, broad and utilitarian.  Among 
the professions listed in Highland regiments were tobacconists, shoemakers, square 
wrights, masons, and gardeners.  Before the French-held Fort Carillon in November 
1757, the 42
nd
 Foot contained more artificers than any other regiment present.  They 
were outnumbered only by local tradesmen.  In all, the regiment had arrived in America 




Like their British counter-parts in the 1760s, the revolutionary governments of 
the early United States were quick to recognize the potential of Highland soldiers to 
internal economic development.  On 29 May 1776, Nicholas Biddle of the Virginia Navy 
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took two British ships, the Oxford and the Crawford transporting reinforcements to the 
by then rebel-occupied Boston.  On the Oxford were over 200 Highlanders of the 71
st
 
Foot, „Among them, we are told are many valuable Artificers‟.  Edmund Randolph 
informed Thomas Jefferson that „Measures are in Agitation to reconcile them to 
prosecute their different Occupations in this Country‟.
83
  After much of the 1/71
st
 Foot 
was captured at Yorktown in 1781, some were similarly offered wage labour on local 
plantations during their march to York and Lancaster, Pennsylvania, which was readily 
accepted.  Three officers were chosen by lots to remain with the prisoners on parole, but 
they found during their occasional visits to the barracks at York that few remained in the 
camp, and that the privates had as much freedom to come and go as the paroled officers.  
Many privates, it was reported, married local girls and settled in the area.
84
 
Highland soldiers were an increasingly sophisticated and consumer-orientated 
constituency.  The common soldier grew up in the period of the consumer revolution, 
fuelled in part by a desire to emulate the conspicuous consumption of elites.
85
  While 
relatively poor, the Highland gentry were stupendous consumers and in an attempt to 
match the spending habits of other pan-British elites, spent high proportions of their 
wealth on demonstrative luxuries.  Prior to the Jacobite rebellion, British officers in the 
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Highlands had mocked the attempts at luxury displayed by all sections of Highland 
society.  There was no doubt, however, in Edmund Burt‟s mind that emulation was 
carried on to an „exorbitant height‟ and that the common people would adjust their habits 
in economic proportion to their elites.  Goods from London were available, even outside 
the main urban centres, and Burt characterized many Highlanders as profit-driven.
86
  
Highland soldiers in America were not entirely dependent on government-issued victuals 
and equipment, but actively sought to acquire material goods of varying luxury.  Soldiers 
of the 42
nd
 Foot bought silk handkerchiefs and bed linen while at Fort Pitt in the summer 
of 1765.  The personal effects of one private, Walter Stewart, included six stockings, 
four shirts, a bladder of snuff, a table cloth, and two pairs of shoes.  A fellow soldier‟s 
possessions included a silk vest.  Some soldiers loaned each other relatively large sums 
of money on credit.
87
  It was even reported among the 78
th
 Foot that:   
 
 
Compleants hav[e] been made ... that some of the non 
commissioned officers and men of the detachment had imposed 
on some merchants and others in town & taken up good[s] in 
credite which they are not able to pay it & ... this stands very 





Michael McConnell justifiably speculates that soldiers used luxury goods to 
fashion selfhood and used modest refinement to define their existence as worth more 
than Georgian society allowed them.  Like their social superiors, soldiers used material 
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goods on public occasions to assert their success within their chosen profession.   It did 
not revolutionize their consuming lives, he argues, much of the habits being brought 
from civilian life, but it did confuse class distinctions.
89
  Clothing, for example, was 
utterly central to a professional military identity.  The selling of government-issued 
equipment and the individualizing of uniforms through purchases were not simply a 
breach of discipline, but a subversive challenge to an entire social system.  That said, the 
maintenance of order and was not simply enforced by officers but expressed from within 
the ranks as well.  An argument that developed out of an acting sergeant removing his 
coat, considered as a bad example to the men by a fellow sergeant, led to the murder of 
one of the sergeants involved.  The investment of clothing with the politics of male 




Military service did not, however, simply deflect civilian habits into a new orbit.  
If the bonds of empire were material and consumerist as well as political in nature, 
exposure to that empire through military service could vastly alter the habits and 
horizons of individuals.  One officer of the 77
th
 Foot reported to James Grant at the end 
of 1763 that he was returning to Britain with 100 guineas, made while in the service, but 
stated he could have brought back much more were it not for the conspicuous 
consumption which accompanied military service: „Col. Montgomery‟s regiment was a 
school in which I learned a lesson that in part sticks by me yet.‟  Even on campaign, 
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some complained of getting greedy and opulent, often blaming their fellow officers for 
these habits.
91
  Networks of credit operated within regiments, seemingly without regard 
for rank.  Some evidence even suggests the impact of luxury was felt among the lower 
ranks.  The servant of the Surgeon Sandy Macdougall of the 2/42
nd
 Foot was said in 
1779 to have become „a man [of] too much fashion, tea, Coffee and Chocolate with 
every kind of fruit you can imagine in the Greatest perfection for breakfast, two Elegant 
courses and a desert, with as much wine as I chose to drink, for dinner‟.
92
 
Moderate success through military service was possible, but analysis of this has 
been stymied by interpretive limitations in the historiography.  Improvement of the 
common Highlander is largely viewed as an external assault, orchestrated by non-Gaels 
or Anglo-landowning grandees.  Samuel Johnson‟s assertion, for example, that Highland 
civility was improved through exposure to English habits through institutions such as the 
army, is rightly viewed as reflective of Johnson‟s ethnic conceit.
93
  Scottish historians 
have been largely unwilling to acknowledge the possibility that such views were shared 
by many within the region.  The literacy of Highland soldiers and the emulation of 
consumer spending were both bottom-up declarations of a desire for improvement.  
While touring the Outer Hebrides, shortly before taking up his post as the chaplain of the 
42
nd
 Foot in North America, James MacLagan stayed with a former soldier of the Foot 
Guards.  A property owner, the 80-year old had served thirty years in the army before 
retiring to his native Stornaway.  The man was a leading figure in the community and 
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MacLagan found that he was the only member of the local congregation who could read, 
though he did not own a bible, and saw no reason to acquire one.
94
  Post-war incentives 
for soldiers to practise trades without serving apprenticeships, first introduced in the 
mid-seventeenth century, also marked a type of improvement which was embraced by 
the poor.  So common was this in towns such as Perth that questions about whether 
demobilized soldiers were liable to pay the burgh dues were raised in a memorial by the 
townspeople, to which the opinions of the town clerk and a local advocate were added.
95
 
Highland soldiers remained „unimproved‟ in the eyes of contemporary English 
opinion.  It is also true, however, that large numbers of the men saw no better occupation 
for the improvement of their lives than military service.  When the 42
nd
 Foot was 
reduced in 1783, its officers bitterly argued over who had the right to half-pay and, who 
was to remain, gaining the advantage of continual service in the regiment.
96
  Some half-
pay officers sought an immediate return to the army or sold their services to the East 
India Company.  Archibald Campbell described how by going on half-pay, „I‟m stripped 
of all my grandeur in a moment‟ and that he neither had money or credit to re-enter army 
even as ensign.
97
  A correspondent of the Earl of Loudoun had informed him in 1757 that 
gaining his son a commission was „the most probably and effectual means of reclaiming 
him‟ from his debts and gambling.  The young man had „promised in the most solemn 
manner a thorough reformation‟.
98
  Donald Leodhasach Morison, the great nephew of An 
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Clarsair Dall [the Blind Harper] returned to Stornoway following the War of American 
Independence.
99
  Morison became a merchant and improver, writing to Henry Beaufoy, 
Member of Parliament for Great Yarmouth, in an attempt to establish fisheries in the 
Outer Hebrides.  He seems, however, to have entirely failed in all lines of business.  His 
inn failed, he claimed because local people subverted the act of parliament which 
allowed ex-soldiers to carry on trades; he went bankrupt in the mid-1790s.  But he never 
lost hope of re-entering the army and tried repeatedly to secure a commission, recruiting 
men for Francis Humberston Mackenzie, first Baron Seaforth, but failing in that too.
100
  
Morison‟s fate is unknown, but in this sad story (which also included personal tragedy) 
are two strands of the Highland soldiers‟ narrative: the desire for improvement and the 
view of military service as a crucial measure of that improvement.  Continual military 
service was not just confined to the officer class.  It was not unknown for demobilized 
Highland soldiers to immediately enlist in other regiments.  Jeffrey Amherst warned 
James Grant in 1761 never to be too hasty in demobilizing soldiers as some often re-




 This should not be interpreted as a celebration of military service.  Kirk Session 
Minutes in towns such as Dundee are replete with stories of Highland soldiers who eked 
out meagre existences, often getting local women pregnant before migrating further 
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  We should distinguish, however, between moralist judgements of an entire 
group of people and how individuals judged the relative merits of their military service.  
Many died, and many failed, but military service survived, on an individual level, as a 
means, however difficult, of economic and social improvement.    
 
 
VI   CONCLUSIONS 
There is no question that military service vastly altered the economic and landholding 
structure of the Highlands from the 1750s onward and would continue to do so into the 
nineteenth century.  Some Highland estates were almost wholly converted to military 
entrepreneurship.
103
  Nevertheless, the impact of Highland military service fitted into a 
much wider imperial debate, where the Highlander, divorced from his difficult domestic 
context, was to serve as the paradigm of imperial expansionism.  The Highlander seemed 
to encapsulate Britain‟s imperial expansion: formidable, dominant, and assured.  The 
Highland soldier not only served the imperial cause, but embodied the perceived progress 
of British imperialism.  Instead of being a threat to internal stability, the rural Highlander 
was being employed to conquer foreign parts for settlement and cultivation, and deny 
hegemony to Catholic France.  There were stereotypical views of the Gaelic soldier that 
informed opinion, but government policy was much more sophisticated; by assuming 
that policy was formulated on the basis of disparaging views, we implicitly recast the 
Highland soldier in the negative terms we presume eighteenth-century ministers applied.  
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In fact, for entirely selfish reasons, British ministers had far more sophisticated views of 
the Highlander, predicated on the imperatives of empire. 
In spite of this, it was the Highlander‟s own agency that led to his utility within 
an imperial setting.  Faced with difficult circumstances, Highland soldiers acted in 
pursuit of their own imperatives, imperatives that often overlapped with ministerial 
policy.  Indeed, the two cannot be easily separated for the actions of people on the 
ground helped forge imperial administration before a systematized theory of empire had 
emerged.  The demobilized Highland soldier was important in another significant respect.  
He was the living embodiment of the impact, positive and negative, of service to the state 
in the mid-eighteenth century.  He represented achievement to the Gaelic population and 
was the most important conduit through which the Gael was exposed to the empire.  It is 





























































In late September 1759, James Campbell of Danna wrote to his father in Edinburgh to 
report on the triumphs secured by British forces in North America that summer.  
Campbell had not been present at the fighting and wrote his letter from near Inverary in 
the south-west Highlands.  He was confident enough, however, to report that „The 
campaign is I think happily over almost in America: at least as far as our private concern 
reaches.‟  While not explicit about what this private concern entailed, his „private 
comfort and satisfaction‟ were evidently important enough to be ranked alongside „the 
publick [sic] utility‟ of victory.  Campbell could hardly be accused of disregard for the 
public good.  His contacts kept him informed of events in Central Europe where 
Frederick II of Prussia, Britain‟s foremost ally on the Continent, was fighting the 
combined forces of Russia, France and Austria.  The war impacted upon the family 
closer to home.  A mutual friend of Campbell and his father had lost two sons during the 
conflict with France, one at Louisbourg, another in Bengal.
1
   Campbell was himself 
active in recruiting men from the family‟s estate to serve in the army.  He clearly 
understood the interaction between private interest and the public good.  The letters 
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Campbell wrote to his father reveal several key aspects of the Highland‟s interaction with 
imperial developments during Britain‟s transition from maritime power to territorial 
empire.  Our understanding of eighteenth-century British imperialism must be 
intellectually refined.  The spread of the empire was marked not only by its military 
progress, but by the state‟s ability to engage pre-imperial economic and social structures 
to ends which suited the periphery. 
The expansion of the fiscal-military state into the Highlands was such a process, 
as regional elites sought to co-opt the financial benefits of state intervention to secure the 
economic and social solvency of their place in the upper echelons of Highland society.  
What was significant about the imperial relationship in the Highlands, however, and the 
topic under investigation in this chapter, was that imperial integration did not simply 
reinforce a pre-extant social pattern, but helped define what was required of an individual 
to secure these benefits.  Loyalty to the crown and the Hanoverian government was a 
choice that privileged private interest, much as Campbell of Danna had made clear.  It 
could not operate, however, with scant regard for a wider political context.  Owing to the 
unquestionable privileging of private interest over public good, historians have tended to 
neglect the sophisticated way in which the two became increasingly inseparable.  The 
argument, for the Highlands, has been made that conscious displays of loyalty emerged 
largely as an epistemological device to secure patronage.
2
 
This chapter takes a more inclusive approach, challenging the notion that loyalty 
and political allegiances meant little to the development of private interest.  The 
satisfying of private interest did create genuine attachment to the imperial state, which 
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played out in the choices made by individuals, choices which make little rational sense if 
read purely from the viewpoint of private interest.  It asserts that we cannot chart the 
loyalty of imperial subjects through explicit declarations of loyalty.  A far more 
profitable approach is to analyse how Gaels conceived of the empire and the ideological 
context of the crisis of empire in the 1760s and 1770s.  What did these challenges mean 
to a people gradually becoming accustomed to the potential advantages of imperial 
dominion of North America?  Broadly speaking, historians have tended to rely on 
simplistic readings of Highland loyalties.  Traditional monarchism, suggesting that most 
Highlanders could not conceive of a constitutional settlement more complex than the 
figurehead of the king being the source of all political actions, is viewed as a primary 
motivator in the region.  David Hackett Fischer mistakenly portrayed Highland settlers of 
the American colonies as lacking the intellectual framework to extend their ideas beyond 
a fundamental attachment to the British crown.  The Highlands had, at least as far as 
unsophisticated readings are concerned, instigated a rebellion in support of the Stuart 
dynasty, and their support for the crown in America was a continuation of a Gaelic 
predilection for absolutist monarchy.
3
 
Conversely, this chapter asserts that Highland loyalty to the British state verged 
on Loyalism, not Royalism.  The latter rests on the principle that the king is the centre of 
government and wielder of all authority.  It requires belief only in the divine right of an 
incumbent monarch to rule.  Loyalism, on the other hand, requires that people accept that 
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they are beneficiaries of a system in which there are multiple sources of authority and, in 
which, loyalty to a broad cross-section of principles is essential.  For many Gaels, 
particularly those who wrote at length on the American rebellion, their principles suggest 
Loyalism, combining, as they did, ideas of parliamentary sovereignty, social order, 
imperial vitality, and state-backed trade regulation.  One word of caution is required at 
this junction.  This chapter integrates the Highland poor into the political debates of the 
time; it is a gross error to dismiss the poor from political analysis on the basis of lack of 
written evidence.  Nevertheless, sophisticated Loyalism was largely confined to literate 
elites, just as it was throughout the British Isles.  The perplexing mistake made by some 
historians is to ascribe political loyalties to ethnicity rather than socio-economic 
circumstance.  Highland elites were among the most sophisticated thinkers on political 
loyalties in the British dominions in this period, owing to their historical experiences and 




This Loyalism was formulated through Highland contacts with the perceived 
benefits of the empire in North America.  Inter-peripheral links, rather than centrifugal 
forces were defining features of the empire in the Atlantic region.  Highland relations 
with the empire derived from distinctly Highland conceptions.  It has been argued by 
Allan Macinnes, that the imperial dimension of the 1707 Union was as important a 
political event for the Scottish Highlands as the defeat of the Jacobite cause in 1746.
5
  
The chapter which follows puts meat on the bones of this perceptive argument, 
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investigating how loyalties were constructed as Highlanders became exposed to the 
empire in increasingly large numbers after 1756.  There were, of course, various notions 
of loyalty as diverse as those individuals in the Highlands interested in the vitality of the 
imperial project.  The common theme, however, was the centrality of imperial military 
service in forming the relationship between the Highlands and the North American 
empire. 
We will first analyse why the Highland regiments were so central to an 
understanding of the empire that emerged in the Highlands.  The chapter will then 
explore, in much greater depth, an issue which highlighted these processes: the 
availability of land in America.  Land grants proved utterly essential to how imperial 
government was conceived by Gaels.  Land was an issue which held huge resonance to 
the Gaelic world, becoming the most unique aspect of Highland interactions with the 
empire.  This was, however, understood in broader political terms and the following 
section will then chart the link between private interest, loyalty and reward, which was 
increasingly recognized as dependent on the imperial state.  This process did not, of 
course, signify an incipient imperial nationalism.  Instead, the individual remained the 
judge of what was consistent with his or her loyalty and needs.  It was deeply personal, 
but had a much greater scope for popular patriotism than many scholars have been 
inclined to assert.  The conceptions which emerged during the Seven Years‟ War, 
highlighted in the first half of this chapter, were severely tested during the American 
rebellion.  This chapter centres the American rebellion in the political history of the 
Scottish Highlands.  As Vincent Morley has recently demonstrated for Ireland, the 





  What is revealing is that in the Highlands, the American Revolution was 
a significant moment in the construction of regional loyalty to the central government 
which has not been significantly challenged since that time.  The Seven Years‟ War may 
have revealed the utility of Highland manpower to the expansion of the territorial empire.  
It was the War of American Independence, however, which defined the region‟s political 
meaning.  The commitment of Gaels to the war in America from 1775-1783 reflected 




I   WAR AND KNOWLEDGE 
Highland contacts with the overseas British Empire in the early eighteenth century were 
multifaceted, encompassing emigration, trade, military service, political and criminal 
transportation, religious conversion, and one of the earliest anti-slavery petitions in 
American history.  The Camerons of Locheil, whose support for the Jacobite cause under 
Donald Cameron was critical in the early stages of the 1745 rising, had interests in New 
Jersey land, colonial timber, and West Indian sugar plantations.
7
  There were notable, if 
isolated, emigrations to the colonies beginning in the mid-1730s, which established 
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Highland communities in Georgia, North Carolina, and New York.
8
  One event, however, 
changed the entire structural dynamic of Highland connections with North America.  The 
Seven Years‟ War provided the opportunity for estranged elements of British society to 
integrate in a manner acceptable to the cultural assumptions of the Anglo-Protestant 
governing class.  More critically, from our regional perspective, the war witnessed a 
massive rise in the number of Highlanders in North America.  Estimates of Highland 
emigration prior to 1756 suggest that around 3,000 Gaels were in the colonies at this time.  
An account for one month, February 1758, suggests that of the 24,000 British soldiers in 
North America, 4,200 were in the Highland regiments.  The Seven Years‟ War at least 
doubled the number of Highlanders with direct experience of the North American 
colonies, altering significantly the way in which contacts were formed and the social 
groups instrumental in these processes.
9
 
 Numbers, however, were only one measure of the impact.  The post-war period 
saw a huge rise in commentaries, political tracts, debates, songs, and emigration literature, 
all concerned with the relevance of North America to Britain.  In 1752, British publishers 
produced twenty-four pamphlets relating to America or American affairs; in 1754, it was 
forty-two; in 1755, it was fifty-nine, and in 1756, it was eighty-eight separate 
publications.
10
   Sections on American affairs began to appear regularly in the Scots 
Magazine at this time.  William Thom, the minister for Govan, saw how information, 
even in printed form, was available to the lower orders:  
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By the intercourse which hath been carried on between the West 
coast of Scotland and North America our common people have 
been gradually informed … during the late war, and since the 
peace was established, particular and encouraging accounts of 
its provinces have been published in such periodicals and papers 






Outside the public sphere, the social consequences were massive and increasingly 
beyond the abilities of government and regional elites to control.  Knowledge of the 
world beyond the Highlands expanded with correspondence from the war and the return 
of veteran soldiers.  Contemporary commentators noticed the changes and reflected on 
how interest in the American colonies had expanded exponentially across the Highland 
community.  „It is believed‟, Thom explained:  
 
 
that many soldiers from the highlands, who, at the conclusion of 
the late war, got, from the government farms in north America, 
correspond with their relations and acquaintance in the 
highlands, and by accounts they give of their own happy 






Robert Kirk‟s account of the war in North America was a detailed example of this 
information transference.  Published in Limerick in the early 1770s, the title-page of 
Kirk‟s account detailed in two lines what the reader might read of the late war, but ran to 
eight lines in describing the information he had written regarding „great lakes, rivers, and 
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Waterfalls ... Birds, fish, fruit, trees‟ and „the customs of the Indians‟.  Kirk‟s account was 
remarkable, but not atypical.  Twenty-fives pages of appendices covered descriptions of 
the natural environment of America, including such information as the price of various 
skins.  A list of subscribers contained in the 1775 edition shows Kirk‟s account was 




 Foot, deployed to Boston 
that year.  Soldiers from Kirk‟s old regiment, the 42
nd
 Foot, also subscribed.  As much as 
we might be inclined to appreciate narrative accounts of the Seven Years‟ War from the 
soldier‟s perspective, Kirk was far more concerned with descriptions of America and its 
people, an agenda which reflected the interests of Kirk‟s readership.  Scotus Americanus, 
probably Alexander Campbell of Balole, a vocal advocate of Highland emigration, 
explained that his flattering account of North Carolina could be corroborated: „I might 
appeal‟, he said, „to numberless letters from those very settlers, to their friends and 
acquaintance in the Highlands‟.  Americanus reported that the information he received 
from people who had never left the Highlands was so accurate that „I would be tempted to 
think they had lived for some time in that country [America]‟.
13
  Published emigration 
literature was certainly widespread enough to fall into the hands of the Commander-in-




There was, of course, a plethora of push factors prompting Highland emigration in 
this period, but these accounts must constitute one of the most central pull factors, which 
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saw at least 10,000 Highlanders leave Britain for North America between 1763 and 1775, 
with the overwhelming majority from 1770 onwards.
15
  There is an excellent 
historiography of the great Highland exodus of the 1770s and little needs to be added here.  
It is evident, however, that America began to assume the mantle of a panacea for 
Highland problems in the minds of many rural people.  John Macdonald of Glenalladale 
reported to his cousin how America was being integrated into the existing mindset of his 
own family.  For Glenalladale‟s staunch Jacobite father, Alexander, a desire to go to 
America had „driven the Pretender out of his Nodle [sic] entirely: He never speaks of him 
now, & he is quite a good subject.‟
16
  „The only news in this island is emigrations‟, Flora 
Macdonald‟s husband reported in 1773.  „This spirit began in the Western Isles‟ 
commentators explained, „but has now come to the inland parts of the country‟.  So great 
was the exodus that hyperbole overtook several authors who reported that not one person 
would remain in the Highlands if the emigrations of the early 1770s continued apace.
17
  It 
is fair to say that military stimulants were only part of a larger development of 
transatlantic connections brought forth by the victory in 1763.
18
  For the common people 
of the Highlands, however, with a disproportionate commitment to overseas military 
service, these military-orientated experiences of America were essential to how the 
empire was increasingly framed. 
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The soldiers‟ knowledge of American lands was the product of the processes seen 
in the previous chapter.  Government land grants as a reward for military service, 
following the Royal Proclamation of October 1763, were increasingly important in the 
recruitment of Highland soldiers.  But we should not submit to determinism.  In 1756, 
Lord John Murray had made it clear to his second-in-command, Major Duncan Campbell 
of Inverawe, that in order to augment the 42
nd
 Foot to full strength, the intention of 
sending them to North America was not to be mentioned, „least it may hurt the 
recruiting‟.  Across the British Isles, Lord Barrington found that few would enlist to go to 
America if there was sufficient potential for service in Britain or Ireland.  Less extensive 
opportunities in Highland home defence battalions, rather than a pre-existing desire to 
leave for America, was the determining factor in ensuring Highland exposure to North 
America.
19
  It was only after 1763 that favourable reports of the region began to permeate 
personal correspondence, emigration literature, recruiting promises, and Gaelic texts in 
the Highlands.  As we have seen, a significant minority of veterans chose colonial 
settlement.  The influence of land must be understood within the contextual parameters 
of demobilization and imperial settlement.  Anti-militarism in the Highlands, the 
preferment of enlistment in home defence units, desertion, and the aforementioned 
comments by Lord John Murray, all tell against a linear connection between a desire to 
emigrate and military service.  In 1756, upon hearing that Adam Ferguson was planning 
to accompany the 42
nd
 Foot to America, a friend wrote to his sister that, „I suppose 
[Ferguson] will be going to America with the regiment in which case we may bid an 
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eternal adieu to his loggy-reat [Logierait, Ferguson‟s place of birth] soul for he will be 
slain assure as he‟s a highlander.‟
20
  We should, also, never overemphasize the altruistic 
motives of senior figures or institutions in this period.  Adjudging claims for losses 
sustained in the Bushy Run campaign in 1763 to be too high, Henry Bouquet wanted the 
new Commander-in-Chief, Thomas Gage, to arrange the reduction of the 42
nd
 Foot 
before warrants were issued to pay the men what they were owed.
21
  We do not have 
enough evidence from the perspective of the enlisted soldier to assert, with confidence, 
that the letters from America - hyperbolically claimed by Scotus Americanus - were 
uniformly favourable.  In the case of some officers, they were decidedly ambiguous.
22
 
Nevertheless, there seems little doubt that, owing to land grants, military service 
was a generally positive encouragement for North American settlement.  Military service 
constituted a form of subsidized emigration or „a form of entrepreneurial activity‟.
23
  The 
explanation for this lay in the structural foundations of Highland military emigration, and 
the ideological imperatives of Highland military service.  Military emigration had been a 
major facet of the political economy of the Highlands since at least the medieval period, 
and service in foreign armies remained important until the 1750s.
24
  Unique, however, 
was the centrality of military service to private economic security.  Prior to the collapse 
of clanship in the Highlands, men had pledged their military service to a chief in return 
                                                 
20
 The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. Vincenzo Merolle (London: William Pickering, 1995), I, 
xxv.  
21
 Papers of Henry Bouquet, VI, 588. 
22
 NAS, GD170/1176/10, f. 1, Patrick Campbell to Duncan Campbell, 10 Feb. 1777. 
23
 Scotland and the Americas, c.1650-1939: A Documentary Source Book, p. 16; Devine, Scotland‟s 
Empire, p. 138; Mackillop, More Fruitful than the Soil, pp. 168-90.   
24
 John Marsden, Galloglas: Hebridean and West Highland Mercenary Warrior Kindreds in Medieval 
Ireland (East Linton: Tuckwell, 2003), passim; Stephen Conway, „Scots, Britons and Europeans: Scottish 
Military Service, c.1739-1783‟, Historical Research, 82 (2009): 114-30.  
225 
 
for economic security and a safety net from famine and starvation.  The end of clanship 
as a viable form of communal organization did not sever the connection between military 
service and familial security.  This was reinforced in the post-Culloden Highlands as 
landed elites invested increasing energies into military recruitment, underpinning the role 
of the army as a logical guarantor of private interest. 
  In the eighteenth-century Highlands, the foundation of private interest was 
access to land.  In much of the Scottish Highlands, community was centered on the social 
and political space of the township, with its hierarchy of landownership.  Rights and 
obligations in Highland communities were, therefore, rooted in the land, or whoever held 
authority over those lands.  Land was the main form of property and thus essential to 
economic security.  This does not suggest, however, that Highland military service was 
confined to a traditional localist model; rather, it was increasingly immersed in a broader 
imperial culture.  The pursuit of private or familial interest, almost always prioritized 
above considerations of community or country, was increasingly rationalized in a world 
of expanding opportunities.   
Land grants for the private soldier in North America consisted of fifty acres, 
initially rent free, but then requiring only the payment of limited quit-rents.  Vitally, quit-
rents lacked the potential for a landowner (in this case the crown) to rack-rent.  For a 
society still shaped by the contours of land as the basis of success, the provision of cheap 
or free land without rents proved an effective means of giving Highlanders access to 
colonial land.  The limited evidence available from rank-and-file soldiery suggests that 
promises of land were part of their conception of military service.  William Mackenzie, a 
piper in the 71
st
 Foot wrote from New York to a relative in Argyll in early 1778: „I am as 
226 
 
well as ever I was in my Life my pay is as good as one shilling & six pence Per Day and 
I hope my fortune within two years will be as good that I will have 200 acres of free 
Ground of my own in this Country.‟  Similar accounts were echoed by Nile Mclean, a 




  A recruiting poster for the 71
st
 Foot, distributed in Dundee in 
1776, made no appeals to the volunteer‟s patriotism, instead promising, on the terms of 
the Royal Proclamation, a „full discharge at the end of three years … or of the present 





Foot] are to go to America, and by his Majesty‟s 
royal and most gracious proclamation, they will be entitled to a 
full discharge at the end of three years, that is in 1779 or of the 
present American rebellion. Now, considering that the British 
army will be from forty to fifty thousand strong, there, in spring 
next, it cannot in all probability, fail to be entirely quelled next 
summer. Then, gentlemen, will be your harvest, and the best 
one too you ever cropt. You will each of you, by visiting „This‟ 
New World, become the founders of families. The lands of the 
rebels will be divided amongst you, and every one of you 






A very similar proclamation, written in Gaelic around the same time for the 42
nd
 Foot, 
made similar appeals: „Ma ta duine bhar measg, a dhaoin-uailse, ag mianughadh na h-
onoire sho, ghigeadh e da m‟ ionsiudh sin ... neach a bheir dearbh chinnteachd dha, gu ‟n 
cuirear gach comhara cliuiteach air & gu faigh e gach ardughagh Inbhe ris am fead Duil a 
bhi aige  mhuintir a dhucha & o cho-shaideiribh fein [If there is a man among you, 
gentlemen, desirous of this honour, let him come to me … who will give him an absolute 
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guarantee that every distinction will fall upon him and that he will acquire that elevation 
of status to be expected].‟
27
 
What Highland soldiers might achieve in America for their kin or community 
became the topic of much embellishment.  There was a correlation of interest between 
military land grants and the land hunger of civilian Gaels.  Metropolitan propaganda 
derisively satired the „Scotch exodus‟ to America or „Mony land‟, bitter that many Scots 
were apparently so willing to take advantage of „English‟ triumphs.  Such satire fed off a 
prevailing English assumption that Scots were infiltrating every facet of the British 
government.  Frederick Montagu, MP for Higham Ferrers, quipped after two Scots broke 
into his house, they were „the only two, I am persuaded, who are not in office and 
employment‟.  When one satirist had a starving Highlander in an engraving cry out „I 
shall soon be a laird‟, however, he touched on a truism.
28
  Hope of individual success was 
an essential motivating factor in emigration.  What this satirist got wrong was that, while 
he considered colonial victories a product of English triumphs, this was not how this was 
appreciated in Scotland.  Highland commentators tended to see the benefits for 
individuals, or in some cases, Highland society in a wider sense.  Americanus conceived 
of the actions of Highland soldiers in the Seven Years‟ War as being for the single 
purpose of providing Highlanders with „a state of ease and happiness‟:  
 
 
Some of them were officers in America, and our common men 
served as soldiers there during the last war, and both acquired 
immortal honour. It would seem as if they had made such 
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important conquests in that quarter of the globe, in order to 
secure for themselves, and their countrymen, an agreeable and 
happy retreat, and a large and fertile field for them and their 
posterity to flourish in.
29




There was a substantive belief not only that Highland prowess secured the 
colonies for Britain but that Highlanders had secured the colonies for themselves.  It was 
said that, „dh‟ eug moran eile [na saighdearan a chaidh a dh'Ameireaga] dhiubh gu 
glormhor g‟ar dionadhsan & bhar nith & ag cuir ducha ur fa chis dibh; Chuireadh mise 
[Mhormhair Iain Moireach], air an abhar sin a thogbhail urachadh ghaisgeach nan aite sin 
[many others of them [soldiers who went to America] died gloriously protecting you and 
your worldly goods, and conquering a new land for you; I [Lord John Murray] have been 
sent for that reason to raise a new set of heroes]‟.  One Highlander would later express the 
view that the „most desirable holding of any for a Highlander‟ was to conquer land from 
the Indians by the sword.
30
  Simply to dismiss this as histrionics, however, is, perhaps, to 
misunderstand how people were beginning to see imperial conflict.   
A song dedicated to the 42
nd
 Foot, who had been awarded land in New York, 
stated that the 42
nd 
Foot had been employed: „Cuir Innseinich air àireachas. Màr chùire 
grian le làthaireachd, An dealt do bharr a‟n fheior [Putting the Indians onto the summer 
grazing, as the sun puts with its presence, the dew off to the tips of the grass]‟.  In a 
revealing appeal to natural imagery, the writer explained how the soldiers had forced the 
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Amerindians from the better quality land at lower elevation to the higher summer grazing, 
making available the lower land for settlement.  What is more, when the Highland soldier 
cleared the land, he had done something which was entirely natural, comparable to the 
rising of the sun.  If that was not sufficient justification, the writer explained that these 
actions were possible within the bonds of àbhaist - custom.  The 42
nd 
Foot, it was said, 
were „‟N America gu ‟m b‟ àraidh iad, Gun dealachadh ri n‟ àbhaisteachd [distinguished 
in America, without departing from their customs]‟.
31
  Nowhere did the writer, Kenneth 
Mackenzie, explore the horrendous casualties that the 42
nd
 Foot had experienced.  The 
fact was it did not really matter.  Gaelic interpretations of the Highland regiments were 




II   THE ESSENTIAL LINK: LAND AND LIBERTY 
The post-Culloden period saw monumental change in the landholding patterns of the 
Gàidhealtachd.  These changes did not originate in imperial contacts with the state, 
either in 1746 or 1756, and had antecedents in the early seventeenth century.  The scope, 
however, for understanding and reacting to these changes was entirely altered by 
imperial contacts.  Here was an essential link.  In the changing relationship between 
social groups in the region, the independence and liberty associated with American land 
politicized interest, entrenching socio-economic divisions within the Highlands.  This 
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went further, however, and Highland views of liberty and property were subsumed into 
imperial attempts to secure the North American empire.
32
  The soldier was essential, both 
as agent and as beneficiary, of access to colonial land as a solution to the socio-economic 
problems of the Highlands.  In time, many would come to believe that support for the 
expansion of the British Empire in North America was the most rational approach to the 
pursuit of private and familial interest.  
 By the late 1760s, the situation of sub-tenants across increasingly broad swathes 
of the Highlands was severely deteriorating.  This was not a simplistic story of increased 
rents, enforced on a languid and unified tenantry by villainous landlords.  Greater 
economic opportunities and rising rents promoted dissension between tenant groups, the 
upper tenantry extending their economic hold over the lower orders as they passed rents 
on down the social ladder.  Paradoxically, it was middling, intellectually vibrant, tenants 
who had responded best to these changes – by becoming leaders in the cattle trade - who 
were most likely to emigrate when prices fell sharply in the 1770s.
33
 
As emigration was the product of an inability fully to pursue commercial 
possibilities within the strictures of Highland society, imperial settlement opportunities 
made colonial land important.  For middling Highlanders affected by financial instability, 
America became part of an aspirational ideal.  Rural Highlanders conceptualized 
America as a land of liberty because it was associated with freedom from the arbitrary 
power of landowners.  Direct ownership of land would, it was thought, safeguard 
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families from any future inability to meet rising rents.  The equation of land and liberty 
held considerable popularity in the British Atlantic world, but its precise meaning 
depended on varied historic experiences.  The deterioration of Highland conditions meant 
that Gaels could insist that ownership of property defined liberty.  These emigrants did 
not have English common-law experience, where property was explicitly understood as a 
bulwark against tyranny; but the frustrations of rack-renting, where in some areas rents 
rose 300-400 per cent between 1750 and 1800, convinced upwardly mobile Highlanders 
of the benefits of full ownership of property.  In 1772, Alexander McAllister wrote from 
North Carolina that in that colony, „we breathe the air of liberty, we have no rents‟.  One 
observer noted how Highland emigrants leaving Scotland, „launched out into a new 
world breathing a spirit of liberty and a desire of every individual becoming a proprietor‟.  
Duncan Lothian considered these issues in „A Song for America‟, published in 1780: 
„Tha h-uile neach chaidh null; Toirt cunntas math nas leor air; On gheibh iad fearann 
soar ann; Chan fhan ach daoine gorach [Every person who has gone over yonder; Gives a 
favourable report of it; Since they can get cheap land there; No one but fools will stay 
here].‟
34
  Captain Robert Grant likewise invested the colonies with a particular form of 
independence.  He was confident of the opportunities when he settled in America 
following the Seven Years‟ War, even remitting some of his earnings back to Scotland, 
declaring that his half-pay alone „will enable me to live independent in this part of the 
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  Those who had gone to America with the army had the clearest idea of the 
distinction between the relative potential of Scotland and colonial settlement.  As one 
officer wrote on his return to Coll following the War of Independence, „any interest I 
have in this country will not keep me from joining my old friends [in America] … this 
country is damned‟.
36
  In this environment, the people affected did not regard knowledge 
of opportunities and deteriorating conditions as distinguishably discrete bodies.  As 
Samuel Johnson noted, it was only when a man „cannot live as he desires at home‟ that 
he „listened to tales of fortunate islands … where every man may have land of his own, 
and eat the product of his labour without a superior‟.
37
 
The availability of American lands exposed divisions within Highland society, 
offering the Highland poor an admittedly radical solution to new land patterns.
38
  This 
was not confined to the relationships between demobilized soldiers and their officers, 
which we have already investigated.  It went to the heart of elite attempts to maintain 
manageable social relations in the region, based on hierarchical landholding.  The 
rebellion of the American colonies, for landlords, at least, was something of a god-send, 
halting the precipitous flow of migrants from Highland estates: „Government may never 
have a more proper opportunity of chiquing [sic] this Emigrating Disposition without 
force‟, Sir John Grant of Grant explained to the Lord Advocate in 1775, in a letter 
overflowing with faux sympathy for the departing people.  Others pleaded: „for god‟s 
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sake make the news of the arrival of Emigrants from America [Loyalist refugees] as 
publick as possible, to see and prevent our own deluded Country Men from emigrating to 
a Country where nothing but anarchy and Confusion reigns‟.  Of course, all elite opinion 
cannot be dismissed as disingenuous; it is possible that elites such as Patrick Campbell, 
younger of Glenure, did fear that departing tenants would leave their „son[s] & 
grandson[s] heirs to [their] ignorance‟ in the wilds of America.
39
  Most emigrants, 
however, it was reported, recognized the negative reports of America being filtered 
through official channels as „the artifice and cant of landlords‟.
40
   
The incongruity between elite and common accounts of America suggests a wide 
divergence of opinion.  Patrick Campbell, quoted above, commanded a company of the 
71
st
 Foot during the War of Independence.  One of the regiment‟s pipers was William 
Mackenzie, the same man who had stated that he hoped to acquire 200 acres of free 
ground.  Mackenzie is likely the same piper who had first refused to be attested, and then 
deserted, in late 1775.  Evidently, however, several years in America had changed his 
opinions, opinions increasingly polarized from his officer, Patrick Campbell.
41
  It is clear 
also, that interested parties attempted to manipulate information coming from America 
regarding settlement, undermining elite attempts to control information.  This was best 
demonstrated by the publication, in Glasgow, of a letter by the prominent New York 
lawyer and politician, William Smith (1727-1793).  Smith‟s letter was a positive 
encouragement to „Farmers, Labourers, and mechanics‟ to emigrate to New York, stating 
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„Innumerable farms may be had at a very easy rate‟.  Smith was careful though, to 
narrowly define those he thought fit for New York settlement.  For Smith, cottagers and 
other groups of rural poor might find a farm on a lease, but for those who could bring 
cash, „the emigration [was] most strongly recommended‟.  Smith noted that for those 
who „depend on mere charity‟, New York could offer little as „none can expect to have 
the lands given to them for nothing‟.
42
  Smith‟s reserve, however, was not mirrored in the 
comments of his publisher.
43
 Where Smith noted that „there is a great difference between 
one farm and another‟, the publisher portrayed the entire colony as „In short … a land of 
liberty and plenty‟.  More significantly, the potential emigrant that both men sought to 
inform was very different.  Smith had encouraged the middling sorts to bring their money 
to New York.  For the publishers, Morrison & McAllum, their money was not the source 
of potential prosperity, but actual misery. „The useless luxuries of the east‟, they 
denounced „ruins our middling sort of people, the money that might cultivate our 
lands … and give bread to the poor, is lavishly squandered away upon ornamental trifles‟.  
Quoting Voltaire, the publisher prophesied that the only „animals‟ left in Britain would 
be „Tyrants and Slaves‟.  The publisher did not see America as a haven for the fir-taca 
class.  Instead, America was a haven for the victims of those middling farmers, who had 
„contributed all in their power to rack and raise the landed rents … over-bidding one and 
other and ruining the poor, industrious small farmers, by turning them out of their 
possessions‟.  „Nature is content with few things‟, he added, but „nothing can satisfy 
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  The contrast between Smith and the person(s) who decided to publish it for 
the benefit of Highland emigrants is striking.   
The divisive issue of emigration reveals the greater place North America was 
fashioning in the dynamics of Highland society and how the poor were gaining an 
understanding of the imperial context far beyond what we might expect from such a 
society.  Alexander McAllister, a prominent colonist in Cross Creek, North Carolina, had 
left for Cape Fear with his father in the late 1730s.  McAllister maintained 
correspondence with his brother Hector and seven other potential emigrants in Islay and 
Arran during the key period between the Seven Years‟ War and the War of American 
Independence.  His views, however, Barbara DeWolfe states, extended beyond this 
relatively small network with influences as far as Skye and Greenock, the main emigrant 
port.
45
  While hardly impartial in his views on the success Highland settlers might have 
in the colonies, it was the language he chose to represent these views that was significant.  
„This is one of the best poor man Country you ever heard of‟, he told a vacillating 
Highlander in November 1770.  The phrase would appear consistently in his writing that 
year.  To Angus McCuaig, there was no place for ambiguity.  McCuaig was told that 
each of his children would get „a pice [sic] of land which is mor [sic] then they can 
expect where they are this is the best poor mans Country I have heard in this age‟.
46
  The 
„best poor man‟s Country in the World‟ had initially been used to describe public charity 
in early eighteenth-century Virginia, but became a byword for the potential of colonial 
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settlement in general, applied in circumstances as diverse as Jesuit evangelism in 
Maryland and the land grab on the Pennsylvania frontier.
47
  It was a phrase frequently 
quoted in literature relating to Highland emigration.
48
  America was often framed with 
specific reference to the poor.  As Benjamin Franklin would later note, „Multitudes of 
poor people from England, Ireland, Scotland and Germany, have … in a few years 
become wealthy farmers, who in their own countries … could never have emerged from 
the mean condition wherein they were born.‟
49
    
During his three decades in North Carolina, McAllister had evidently been 
exposed to these descriptive terms for North America.  McAllister‟s network also 
employed a messianic motif.  For McAllister, North Carolina was „the door that god is 
opened for them [the poor of the Highlands]‟.  McAllister‟s brother, Hector McAllister 
may have been preaching to the converted when he wrote to his brother that „it would 
seem as [if] providence had ordered for the peopling of that vast continent‟.
50
  Such 
religiously imbued rhetoric may not have matched the histrionics of Cotton Mather, but it 
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The way in which America was framed to appeal directly to the poorer members 
of society suggests a nuance and complexity to the imagery that is not immediately 
apparent.  Centre and periphery should not be imagined only as geographical definitions, 
but as relationships to influence and power.  For poorer people, with more restricted 
freedom of action, a belief in the redeeming power of land acquisition was important.  
There is something which must be acknowledged here.  As much as McAllister and 
others portrayed America as an appealing destination for the poor, in general, early 
Highland emigrants paid for their passages and were the middling sorts who had been 
frustrated by shrinking margins in their economic activities.
52
  Information was, therefore, 
manipulated on the basis of an increasing divide in the social structure of the Highlands, 
which such information unquestionably contributed to.  It was, most likely, from the 
divide between elites and poor that the ambiguity of images of America in the eighteenth 
century evolved. 
How did this imperially-situated, but ultimately traditional, reading of land-
ownership translate into a politicized interest in imperial vitality?  The key event was the 
new demands on political loyalties prompted by the American Revolution.  If liberty was 
freedom from the tyranny of landowning elites, both in Scotland and in America, 
Highland conceptions of liberty were necessarily negative ones; Highland emigrants 
demanded the absence of constraint and the freedom to be left in relative peace.
53
  Free 
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land provided the physical space where socio-political and economic constraint could not 
materialize.  The belief of people like McAllister, that their fellow countrymen could 
gain liberty by emigration to the colonies, demonstrated a belief in the ability of the 
British constitution to provide this most central of rights.  Land was, therefore, perfectly 
suited to negative conceptions of liberty and, as such, reinforced an imperial reading of 
the conflict.  As most Highlanders sought negative liberties, they did not claim rights as 
Englishmen, a positive approach to liberty favoured by American Whigs.  Instead, they 
expressed their rights by seeking the free ownership of land.  In this reading, an imperial 
balance was maintained between government and individuals, and between periphery and 
centre, in which all were protected from tyranny and arbitrary authority.  The quest for 
liberty and independence among Highlanders, socio-economic in origin but with 
increasingly political overtones, can be understood with reference to Alexander 
Macdougald, „a simple man about 26 years of age‟.  Macdougald expressed his desire to 
become a settler and petitioned for land of his own, comparable with others in the areas, 
having previously lived with his parents.
54
  In Macdougald‟s case, imperial government 
was the source of his liberty, removing him from the dependence of his parents.   
This was a deeply hierarchical world in which liberty could only be understood in 
relation to the multitudes who possessed none, be they enslaved Africans, indentured 
servants, tenants, or the dependants of free men.  It was, despite this, an inequitable 
system of checks and balances against overt tyranny, at least as far as tyranny was 
defined.  Indeed, in the same poster which had advertised rebel farms as a reward for 
military service in the 71
st
 Foot, a contrast was drawn between America and „drudging 
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like slaves‟ in Scotland.
55
  It would take one of the most brilliant political minds of the 
century to express this counter-intuitive system:  
 
Without subordination, it would not be one Empire. Without 
freedom, it would not be the British Empire ... The most anxious 
work for the understanding of men is to govern a large Empire 
upon a plan of freedom; but it is as noble as it is anxious, and it 
is necessary because it can be governed by no other.
56
   
 
 
By demanding positive self-mastery and rational control over their political 
destinies, the Revolutionaries launched a direct attack upon this assumed uniformity of 
rights; they also undermined the constitutional order that created this balance.  
Adherence to negative conceptions of liberty necessarily brought the Highlanders into 
more direct conflict with revolutionary authorities, who demanded more concrete 
expressions of obligation, through the administering of patriotic oaths, or forcible 
enlistment in patriot militias.  Two Highlanders, Iain Mackenzie and Sim Cameron, were 
fined in 1777 for missing militia exercises with the militia of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 
though they were excused on the grounds that they did not speak English.
57
  These 
impositions, so contrary to negative freedoms, were later cited by Loyalists as a major 
cause of their resistance.  Helen Macdonnell, the wife of a leading New York Loyalist, 
Allan Macdonnell of Collachie, summed up Highland imperatives when she assured 
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patriot commanders that though aggression would be met with equal violence, her fellow 
Highlanders had „not done anything against the country, nor intend to, if let alone‟.
58
 
The reason Highland Loyalism was relatively strong in the initial phase of the 
war, was that previous military service in the Seven Years‟ War had secured free land 
and there was every reason to assume that, in 1775, this would be repeated.  For recently 
arrived Highlanders, entirely receptive to the view that the imperial state was 
unconquerable, and that it was only through imperial dominion that they had „been 
enabled to visit this western region‟, the idea of defeat was incomprehensible.  Recruiting 
officers deliberately cultivated the idea that the war would soon be won.  As late as 1777, 
Highland officers were still making plans to bring their families to America, presuming 
the rebellion would soon be over.  The idea that the „Yankies‟ would soon give up the 
rebellion and that „The Congress and leaders of rebellion will be sent home to take their 
fate at Tyburn‟, was a common one.  It took Alexander Macdonald of the 84
th
 Foot until 
late 1777 to realize that the landed rewards might never be forthcoming.  Even then, he 
still placed his faith in a negotiated settlement that would allow him to return to his 
Staten Island farm.
59
  For a region with decades of reciprocal relations with the imperial 
state, and indeed for individuals with personal experience of the material benefits of 
service, the idea that revolutionary authorities could satisfy Highland interests could not 
possibly develop in the short years between arrival and the mobilization of Patriot 
militias against Highland settlements in North Carolina and New York in early 1776.  As 
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Donnchadh Ban Mac an t-Saoir had expressed as early as 1767: „Bidh sinn uil‟ aig Rìgh 
Deòrsa; ‟S cha ghòraiche dhuinn; O ‟s ann aige tha ‟n stòras; Is còir air a‟ Chrùn; Bheir 
e ‟m pàigheadh ‟nar dòrn duinn [We will all belong to George; And we are not foolish 




The most brilliant articulation of land, liberty, and loyalty had emerged as early 
as 1748, when security was of immediate importance to Anglo-Scottish Whigs.  A 
Second Letter to a Noble Lord Containing A Plan for effectually uniting and sincerely 
attaching the Highlanders to the British Constitution, and Revolution Settlement (London, 
1748) was most likely the product of a Scottish Whig, perhaps a Highland one, owing to 
his rare ability to dissociate Jacobitism from the Highland region as a whole.  For this 
anonymous writer, the solution to changing the region was not re-orientation or 
replacement of rebellious elites, but a bottom-up approach: „it is absolutely necessary to 
make it [for the individual tenant farmer] not theoretically only, but directly and 
immediately their Interest to be free and independent,‟ he said.  What he eventually 
proposed was a revolution in social patterns.  Major landlords would be forced to sell 
their estates, most of the product of which would go on paying their financial debts.  The 
land would be divided among the people, where no farm was to consist of less than sixty 
acres and leases were to be of at least twenty-ones years‟ duration.  The people would 
have a vested interest in agricultural improvements and in possessing a large acreage 
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would be less deferential and more capable of independence.
61
  Proto-Communist this 
was not, but it was the most radical declaration of Highland land rights in the eighteenth 
century.  What is especially worthy of analysis is the centrality of personal interest which 
was envisioned in A Second Letter.  The distribution of lands was not to emanate from 
the monarchy, which would only invest the crown with increased powers, making 
Highlanders servile to another chieftain.  Instead, the people were to be made to look 
only toward their own interest and prosperity.  What principles the author believed had 
motivated Gaels prior to his self-evident convention remains unclear.  Private interest 
would, however, „Bring in View a publick Interest, composed and made up of the private 
Interest of each; from whence will result a publick Feeling, a publick Affection, an 
honest Patriotism and love of County‟.  The ultimate aim was the realization that „the 
Happiness and Advantage of the subject ought to be the End and Aim of government‟.  
The right of regicide was even defended and legislative powers were to be with „the 
people‟.  This was evidently an extreme, probably unique, stance, within the discourses 
of Highland political economy; it highlighted, however, the intention to instil a public 
patriotism through individual private interest.
62
  Indeed, as far as theorists such as Adam 
Ferguson were concerned, it was only once a man had a sense of himself and his interest 
that he could be capable of public good.  His philosophy, grounded in that of the Stoics, 
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asserted that only once you had full knowledge of yourself as a free actor could you be 
capable of selfless and uncorrupted sacrifice for the public good.
63
 
Whether there was a direct link between A Second Letter and government policy 
is highly unlikely.  What is clear, however, is that its more benign ideas were embraced 
as a method for governing the North American empire.  On 6 April 1775, thirteen days 
before shots were fired on Lexington Green, secret instructions were issued to Governors 
Josiah Martin of North Carolina and William Tyron of New York to form an 
„Association‟ of Highlanders.  The Associations were to consist of the heads of Highland 
families residing in both colonies with the stated intent to prevent „all such proceedings 
and practises that are contrary to the laws of the land, and the authority of the king‟.  The 
heads were to receive 100 acres for this service, plus fifty additional acres per member of 
their family, with no quit-rents for the first twenty years.  Should those heads be required 
to become enlisted soldiers in His Majesty‟s service, they would receive additional land 
on the basis of the 1763 Royal Proclamation.
64
  It was a system which granted liberty to 
the heads of Highland families by giving them the ability to provide, and maintain social 
control, over their own dependants. 
What Martin or Tyron may not have known was that their instructions had 
already been superseded by the zealotry of several Highland individuals.  „Recruitment‟ 
for a militia of Loyalist Highlanders to deal with the discontented colonists had begun as 
early as winter 1774.  There were numerous and rival contending offers to raise Gaels for 
service against the colonists, a schism which eventually resulted in the formation of a 
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regiment with a two battalion structure.  Agents such as Alexander Macdonald travelled 
from Staten Island, to the Mohawk Valley and then across to Boston, before returning to 
Staten Island, in order to receive promises of enlistment.  Actual enlistment was 
impossible, being illegal in the absence of a declared state of rebellion.
65
  The products of 
these efforts, the Royal Highland Emigrants, were officially embodied in early April 
1775.  The Royal Highland Emigrants were raised on the basis of relatively generous 
terms of enlistment:    
 
 
They are to engage in the present troubles in America only. 
Each soldier is to have two hundred acres of land in any 
Province in North America he shall think proper, the King to 
pay the Patent fees, Secretary‟s fees, and Surveyor General‟s; 
besides twenty years free of quit rent; each married man gets 
fifty acres for his wife, and fifty for each child on the same 







Governor Martin was quick to realize how far the provision of land attached 
Highland emigrants to government.  A month before the outbreak of hostilities, he had 
informed the Earl of Dartmouth, that, despite attempts to prevent them, recently arrived 
Highlanders had begun squatting on royal lands because the land office closures gave 
them no access to land through official means.  Martin also reported that those 
Highlanders who had fought against the Regulators at the battle of Almanace in 1771, 
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had been questioning him whether the King‟s Proclamation of 1763, providing lands to 
veterans of the Seven Years‟ War, extended to their own military service.
67
  By 
November, Martin had grown in confidence and detailed how he had begun to 






I was induced to Grant their request [for land] on the Terms of 
their taking such lands in the proportions allowed by his 
majesty‟s royal instructions … thinking it more advisable to 
attach these people to government by granting as matter of 
favour and courtesy to them what I had not power to prevent 
than to leave them to possess themselves by violence … as it 
was not only the means of securing these people against the 
seditions of the rebels … I think my lord, with submission, that 
the expediency of making some rule of favour and indulgence in 







Highlanders residing at Cross Creek had already attempted to use their service 
against the Regulators as a means of providing themselves with the freedom that 
accompanied the possession of land.  Martin clearly believed that these land grants were 




 For the New York Highlanders there was a clear landed imperative to Loyalism.  
Fifty families, who had arrived from the Western Highlands in 1773, settled on the lands 
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of Sir John Johnson, all of whom were given 50-200 acres of land at just £6 per 100 
acres, with no rents to pay until the farms were established.  With their available credit, 
some, such as settler John Cameron began buying more land and were invested, 
economically and emotionally, in their farms.  Many had cleared an average of two to 
eight acres when the war began, which not only had to be protected, but through military 
service might be expanded up to four times the original allotment, and on even better 
terms than Sir John had offered, being free land.  The rank-and-file were men of modest 
means, sometimes sub-renters working on land rented by others from Johnson, 
suggesting that they used their military labour to secure land in the absence of available 
credit.
70
  Donald Cameron possessed no land and made his living from three cows he 
was permitted to graze on the twelve acres owned by Angus Cameron near Johnstown.  
He joined the King‟s Royal Regiment of New York in 1776, but transferred to the Royal 
Highland Emigrants where the land grants were of greater value.  His immediate 
superior, Angus, who was probably less motivated given his partial security, would not 
join the Loyalists until 1777.
71
  When making post-war claims, Highland Loyalists 
included the valuation of their lands, often at inflated rates.  The result was modest 
Highlanders claiming over £100 sterling in compensation for their losses in the war.  
Some of the Mohawk Valley Highlanders, who had arrived in 1773, were not in full 
possession of their land grants before the war broke out, and there was understandable 
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support for the maintenance of the pre-1775 political order to ensure these lands were 
delivered.
72
  The aspiration to landholding was the most important motivational factor in 
Highland Loyalism.  Given the number of Loyalist claims from Highlanders that 
indicated they had rented from Johnson, and the number of armed men revolutionary 
General Philip Schuyler disarmed in 1776, we must conclude that the number of sub-
tenant Gaels who served the Loyalist cause in New York was a significant majority.  The 
poor were political actors.     
  
 
III   THE ESSENTIAL LINK: LOYALTY AND INTEREST 
Land was the most obvious and key element of loyalty and interest.  It was, however, 
relatively localized, and as discussed, predicated on the specific contextual environment 
of the mid-1770s.  There were, nevertheless, more broadly situated ideas which 
underpinned the specific equation of loyalty and interest seen in the land issue.  The 
following sections explore these principles. 
The British fiscal-military state was, by the standards of the time, incredibly 
effective in mobilizing resources to finance the expanding costs of overseas expansion.  
Whether this was achieved through the creation of a national debt or by taxation –
historians still dispute which was more effective - the mobilizing of these resources 
rested on political stability and the acceptance of the state by wide sections of the British 
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  Why did Britons accept the heavy burdens of the fiscal-military state?  In 
return for political loyalties, „patriotic‟ Britons received privileged access to markets and 
commercial opportunities.  Demonstrating just how central market access was to political 
allegiance, colonial trade with belligerent powers during the Seven Years‟ War, in 
violation of the discriminatory Flour Act of 1757, was a major precursor of the American 
Revolution.
74
   Still an overwhelmingly mercantilist-based economy in this period, 
British popular patriotism was bolstered by military success against foreign, 
predominantly French, markets.  Patriotic loyalty rested not on the post-1789 notion of 
collective patriotic enterprise in which the people were bound to the nation; instead, the 
fiscal-military state bound key individuals to a central political purpose, the security of 
the British state and, by extension, her trade and empire.  This made the process deeply 
localized, but no less individually significant for that. 
It was William Thom who most forcefully articulated the Scottish perspective.  
Writing at the conclusion of the Seven Years‟ War, Thom stated that „Our joy, at the 
commencement of the war, proceeded entirely from the hope that other people‟s quarrels 
might give us an opportunity of enlarging our trade, and be the occasion of increasing our 
wealth.‟
75
  There were other suggestions that foreign war might, through commercial 
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markets, bind people to the state.  In 1756, it was reported that even in formerly Jacobite 
areas of the Highlands, hostility toward the French was emerging.  It was increasingly 
understood that the war was being fought to protect British commercial markets in the 
Americas, a war aim vital to the growth of linen industries in several parts of the 
Highlands.  Linens from Europe were the staple garment of slaves and indentured 
servants across the West Indies and the North America colonies.
76
  A Board of Trustees 
for Manufactures was established in Scotland, based on the earlier Irish model, as early 
as 1727.  The idea of boosting the industry through quality control was a sound one and 




The centrality of markets and opportunity began to transcend the satisfaction of 
private interest but, again, for initially localized reasons.  For many Scottish elites, the 
incorporation of Scotland into the Union - on the basis that Scotland could never 
maintain a balance of payments with England - was a severe humiliation.  There was, 
therefore, an element of economic patriotism which underpinned commercial enterprise 
within the empire.  The vision of seventeenth-century Scotland as a poverty-stricken and 
bigoted religious state, troubling for many Moderates, further reinforced commercial 
trade as a form of patriotism.   
Improvement was the pinnacle of this patriotism, the long-term alteration of 
Scottish agriculture and industry.  The issue was that, by the 1760s, improvement had 
become intertwined with the rhetoric of empire.  The Scots‟ desire to re-write national 
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history in more polite terms, but not yet having the confidence to articulate their nation as 
a civilized country on a par with England, ensured that Scottish historiography was 
directed toward a more universal approach to history.  Certain groups, no matter their 
supposedly barbaric ways, could be, eventually, incorporated into the civilized list of 
nations with this model.
78
  The language of improvement was thus based on universal 
moral sentiments and entirely underpinned intellectual readings of the empire.
79
  
Improvement in the Highlands was incorporated as a distinct facet of pan-imperial 
designs.  So many of the Scottish commercial elites were based in outwardly-looking 
centres in England, and so integrated into British colonial trade were they, that a 
Scottish-centered commercial patriotism appeared less and less rational.  Adam Smith, 
for example, while he had favoured the loosening of Britain‟s trading monopoly over the 
colonies, accepted that this was unlikely and explicitly invoked the Scottish example to 
support the advantages of political union.
80
   
Glasgow, with its dominant control over the Chesapeake tobacco trade, was a 
place where policies toward the colonies did touch a nerve and localized commercial 
interest might have trumped the attempted centralization of the state.  The Glasgow 
merchants prevented Glasgow joining the list of public bodies which presented loyal 
addresses to the king in 1775.
81
  Yet the tobacco trade rested on wider, largely English 
centres to facilitate its business model, not least of which was the provision of enslaved 
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labour.  When the war expanded with the entry of France and Spain, a belated loyal 
address was sent to the king and Glasgow‟s dissenting voices only ever amounted to calls 
for reform of the political system, not a change in its overall structure.  State-based 
patriotism, as opposed to regional or ethnic identities, proved to be an increasingly 
common outcome of commercial enterprise. 
It would be inappropriate, however, to essentialize profit-driven economic 
motives as a means of national patriotism without acknowledging the political context 
which gave these advantages their emotional traction.  It was the ability of middling 
Highlanders to embrace, what we have been hitherto inclined to see as cultural 
impositions, which was the most significant theme underpinning this period.  These 
principles, of which improvement was the most important, were fully understood as 
deriving from the imperial state.  The Gaelic scholar and chaplain of the 42
nd
 Foot, James 
Maclagan, was a vigorous defender of Gaelic but, while touring the outer Hebrides in 
1774, did not shy away from describing the people of the west of Lewis as „naturally 
indolent‟, a phrase which might have appeared in any of the English-language accounts 
of the isles.  The origin of this supposed indolence was a lack of education and, for 
Maclagan, improvement was primarily about the ability of educated people to form 
commercial relationships for the betterment of themselves and their nation.  He was fully 
behind the planned villages, which as well as ending „Popery‟ and superstition, would 
allow the people to sell cheaply to British overseas markets:  
 
This seems to be no trifling consideration. The body of the 
British Empire is already overlarge for the head, or the head too 
small for it, some limbs or members of it now refuse to bear 
your own weight, and seem determined never to do the head or 
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heart any good ... and if Britain take all the burden and grant all 
immunities to other Parts of the Realm who that was not mad 
would stay in it. Encouragement [for emigrants] to stay at 






 Already, in 1774, Maclagan was looking towards a future where Britain‟s 
success would be entirely predicated on its ability to educate and keep its sons and 
daughters.  Being a part of the British state was, therefore, an agreeable situation, 
thought Maclagan, even if the zealotry of the improvers had distracted them from their 
true goal, the educational improvement of the Highlands. 
   
 
IV   IMPERIAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Having analysed the intersection of loyalty and interest, we now turn to the more abstract 
impact of imperial contacts on the political environment of the Scottish Highlands: the 
sophistication in Gaelic views of the king and government.  Many Highlanders, 
particularly the literate classes, possessed of highly sophisticated readings of the body 
politic, which underpinned the aforementioned self-interested loyalties.  At times, this 
may have been condensed to traditional declarations of the right of the king to rule, but 
this did not necessitate a rejection of complexity.  These ideas were the contextual setting 
for understanding the American rebellion and contributing greatly to Highland resistance 
to the Revolution.  Critically, however, the American rebellion helped re-define the place 
of the Highlands within the British state. 
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What precisely were the tenets of Loyalism in the Highlands?  It can be broadly 
understood as a popular conservatism.  Overwhelmingly, Gaels possessed a persuasive 
belief that success was dependent on parliamentary monarchy, the rule of law, and the 
continuance of the present social order.
83
  Contrasted with the dangerous potential of the 
American Revolution, this was seen to be a noble cause, which, in the interests of the 
majority, favoured the practical enjoyment of justice above an inalienable right of every 
man to have a say in government.  The rejection of parliamentary sovereignty, it was 
feared, would precipitate the total collapse of all social order.  Major Alexander 
Campbell, a Highland Loyalist, hoped: 
 
 
The ministry will act with true British spirit & not suffer a 
Parcell of wrong headed Bandittie of desperate Fortunes to 
disturb & Disconcert their just rights & authority. This, sir, is a 
valuable Country the whole of it, every Colonie producing one 
or more Stapple Commodity peculiarly native … & surpassing 
almost in Quality and Quantity that of other Countries, ever 
since the last war this Country was left bair of Troops in so 
much that mobs Lauch‟d at the legall authority … so that any 
Cunning and Designing Desperate got himself made a Select 
man & Committeeman & so forward his interest in Leading 
them on to Confusion & Rebellion by imposing on the 
weakness & Credulity of the illiterate whose passions are 
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Campbell‟s major concern was the lack of social stratification and stability of 
hierarchy that the Revolution seemed to endorse.  Without hierarchy, it was thought, as 
previously suggested in this chapter, liberty was unobtainable and the tyranny of the 
multitude would prevail.  Strangely, for a nation which had declared its independence 
three years earlier, one Highland officer declared that the Americans knew „no national 
faith‟.  In this reading, the Americans‟ mistake was their lack of loyalty to a legitimate 
authority, however genuine their grievances may be.
85
  The lack of legitimate authority 
and social order was something which terrified other Highland witnesses.  Such rejection 
of legitimate authority and hierarchy was not just abstract, but impacted on the 
intellectual honesty of American colonists in the most day-to-day interactions.  „They 






Was the ultimate source of this stability a linear hierarchy which placed the king 
at the top as an archaic chieftain?  It is true that Gaelic song from the period and earlier 
had considered the king, and loyalty to him, as the ideal mark of Gaelic society.  
Donnachadh Bàn‟s Hanoverian poetry had made much of the disloyalty of the Jacobite 
rebels, much in the same way Jacobite writers had believed the Hanoverian succession to 
be a disloyal act to the true dynasty.
87
  This ignored, however, the sophistication of 
Highland constitutional values.  When loyalty was expressed in Highland thought it was 
not directly solely at the crown, but at the powerful authority of the British state, 
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expressed by the constitution and through the institution of Parliament.  The concept of 
the King-in-Parliament, welding unlimited sovereign power, was central to British 
constitutional values.  Only the resolute application of unitary sovereign
 
power could 
create the orderly governance that the empire needed to
 
prosper.  This was reflected in 
Gaelic statements of constitutional values.  One song from the period described the 
balance that was maintained through a hierarchical constitution: 
 
An ceithir àirdean an t-saoghail  
Tha fearann is daoin‟ aig Deòrsa; 
‟S tha chinn-eaglais anns gach àite  
Chum an sàbhaladh o dhò-bheairt;  
Tha lagh is pàrlamaid aca,  




[In the four corners of the world George has land and men; And his prelates in each place To save men 
from iniquity; They have law and parliament, Maintaining right and justice for them.] 
 
This idea of a protective imperial constitution, predicated on unitary sovereignty, 
was expressed by John Stuart, an Inverness-born Indian trader in South Carolina.  In the 
early 1760s, he had helped convince James Grant of Ballindalloch that it was not in the 
state‟s best interest to entirely subjugate the Cherokee to the South Carolinian planter 
elite.  Highland traders such as Stuart and his agent David Taitt argued that only an 
expanding British imperial sphere could protect native interests.
89
  In effect, the imperial 
polity could be seen as a protective umbrella under which minorities could most 
effectively progress through the stadial model.  This could be done with the minimal 
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unnecessary disruption that inevitably accompanied interaction with more „developed‟ 
societies. 
 American colonists, largely ignorant of the constitutional developments which 
had occurred in Britain since 1688, remained welded to an older understanding which 
saw the king as a separate sovereignty, rather than, as James Macpherson put it, „the 
Great hereditary magistrate, who carries into effect the laws of the Legislature‟.
90
  The 
rejection of the Olive Branch Petition was a key moment for many moderate colonists, a 
brutal wake-up call to modern imperialism for which their concepts, based on the 
seventeenth century writings of figures such as James Harrington, had not prepared 
them.
91
  We may even claim that Highland commentators were more in touch with 
contemporary political models than many colonists.   
The only major difference between Scotland and England in constitutional 
models was the absence of the king as the protector and head of the state religion.  There 
was still a powerful tradition in Scotland, dating back to the National Covenant of 1638, 
of the purity of the Presbyterian Church being above allegiance to the head of state.  This 
was a separation only seen among the dissenters of England.  From this point of view, 
most Lowland Scots, and an increasing number of Highlanders, had less ideological 
reasons for a strict adherence to kingship, when loyalty to God and the kirk came above 
that to the king.  The National Covenant had been based upon the Confession of Faith, 
signed by James VI, in 1581.  It consciously placed religion within a constitutional 
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framework separate from the crown, by enshrining the laws already declared by various 
acts of the Scottish parliament.  If this did not produce a definable increase in loyalty to 
the king and state, in various ways it did underpin the political stability of Scotland.  The 
Ministers and Church Elders of the National Assembly believed it was incumbent upon 
them to press the people in their sentiments of loyalty, and critically, „attachment to the 
constitution‟.
 92
  Surprisingly, this unique connection between church and state even 
helped non-Presbyterian Scots understand the benefits of the constitution.  Bishop Hay 
was informed by Glenalladale that, „On account of their intollerancy [sic], Of all the 
People on earth, The Scots, & of all Denominations the Rigid Presbyterians … are to me 
the most hateful and disagreeable‟.
93
  Yet Glenalladale was celebratory in his praise of 
the British constitution, suggesting a religious component to the understood balance of 
the constitution against tyranny, enshrined only in the British model. 
An advocate of the legalizing of Highland dress perceived a fairness to this model:  
„Every subject in this country values himself upon British liberty ... Our constitution is 
certainly the mildest and best in the world; and it is the peculiar happiness of the present 
reign, that Administration studies to reward merit, without local distinction‟.
94
  Any upset 
in this balance, such as a brutalization of enlisted men in the army, was perceived as an 
„attack … on the liberty of the subject‟ which dealt a „moral wound … to the constitution 
of Britain‟.  Indeed, Highland commentators seem to have used the language of 
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constitutional values to create political capital in advance of various rights.
95
  This did 
not mean, however, that such sentiments were not genuine.  
The events of the year 1775 forced these underdeveloped theories to form a 
salience that had not been previously necessary.  As so much loyalty was bound up in the 
provision of land and commercial opportunities, what truly defined Highland support for 
the continuing vitality of the British imperial project was the demand for stability.  To 
call this pax imperium would be inaccurate, for as the events of that year demonstrated, 
the empire proved incapable of maintaining peace.  And besides, the provisions of land 
were largely predicated on imperial disruption or war.  Nevertheless, in the initial stages 
of the American rebellion, most Highlanders, hoped for a quick resolution which would 
return events to their antebellum status quo.  A Highland merchant in New York, Donald 
Mclean, writing in mid-1775, lamented to a London contact, that the „sinew of trade is 
already broken and that only anarchy and confusion stare land in the face‟.  When the 
Loyalist Highlanders, as many as 1,200 of them, had risen against Revolutionary 
authorities at Cross Creek in February 1776, it was for the purpose, Brigadier-General 
Donald Macdonald said, „to restore peace and tranquillity … to open again the glorious 
streams of commerce – to partake of the blessings inseparable from a regular 
administration of justice‟.
96
  Gaelic writers had envisioned the wonders of imperial peace 
as early as 1756.  The defeat of the French in North America, it was said, would usher in 
a joyous peace:        
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‟N sin gabhaidh croabh na sìth le freamh, 
Teann ghream do ‟n doimhne thalmhainn; 
Is sìnsidh geuga gu rig Nèamh,  
Gach àird le feamh-mheas ‟s geal-bhath; 
Bithidh ceiler èibhinn eun na meaghlan, 
‟S daoine le‟n clainn ag fealbhachadh; 
Toradh is saoth‟r an làmh gun mhaoim,  




[Then the roots of the tree of peace will, Take a hold of the earth‟s depths; And its branches will stretch to 
Heaven, Every height with delicate fruits and white blossoms. The melody of birds in its branches, 
Families taking residence, The produce of their hands unfailing, Under the follicle‟s proven splendour.] 
 
Peace, however, would have to come from the barrel of a musket, with the 
defence of parliamentary sovereignty being sufficient justification for the violence to be 
inflicted upon fellow Britons.  Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell of the 71
st
 Foot was called 
upon to define the meaning of the conflict when accosted by a distressed Loyalist, 
Andrew Peppernell, after his property had been confiscated by the Royal Navy.  
Campbell had to assure Peppernell that such acts were not intended to harm loyal 
subjects, but that it was utterly essential that the rebels „recognize the constitutional 
authority of Great Britain over her Colonies in America‟.  Campbell would later state his 
belief that the restoration of civil government would be more effective in establishing 
peace than 20,000 British soldiers.
98
  In Adam Ferguson‟s response to Richard Price‟s 
defence of the colonists, published at government expense in 1776, he too advocated the 
necessity of a balanced constitution to prevent anarchy: 
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Is Great Britain then to be sacrificed to America … and a state 
which has attained high measures of national felicity, for one 
that is yet only in expectation, and which, by attempting such 
extravagant plans of Continental Republic, is probably laying 





 Always a careful and balanced thinker, Ferguson was ill at ease with the unfair 
strictures placed upon the colonists.  But violent rebellion was a more terrifying threat to 
order than unfair government.  „We do not subject ourselves to Government‟ he had 
preached to the 42
nd
 Foot in 1745, „merely to satisfy the Lusts of those who are fond of 
power.  It is because society, under the regulation of Laws and Government, is the state 
for which Providence has calculated our Natures‟.
100
 
 Echoing Ferguson was the London-based agent of the Nawab of Arcot and future 
MP for Camelford, James Macpherson.  Macpherson was already a major literary figure, 
at the centre of a rancorous debate over the authenticity of Fingal, an Ancient Epic Poem 
(London, 1762), in which there were Gaels and English-speakers on both sides.  In 1775, 
Macpherson was commissioned to defend the policies of Lord North‟s government.  The 
resulting pamphlet, The Rights of Great Britain Asserted Against the Claims of America: 
being an Answer to the Declaration of the General Congress (London, 1776), a direct 
attack on the Declaration of Independence, went through at least ten editions in its first 
two years and represents one of the most significant counter-Revolutionary texts of the 
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  There was no other method of governing, claimed Macpherson, than on the 
principle of „uncontroulable [sic] power‟.  In the British constitution, however, power 
was invested where it was safest, in the combined legislature, consisting of the king, 
Lords, and Commons.
102
  Highland appeals to the constitution recognized this and serve 
to demonstrate just how connected to contemporary debates many Highland thinkers 
were.    
Were Macpherson and Ferguson exceptions, worldly-wise men whose literature 
had little resonance outside London?  After all, one of the reasons Horace Walpole 
doubted the authenticity of the Ossianic verses was that he was not convinced that a 
„savage bard‟ would have written „with the fear of criticism‟, a sure sign of a 
metropolitan author in a literary world.
103
  Upon his arrival into the village of Ruthven, in 
early March 1776, William Tod, the Duke of Gordon‟s factor in Badenoch, found a small 
parcel waiting for him.  Opening it, he discovered a copy of James Macpherson‟s 
pamphlet.  He had already had a „perusal‟ of the ninety-four page document with the 
duke‟s treasurer, James Ross, but now he had his own copy.  In fact, „I find copies of it 
are sent to everybody here by the Government – I found one waiting me which had come 
by Post – gratis‟, he told Ross.  Astonishingly, Lord North‟s government was sending 
free copies of Macpherson‟s pamphlet into the very localities in which a high percentage 
of fir-taca were attempting to enlist men.  Duncan Macpherson of Cluny, future Lt. Col. 
of the 71
st
 Foot, already had seventy men.  His brother-in-law and cousin, Duncan 
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Macpherson of Breakachy, was also recruiting.  Aging Malcolm Macpherson of Phoness, 
promoted for heroism on the Plains of Abraham in 1759, was another local officer, 
though age would prevent him from returning to America.  John Macpherson of 
Invereshie also intended to go, provided he got a good commission and John Macpherson, 
younger of Benchar, hoped to become a lieutenant.
104
  All of these men lived within 
seven miles of James Macpherson‟s birthplace, a fact which may have given reading the 
pamphlet greater resonance.  Sending the pamphlet may have served several purposes.  It 
may have been to prompt vacillating half-pay officers to return to the service.  It may 
have helped explain to officers about to cross the Atlantic why they were to go.  It may 
even have been to set out the arguments recruiters could use on local men to supplement 
the material promises of land and bounty.  The relevance of the political dimensions of 
the conflict to Highland recruitment, however, was clear. While the state could be 
reasonably certain of a Highland military commitment to America, explaining the 
reasons for sending the troops appears to have justified the expense.   
We must confront the expedient use of the American Revolution by politically-
minded Highlanders.  Loyalty in the period gave regions and individuals political 
significance.  Paradoxically, there was utility to previous rebelliousness in regard to 
interactions with the state.  Gaels could demonstrate a loyalty that other Britons could not, 
as the loyalty of Englishmen was rarely questioned before the 1790s.  The collapse of 
social order in the colonies was contrasted with the limited aims of the 1745 Jacobite 
rebellion, implicitly demonstrating the loyalty of the Gael.  For Highlanders, the Jacobite 
challenge to the Hanoverian settlement had sought to replace one king with another.  The 
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degenerative potential of the Revolution, as far as many Highlanders were concerned, 
was much worse:  
 
What in the name of God had the Highlanders been Guilty of in 
the year 45 they acted from principles of honour they thought 
themselves right th‟o they were certainly in the wrong, they Did 
not aime at the totall [sic] Destruction & Subversion of the 
constitution like the Americans for they not only mean‟d to be 






An explicit hatred of American republicanism was expressed by James Maclagan, 
while he served in the colonies in 1777:  
 
 
We sometimes, at least some of us, mistook the right king, but 
we were always friends to Kings and monarchy in general, the 
American rebellion, on the other hand is entirely selfish and 







A „Wellwisher to the Highlanders‟ declared that the measures used against the 
Jacobites in 1746 had been correct:   
 
 
But the ghastly spectre of rebellion is no longer characteristic of 
our Highlanders. They are a brave, an honest, and a worthy 
people, and, as such, have distinguished themselves, on many 
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  Remarkably, even loyal Whigs in the Highlands were beginning to ascribe 
Jacobitism to the entire region, much as English commentators had done, in order to 
assert the importance of their own loyalties in the 1770s.  This raises the important 
question as to whether monarchy truly served as the touchstone of Highland concepts of 
government.  In fact, the appeal to monarchism did not reflect static conservatism in 
Highland understandings of government, dating back to the days of clanship.  Instead, 
they were a modern interpretation suited to a contemporary need.  Had Whig Highlanders 
engaged the realities of Jacobitism, they would have become trapped in a quagmire of 
problematic motivations.  How much had anti-Unionism underpinned the Jacobite 
challenge in Scotland?
108
  Did the denominational undercurrent to Jacobitism fit with 
religious sensibilities in 1770s Britain?  How differently had Whigs and Tories 
envisioned the constitution and the operation of the empire and how far had parochial 
rivalries been responsible for the mobilization of Jacobites?
109
  Instead, a Jacobitism 
which privileged loyalty to the crown as the source of all political authority avoided these 
issues and served as an unproblematic interpretation of the relationship between the 
region and the state.  The fact that most Jacobite leaders had been vehemently critical of 
Charles Edward Stuart‟s decision not to recall a Scottish Parliament was ignored.  
Loyalty to the state, for the benefits of commercial enterprise and improvement had 
already been accepted by the vast majority of the middling and upper Highland elite.  An 
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intellectual return to a monarchist model of Jacobitism could only give succour to this 
allegiance. 
Jacobitism was a usable past that could be employed in the context of the present.  
It could even, in some circumstances, be a pillar of loyalty.  In one text, dedicated to Lt. 
Col. Duncan Macpherson of the 71
st
 Foot, Jacobitism was used to great effect.  
Macpherson, known in the Highlands as Donnachadh na h-Ath (Duncan of the Kiln), had 
been born in a kiln while his father, Ewan Macpherson of Cluny, was on the run from 
government forces in the aftermath of Culloden.  It was reported, however, that these 
experiences had prepared Macpherson for an equally hard military life in the service of 
the crown: „Slìon‟ar crudal air seachdan, Fhuair Donnacha‟ Mac‟ Phearson, Tric air 
uabairt ‟s air sèachran, Dh‟fhàg sud cruaidh ann am pèars è [Plentiful are the hardships in 
the army, That Duncan Macpherson got, Often expelled, dispossessed, wandering, That 
left him hard, strong in person].
110
  This was not, it cannot be overemphasized, 
atonement nor rehabilitation, a common trope in Highland historiography, but a 
conscious declaration of loyalty in order to assert a position as deserving of recognition 
and, thus reward, within the imperial system.  This ability to re-interpret Jacobitism helps 
explain its continuing utility into the nineteenth century. 
And while these were evidently considerations confined to the elite, some 
evidence suggests that the rank-and-file also participated in the articulation of Highland 
loyalty in contrast to colonial disloyalty.  A complaint printed in the Caledonian Mercury 
in 1777 offers a rare, though secondary insight, into the attitudes of enlisted Highland 
soldiers: 
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A correspondent, who has frequent intercourse, by letters, with 
the officers of the Highland regiments at present serving in 
America, informs us, that nothing displeases the common men 
of that corps so much as to hear the provincials called Rebels. 
On a former occasion many of themselves were dignified with 
that application. They then fought bravely, in what they thought 
a just cause. The Americans will scarce fight at all, though they 
pretend their cause is equally just. The Highlanders, therefore, 
conceive themselves highly affronted, when the designation of 
Rebel is applied to an American. They think it involves in it a 
tacit reflection against themselves, as if they were cowards as 
well as rebels. Of this they can by no means admit, and 







 The wording of this article suggests that it may have been mediated for its 
intended audience.  Nevertheless, as we have seen, Highland soldiers defined themselves 
partly through a corporate military identity in which they considered themselves to be 
vastly superior to their colonial opponents.  The article in the Caledonian Mercury serves 
to demonstrate the importance of the American war in re-configuring Highland self-
imagery. 
Why did the Highland region not see any of the disruption that typified the 
American colonies?  Both had, after all, experience of conflict with the imperial state.  
The reason was actually remarkably simple.  The Highland region had a significant say in 
its own governance, a fact that furthers the argument against the conquered and 
subordinated interpretation.  Highland counties were represented in parliament.  There 
was an overlap between landed and moneyed hierarchies and political power.  The 
                                                 
111
 Caledonian Mercury, no. 8628 (1 Jan. 1777), p. 1; I wish to thank Hisashi Kuboyama for this reference 
(Arigato-gozai-masu Kuboyama Hisashi-San). 
267 
 
Highlands, in this period, were still ruled and run by Highland elites, albeit elites with 
vastly different orientations from the majority of the people.  The landlords were 
grounded in the politics and social structures of the Highlands, knowledgeable and 
sympathetic to its proper governance, at least as far as they understood it.  They were not 
appointed impositions as colonial governors were in America.  They were not, in general, 
segregated from the people by culture and religion, as in Ireland.  Perhaps most 
significantly, through military service, Highland elites were accepted, at least in official 
terms, as equal partners in the state.  In 1754, the state offered an amnesty to all former 
Jacobites, prompting a number of Highland officers from the Scots Brigade in the service 
of the United Provinces to join the British army.
112
  Indeed, it might even be suggested 
that the crisis of empire experienced in the American colonies in the 1770s emerged, not 
because of the belligerent expansion of the British Empire and its military arm, but the 
failure to extend a viable and respectable role in this expansion to the American colonies.  
In the Highlands, access to the advantages and triumphalist discourses of imperial 
expansion was never officially denied.  If English public opinion was often bitterly anti-
Scottish, this often stood in proportion to the significance of Scots in the highest 
positions in the land. 
On a more common level, this very fact even gave the region a negotiating edge 
when dealing with the state.  It was around this period that military service emerged as an 
argument against rising rents and dispossession.  As early as 1773, one author claimed 
that if social change continued to force Highlanders to emigrate to the colonies, there 
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would be no Highlanders left to join the army.  These were not idle threats.  As the 
author explained, „The genius of the Highlander will fall in at once with the nature of the 
country [America] … They will make excellent partisans for the first enterprising genius 
that shall aspire to form an independent establishment in America.‟
113
  The context of 
political loyalty in the Highlands was evidently fluid enough for the author, who styled 
himself a „Highlander‟, to imply that state-backed estate policies might resurrect the 
Highlander as a military threat.  Implicit in his statement was that Highland loyalty was 
negotiable, but only on terms acceptable to those affected by social change.  Military 
service had become vital to the dynamics of social change and loyalty in the Highlands.          
 
 
V   CONCLUSIONS 
The advent of widespread imperial contacts between the Highlands and the North 
American colonies after 1756 was hugely significant for the loyalties and interests of 
numerous groups within the Highlands.  What is more, as Campbell of Danna had 
expressed so well, the two were intimately connected.  Private or familial interest was 
privileged above other considerations, but to understand this as a zero sum game, 
however, is inaccurate.  Highland allegiances conformed to the significance which could 
be gained from political loyalty, but this is not to suggest that economic self-interest was 
the only motivator in Highland loyalties.  Many Highlanders, emigrants especially, had 
deeply invested in the vitality of the British Empire and took tremendous risks to defend 
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it.  Others genuinely believed in the British constitution as the best form of government, 
threats to which had to be met with unforgiving violence.  Ultimately, however, the 
empire served as the political space for the pursuit of private interest, the pinnacle of 
which was access to cheap or free land.  It was a deeply personal loyalty with huge scope 
for fulfilling only those obligations which conformed to personal interest.  The number 
of Highland emigrants who supported the British government in the colonies suggests, 
however, it was no less significant for that.
114
   
One significant question remains.  While the American Revolution altered the 
political dynamics of the Highlands, were the results of the war a vehicle for change?  
The reaction of many people in the Highlands to the American rebellion suggests that, 
unlike in other parts of the empire, they were not.  Irish Whigs successfully used the war 
to browbeat Westminster into a repeal of the Irish Declaratory Act and, in the decades 
before the Union, largely re-discovered their „British‟ identity in opposition to an 
increasingly seditious Irish patriotism.  The American Revolution helped form the 
polarities which were to be so important in Ireland in the crisis of the late 1790s.
115
  In 
India, major reforms, instituted after Charles Cornwallis became Governor-General in 
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1786, massively increased British influence in the sub-continent.  There were few 
significant calls for reform or change in the Highlands.  It might even be argued, from the 
perspective of the Highlands elites, that the region had got what it wanted out of the 
conflict: privileged access to the advantages of loyalty.  They had become full 
beneficiaries of the imperial system.  The events of 1775-1783, were used to assert, with 
more force than ever before, the allegiances, the contributions, and the rights of a region 











THE HEROIC FABRIC OF THE MIND: CULTURE AND IDENTITY 




Contrary to the popular meta-narrative of Highland history, confidence was not absent 
from the region in the period following the 1745 rebellion.  For Gaelic society, there was 
a cultural payoff for sending her sons to North America, which has not yet been fully 
appreciated.  War in the colonies not only exported men out of the Highlands, it also 
exported Gaelic domestic concerns into a different intellectual sphere.  Imperial wars 
created an ambiguous space where cultural concerns and political loyalties could be 
segregated from domestic realities.  The Highland soldier, when he was interpreted in 
Gaelic popular culture through the medium of songs, engendered a pride in the Gaels‟ 
martial qualities, and became a figurehead for Gaelic confidence.  Deployed as Highland 
battalions, complete with distinct cultural trappings, these battalions provided an 
explicitly Highland role in the British Empire.  As that empire could increasingly be 
interpreted as a dominant world power, excessive celebrations of Gaelic martial triumph 
did not strain credulity, and offered an appealing alternative to a narrative of victimhood. 
The motive to enlist owed little to notions of pro-British patriotism and cultural 
identities.  If we consider the way in which the Highland regiments were interpreted, 
however, a more complex picture emerges.  As the majority of regiments raised in this 
period were intended for overseas service, the national/imperial element to military 
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service was necessarily emphasized, diminishing but not eclipsing the more assertive 
socio-political localism that defined the home-defence battalions.  These have been 
analysed with consummate skill by J.E. Cookson, Austin Gee, and Kevin B. Linch.
1
  
Service in a wide imperial dominion had the potential to create a different dynamic, 
interpretively speaking, from the volunteer corps.  As a pillar of imperial expansion, the 
Highland regiments had the potential to be interpreted in cultural terms as a regional 
contribution to a British and imperial institution.  This in no way meant the emergence of 
a teleological „Britishness‟; quite the contrary.  Imperial military service did not 
fundamentally alter Gaelic identities, but created an autonomous space where pre-
existent early modern Gaelic identities were allowed to emerge and develop without 
much overt inconsistency.  This did not mean that the imperial context was incidental, 
however, for it was the prerequisite of such confidence.  As we shall see, there were also 
moments when identity transcended the local and embraced supra-national identifications.  
We should not imagine, however, that confused local identities progressed to form more 
salient national principles.  Most remarkably, the discourses of imperialism were adopted, 
adapted, and turned back upon metropolitan ideals.  In effect, imperial minorities used 
imperialism to strengthen their own place in the body politic.  Virtues which had 
underpinned the seventeenth-century Highlands, the vitality of Gaelic and of martial 
culture, were strengthened, and while not uniformly pro-British, were entirely predicated 
on a meshing of early-modern identities with a new imperial context.   
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Why have these identities been ignored?  Historians have thought it necessary to 
question the emergence of Britishness by highlighting the more fundamental imperatives 
of socio-economic security within localized contexts.  This has led, however, to an 
implicit dismissal of all assertive identities under the intellectually-safe vagueness of 
concentric identifications.  Concentric identities, of course, did exist, but the argument 
presented here is that without an understanding of wider pan-British identities, the 
localized identity of the Highlands could not have formed in the way that it did.  The 
Gaelic identities highlighted here were largely independent of political regimes, but 
operating in conjunction with the expansion of empire. 
Three discrete themes combined to form a Gaelic self-confidence which 
challenged the subordinate identity imposed on the region.  The first theme emerged 
from theories connected to the Scottish enlightenment.  Theories of civil society 
consolidated the pre-established assumption of a cultural divide in Scotland between the 
civilized Lowlands and savage Highlands.  Theories of civil society were reciprocal, 
developing out of this dichotomy while simultaneously reinforcing it.  The 
historiographical error has been to see theories of civil society as the direct antecedents 
of romantic Highlandism, where savagery mellowed to the sublime.  These were 
connected principles, but were vastly different intellectual constructs.  The principal civil 
society theorist of the period, Adam Ferguson, was a Gael and while he often sought to 
distance himself from his Gaelic origins, he never repudiated them.  He asserted the 
authenticity of James Macpherson‟s Ossian poems for longer than many enlightened 
thinkers.  Most important, his views of civil society offered a conceptual framework for 
Highland self-confidence that was asserted prior to romantic Highlandism.  Second, there 
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was the place of the Gaelic language.  Gaelic as a language was legitimized and revived 
in the Highland regiments.  The nature of military service was to provide both a measure 
of martial confidence as well as a relationship with an institution which was most 
definably „British‟, allowing the Gael to take a justly deserved place in imperial triumph.  
Third, the Gaels‟ uncertain status within the British Isles stood in stark contrast to their 
own role as white oppressors within the larger boundaries of empire.  The movement of 
Highlanders into imperial administration and the army, offered the Gael a position of 
unquestionable superiority in relation to other groups.  Superiority of this nature fostered 
a supercilious confidence.  It was this confidence which marked the full extent of the 
Gaelic embracing of British principles, for the views of Gaels toward imperial minorities 
sat firmly within a supra-national framework.  It is hard to identify any material 
difference between Gaelic views of imperial minorities and those of other Britons.  The 
narrative of eighteenth-century Highland decline, despite genuine sympathy toward the 
fate of the region, cannot account for this confidence. 
 
 
I   LUXURY, VIRTUE, AND MARTIAL VALOUR 
Five months before representatives of the colonies of North America absolved 
themselves of their allegiances to the British crown, Edward Gibbon published the first 
volume of his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, an immensely 
influential work which posited that the fall of the Roman Empire had been precipitated 
by the loss of martial virtue among its citizens.  Gibbon had been heavily indebted to 
other authors, many of who were responsible for the narratives of moral declension that 
275 
 
framed the History of the Decline and Fall.
2
  One was a Gaelic-speaking former chaplain 
of the 42
nd
 Foot, Adam Ferguson, who would expand Gibbon‟s narrative with the three-
volume The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic from 1783. 
Ferguson‟s keen interest in the themes that faced all developed societies, virtue, luxury, 
and potential decline, highlighted most effectively in An Essay on the History of Civil 
Society (Edinburgh, 1767), would create an unparalleled foundation for Highland 
identities within the British Empire; these parochial identities, however, could only be 
formed on the basis of knowledge of much larger and more sophisticated worldviews. 
 In An Essay on the History of Civil Society, Adam Ferguson spoke to the most 
immediate concerns of contemporary British readers.  He provided a framework for 
understanding how nations evolved to a state of political maturity, commerce, and 
civility.  This was no apotheosis, however, and Ferguson was particularly careful to 
discuss the associated problems in such refined societies of political slavery and the 
corruption of luxury.  It was the invocation of moral philosophy, Ferguson‟s questioning 
of the moral sentiments of cultural and national distinctions, however, which was of 




[B]ut to extend the limits of any particular state, is not, perhaps, 
the way to obtain it; while we desire that our fellow-creatures 
should multiply, it does not follow that the whole should, if 
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It was admitted, he said, that people admired the Roman Empire „as a model of national 
greatness and splendour‟, but Ferguson contended that that very greatness had been 
ruinous to the virtue of the body politic: „It was found to be inconsistent with all the 
advantages which that conquering people had formerly enjoyed in the articles of 
government and manners.‟
4
  Imperial expansion was potentially hazardous to the 
wellbeing of a virtuous society. 
In was this implicit referencing of Britain and her empire which brought 
Ferguson‟s ideas into the reflective mood of the thinking classes.  The work of Ferguson 
and the harrowing context in which Gibbon‟s magnum opus was read, established that 
the British Empire, fighting a vicious imperial civil war in the colonies, might be 
experiencing a mirror of Roman decline.  Whereas Gibbon had controversially blamed 
the influence of Christianity for the decline, with its pacifying of traditional Roman 
militarism, he had blamed much of the decay on the moral corruption of the metropolis, 
which had become effete through lack of military activity.  While the charge of a lack of 
military activity could hardly be affixed to the British Empire, Gibbon‟s narrative served 
as a critique of what had happened in eighteenth-century Britain.  Imperialism had 
exposed large sections of British society to overseas luxuries.  In a sermon preached to an 
Edinburgh audience in August 1779, shortly after Spain had entered the war, Ferguson‟s 
contemporary, the Reverend Andrew Greenfield, partly blamed the cause of national 
distress on gluttony and luxury.
5
  Another fear arising from the Gibbonian narrative was 
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the rise of a large standing army to fight imperial wars.  Instead of being greeted as a 
measure of patriotic fervour, this force was interpreted as the same separation of soldier 
and pacific citizen which had led to the Roman collapse; this was a worry much 
enhanced by plebeian opposition to the Militia Act of 1757 in England, which 
demonstrated to the Pittites the enormous reluctance of the poor to be the embodiment of 
civic virtue.
6
   
There were, of course, a myriad of interpretations of the Roman Empire, and a 
degree of confusion over the parts of the Roman Empire, or indeed Republic, to be 
emulated or despised in Georgian Britain.  One author, who sought a loose confederation 
between Britain and her colonies, asserted that, the virtuous aspects of a balanced 
constitution could not survive the forced dominion of overseas territories.  This had been 
the case as the Roman Republic had collapsed through the conquests of Gaul, Iberia, and 
the Hellenic territories.  From an opposition point of view, the virtue of Britain‟s rulers 
was corrupted with delusions of Roman grandeur; John Adams, in typically histrionic 
style, had criticized „court sycophants‟ for their attempts at emulating imperial Rome.
7
  
Overall, however, the invocation of Roman history was clear.  Had Great Britain‟s 
emergence as the preeminent world power after 1763 marked, in Ferguson‟s analogy, the 
full „measure of empire‟ and „the finishing hand to the internal corruption of the state‟?
8 
 
Britons, by the end of the American rebellion, could be forgiven for believing the 
empire had irrevocably changed.  Put in the essentialist terms of eighteenth-century 
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commentators, the loss of America had been the loss of the virtuous part of the empire.  
What had once been an empire of common bonds was now one defined by racialized 
difference and authoritarianism; the conquest of the Indian sub-continent was not a 
renewal of imperial virtue, but a civic and moral stain on the empire of liberty.  The east 
could only expose virtuous subjects to oriental despotism and the goods returning from 
imperial expansion were little more than „trinkets and baubles we could well do 
without‟.
9
  Contrary to such fears, the loss of America had actually made the empire 
stronger.  It had removed any illusion that the empire was a voluntary partnership of 
common cause and identity; it was polyglot and inequitable.
10
  But strength remained a 
relative term for a people so immersed in the language of rights and liberties.   
The crisis of empire and virtue spoke directly to the Highland soldier, long before 
1783 made this new empire a reality.  Adam Ferguson largely rejected the legalistic 
interpretation of the social contract and the evolutions of natural law, instead, following 
Montesquieu in privileging climatic and cultural factors which influenced the 
development of nations.
11
  Ferguson‟s An Essay on the History of Civil Society was the 
work of a thinker navigating a fine line between his own cultural origins and his 
affirmation of the benefits of civility.  While Ferguson‟s self-identification remains a 
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subject of some debate, he was a Gaelic speaker.
12
  He meticulously framed An Essay on 
the History of Civil Society as a sympathetic discussion of the place of the Gaelic 
Highlands within a sophisticated intellectual framework.  Ferguson rejected the 
conjectural history of a Hobbesian state of nature and believed that history could only 
start with societies, that it was societies which created individuals and their narratives.  In 
this way, all societies were legitimately historicized.
13
  In effect, Ferguson provided 
plurality within the stadial structure.  Critically, Ferguson claimed there was no universal 
model for understanding the civility of a people, but that there were criteria for judging 
the virtue of a nation.  This pointed to a more complex system of social narrative than the 
simple dichotomy of primitive and civilized, without necessarily resting on a rigid stadial 
progression.  The energy of Highland society, the energy which Ferguson had seen in the 
42
nd
 Foot, could produce a citizen who was at once distinct and possessing of virtuous 
qualities.  Furthermore, Ferguson‟s criticism of society was not directed at luxury per se, 
but instead at the loss of civic virtue arising from societies that had privileged luxury.  
The conspicuous consumption that typified Highland elites was acceptable, as long as 
they continued to join the military in large numbers.
14
  There was, in Ferguson‟s opinion, 
a place for human pathology in social vitality, a sign of innate zeal.
15
   
This navigation of the Gaelic fringe in Ferguson‟s thoughts expressed itself most 
distinctly in his views on independence and freedom.  Ferguson, Hume, and Smith all 
recognized the importance of individual independence; nevertheless, they feared a man 
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might lose such independence by engrossing himself in one specific contribution to 
society to a point where he could only recognize himself in the capacity assigned to him 
by society.  What made Ferguson different was that he asserted that an individual 
remained free as long as he remained virtuous, and he remained as such as long as he 
remained a possessor of himself.  In such a way, Gaels, at least those selling their 




Ferguson was also the only member of the literati to have served with the regular 
army, a fact of great consequence to Highland identity.  More than any other figure of the 
Scottish enlightenment, Ferguson believed in military service as the foundation of civic 
virtue, and as the founder of the Poker Club had campaigned passionately for the right to 
a Scottish militia.
17
  The troubling inability of the Scottish Lowlands to contend with the 
Jacobites, a concern which shaped the early debates of the Select Society, had 
emphasized a critical Gibbonian problem. While southern Scotland had become a polite 
and commercial society, its martial capacities, which had been so central to the national 
narrative in the early modern period, had been lost as a result.  This implicitly made the 
Highlands a major repository, in both ethnic and civic terms, of the virtues expressed in 
earlier Buchananite Scottish historiography.
18
 
Somewhat contradictorily, however, in asserting virtue as key to successful 
societies, Ferguson provided a narrative where the divide between military and 
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commercial society was less artificial than other commentators were inclined to assert.  
While Gibbon had narrated decline and fall partly through the handing of martial 
responsibilities to the periphery, Ferguson believed that the nations of Europe would 
never again see the disparity that existed in Rome between the „pacific citizen‟ and the 
soldier.  Modern Europe was less inclined, he thought, to privatize their border defences 
to peripheral war bands.  Ferguson believed that the modern citizen was easily taught the 
nature of war.  It was probably this which reconciled his fear of standing armies with his 
advocacy of military virtue.  The dangers of a standing army could be held in check, and 
were being held in check, by the overlap between the Highland gentry‟s interest in 
commercial profitability and their independent choice to enter the army: „[T]he children 
of opulent families‟, said Ferguson, could be „made to contend with the savage. By 
imitating his arts, they have learned, like him, to traverse the forest‟.
19
  Thus, not only 
were military imperialism and commercialization indelibly linked, but Ferguson did not 
see Highland military service as a mark of the privatization of the state‟s defence to 
peripheral savages.  It was, instead, the very pinnacle of virtue in a modern, commercial 
society.  In Samuel Johnson‟s writings too, there was an element of this idealized 
dualistic society.  There is, therefore, insufficient evidence to say that there was an 
irrevocable incompatibility between modern society and „the most favourable parts of the 
earth‟, where the people owing to „the qualities of the race ... in respect to ingenuity or 
courage, possess ... a distinguished superiority‟.
20
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It seems unlikely that most commentators embraced Ferguson in the sophisticated 
terms he had intended.  The Ferguson-like rejection of metropolitan luxury, however, 
was a critical element of regional identity.  Alexander Macdonald, Alasdair mac 
Mhaighstir Alasdair, the most brilliant Gaelic lyricist of the eighteenth century, had 
asked, „need it surprise anyone‟ that the genius of the Highlander might be found „among 
a people so remote from the commerce of nations famous for arts and sciences‟.
21
  The 
most astounding expression of provincial superiority was penned by John Clark, a Gaelic 
author and translator, in the context of the mutiny of Highland regiments during the War 
of American Independence.  Clark argued that Highland poverty made recompense, „by 
sending happiness to their breasts through avenues open only to themselves‟.  It forced 
them, he said, „to dig for those comforts within itself, which the inhabitants of the south 
enjoy from the produce of their fields‟.  Clark finished with the improbable, but 
extremely significant assertion that the Highlander looked down with pity on the 
grovelling wealth of his southern neighbours, as he alone, would never forfeit his virtues 
for any affluence.
22
  Four decades later, David Stewart of Garth would similarly argue 
that the Highlanders regarded the English-speaking Lowlanders as „a very inferior 
mongrel race of intruders, sons of little men, without heroism, without ancestry, or 
genius‟, adding, „Whatever was mean or effeminate, whatever was dull, slow, 
mechanical, or torpid, was in the Highlands imputed to the Lowlanders.‟  Clark, Alasdair 
mac Mhaighstir Alasdair, and Garth entirely lacked the intellectual sophistication of 
Adam Ferguson, but, as in An Essay on the History of Civil Society, they placed a 
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premium on virtue and independence as the foundation of the Highland soldier.  „Can we 
expect high-spirited chivalrous soldiers‟ from a population heavily exposed to 
commercial progress, Garth asked rhetorically.
23
 
 Nevertheless, late eighteenth-century Highland commentaries did not mark a 
utopic admiration of savage virtue that could be segregated from mainstream Britain.  
John Clark was a zealous improver, serving as a land agent in Wales and steward to 
George Devereux, thirteenth Viscount Hereford.  Clark‟s studies of agriculture were 
intended to invigorate a nation-wide philosophy of improvement and were published 
through the Board of Agriculture.
24
  Garth, too, was an improver and objected to its 
overly rapid implementation, rather than being against it as a philosophy per se.  Even 
the most fervent romantics tended to privilege marks of civility.  Of a social gathering in 
Inverness in 1774, Anne Grant of Laggan was pleased to report that, since many of the 
gentry had served in the army, they added „liberal notions and polished manners to the 
acute and spritely genius of the country‟.  She held similar opinions of the courtesy, 
civility, and intelligence of her neighbours in Laggan in 1781.
25
  Military figures were, 
therefore, admirable for their imperial service, their manners, and their Highland traits.  
They were definably modern and British as well as being innately superior. 
Provincial superiority was a regional invention which created virtuous sections of 
the British Empire.  While the emulation of English practices were important to Scots, 
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they largely invented themselves as provincials in antithesis to metropolitan corruption.
26
  
Given the evident metropolitan corruptibility, only the provinces would defend empire 
from itself, or so they thought.  It was this reason that as early as 1773, Highland 
emigrants had been implored to carry over the „remains of the true old British spirit 
before it be … extinguished‟.
27
  Campbell‟s referencing of Britain was conscious and 
revealing.  Regional confidence in the Gàidhealtachd, while it had always existed in one 
way or another, could only be formed in this period on the basis of external factors.  
Gaelic confidence was at once, therefore, Highland, British, and imperial, without being 
necessarily concentric.  Highland identity, as a construction of cultural boundaries within 
a wider body-politic, rather than constructed of essentialist traits, was only possible 
because of an awareness of an external „other‟.  By the 1780s, the perceived danger 
posed by metropolitans was increasingly sinister: „the only risk this effeminate, selfish, 
and luxurious age runs, is totally to forget every duty which they owe to the Author of 
their existence, and the interests of society‟.
28
 Anne Grant, writing at the height of the 
imperial crisis, saw the American war as „divine justice ... taking signal vengeance on the 
iniquities of the times‟: „The corruption of the parent state, which leads her to an 
inordinate enjoyment of those advantages, that she possesses in pre-eminence of all 
others, and her ungrateful neglect of the source of all those blessings.‟
29
  The intervention 
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of divine justice on the moral failures of the age reflected closely Ferguson‟s conclusion 
about the Jacobite rebellion of 1745.
30
    
In these readings, fault lay with the metropolis.  Highland writers did not simply 
challenge the assertion of metropolitan values upon the region.  They helped structure the 
meaning of the metropolitan centre and its innate corruptibility.  In a number of 
important works, chiefly those of Ned Landsman, scholars have convincingly 
demonstrated that positive provincial identities in Ireland, Scotland, provincial England, 
and America, were constructed in opposition to effete metropolitan weakness.  While of 
less significance, Gaelic writers thus took their place alongside figures such as Edmund 
Burke and William Hogarth in constructing the luxury of the metropolitan centre, often, 
as a danger to the virtues of British society.
31
   
The superiority felt by some Gaels is perhaps best exemplified by a stanza from 
„Oran do‟na Gael a bha sa cuir do America, san Bhliadhna 1778‟, a poem contemporary 
to the dispatch of the new Highland regiments to America after Saratoga.  Its author, with 
barely disguised anger over Scottish inequality, announced: 
 
Cha robh Saghsanaich glic 
Ann am dùsgadh a mhiosta, 
‟N‟air dhiult iad Milisi do Albain; 
‟N‟air theannuich an eigean, 
B‟e fosgladh gack beul diu, 
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[The English were not wise to start the mischief, When they refused Scotland a Militia; When their 
distress began, The first thing that came from every mouth, Was that the mighty men of the Highlands 
[lit. Rough Bounds] would be of great use.] 
 
The alternative readings of Highland virtue were important to the Gael, but this is 
not to say that there were intractable changes in metropolitan perceptions of the 
Highlander.  There may have been a „rebel to hero‟ paradigm shift, but, for most 
commentators, the Highland soldier remained an unimproved soldier, who could be 
removed from the region without damage to agriculture or manufacturing.  The stature of 
trade in valuating Britishness necessarily highlighted the otherness of the undeveloped 
Highlands.
33
  The perceived ability of Britons to consume was seen to have taken them 
out of the savage realm and established them as a commercial nation at the apex of an 
enlightened hierarchy.  By emphasizing the subsistence and virtuous existence of the 
Highlanders, authors rejected this most central element in British eighteenth-century 
identity.  Fundamentally, however, this represented a largely external construction of 
negativity in the military character, a construction utterly rejected by most Highland 
commentators.  The incompatibility of commercial modernization with traditional 
military prowess demonstrated in English intellectual circles was less obvious in the 
Highlands.  Indeed, the various Highland clubs and societies that emerged at the end of 
the eighteenth century, societies which drew on military imagery and vociferously 
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defended the imagined identity of the region, ultimately highlighted an elitist agenda of 
„improvement ... by the establishment of towns, villages, and harbours‟.
34
 
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, these relatively sophisticated assertions 
of martial vitality gave way to an increasingly racialized and exaggerated reading of 
group identity, based on definable ethnic traits.  In this, however, Highlanders were 
equally responsible for their own imagery.  Upon meeting a young student in 1773, Anne 
Grant was appalled to find a fellow Highlander concerned only about breakfast when 
Highlanders ought, like herself, to detest „every mode of selfish luxury‟.  „He has nothing 
of the Highlander but his birth‟ was her conceited opinion of the young man.
35
  
Alexander Macdonald made a remarkable comment on the 84
th
 Foot after a winter in 
Canada in which several soldiers had died from exposure.  Macdonald reported that the 
best men, those who had survived the winter, were „more highlanders‟ than those who 
had perished.  It was a common practice among Highland soldiers to comment on a 
distinct „Highland pride‟ or discuss the traits associated with being a Highlander, further 
evidence of a distinct regionalism among Gaels.
36
 
The aforementioned clubs and societies which emerged in this period were 
instrumental in the assertion of a regionally-propagated ethnic identity.  The first society 
was The Highland Society of London, formed in 1778.  Emphasizing the link between the 
military and identity, Simon Fraser of Lovat was its first president and the „keeping up 
the Martial Spirit; and rewarding the gallant achievements of Highland Corps‟ where 
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among the stated objectives of the organization.  Other objectives included the 
restoration of Highland dress, the promotion of Gaelic, and, of course, the „promoting of 
Agricultural Improvements‟.  The military seems to have been vital to the work of the 
society.  Among the eleven members admitted on 20 January 1779 were a general, three 
colonels, one major, two captains, and two lieutenants.
37
  The society‟s scheme in 1779 
to produce a Gaelic dictionary involved Major John Small seeking to obtain Sir Henry 
Clinton‟s permission to have James Maclagan sent home from service with the 42
nd
 Foot 
in America, a request which was granted.
38
  The London model was soon followed by the 
Highland Society of Edinburgh, formed in 1784.  All 189 founding members were 
Highland proprietors, including David Stewart of Garth.  Its first president was the 
former Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, John Campbell, fifth Duke of Argyll.  The 
Celtic Society of Edinburgh closely mirrored the Highland society of that city and had 
been the brainchild of William Mackenzie of Gruinard, a former officer in the 72
nd
 Foot.  
Its stated objective was the limited goal of the promotion of Highland dress. 
There is, therefore, the powerful suggestion that Highland identity emerged from 
the manipulation of military service as a brand from within the Highland region.  There 
were celebrations of martial vitality, tartan, bagpipes, and weaponry in Gaelic song long 
before it was acceptable to Lowland audiences.
39
  This Highlandism was a reworking of 
tradition for contemporary results, but it was not the unscrupulous co-option of a 
subjected region to suit a national interest, the bedrock of analysis of Scottish identity in 
the early nineteenth century.  It was, at least initially, a regional formulation of group 
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identity.  The Highland martial imagery propagated by the Highland gentry, many of 
whom were former officers, drove the agenda of what was important to the Scottish 
narrative and the overlap between early Highland concepts of manners and the attributes 
ascribed by external commentators reveals significant similarities.
40
  Exact parallels were 
never entirely possible, however, and a common complaint from Highland commentators 
was the ignorance of external commentators.  Writers such as Tobias Smollett, who are 
seen as key to the Lowland „invention‟ of the Highlands, were critically attacked for their 
„allowable ignorance‟ on the manners of the common Highlander, a criticism that was 
extended to ministerial officials and the government.
41
  
 By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the processes which had begun with Adam 
Ferguson‟s invocation of martial identity were nearing the form they would keep for 
much of the next two hundred years.  The name of Sir Walter Scott and, in particular, his 
role in the 1822 visit of George IV to Edinburgh is synonymous with the creation of 
Highlandism.  Scottish historians have long poured scorn on Scott‟s romanticized 
misrepresentation of Highland culture.
42
  What they ignore, in a legitimate attempt to 
expose the myths of Scottish historiography, is the role of Gaels within this process.  It is 
known, for example, that Walter Scott was deeply affected by the visit he paid to Ranald 
Macdonald of Staffa in 1810, where Scott was welcomed by armed retainers, bagpipes, 
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and musketry, four years before the publication of Waverley.
43
  Scott‟s principal assistant 
in the forging of the nation in 1822 was David Stewart of Garth, recently established as a 
leading authority on the Highlands through the publication of his Sketches.  Historians 
have been rightly keen to dismiss Garth as a romantic, an ethnic chauvinist of the highest 
order.  But Garth was a Gaelic-speaker and was, to a far greater degree than Scott, 
responsible for the vulgar imagery of the Highland soldier that has survived to the 
present day.  His role in the 1822 visit, in which he organized the great Gathering of the 
Clans, was that of a Highlander, as well as a Scot(t).  Another figure of significance to 
the 1822 visit was Alexander Ranaldson Macdonnell of Glengarry.  Glengarry thought of 
himself as a chieftain of old and kept up the pretence while all the time clearing his 
ancestral lands of people for sheep walks.  He had served as a captain in the Strathspey 
Regiment of Fencible Highlanders and operated his company as if he was its chief, rather 
than acting as the administrative officer of a functional military unit.  Upset at the 
supposedly faux Highlandism he had seen in the members of various Highland societies, 
he established The Society of True Highlanders in 1815 and was deeply offended when it 
was refused precedence in 1822.
44
 
 There were, of course, deep divisions within the Highlands over these propagated 
identities.  Major Donald Macgregor of Learnan had spent much of his adult life in the 
Highland regiments during the Napoleonic wars and excused himself from parading 
alongside the „Spurious Highlanders‟, who did not accord „with my view of the dignity 
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due to the clans‟.  Sir John Macgregor Murray, a member of The Highland Society of 
Edinburgh, The Celtic Society of Edinburgh, and The Society of True Highlanders, 
quizzed Glengarry over how genuine his society could be when it had never granted any 
funds for the promotion of Gaelic.  Indeed, astute men such as Macgregor Murray had no 
illusions as to the role of the societies as little more than a gathering of elites, in which 
effective estate management, if necessary at the expense of the common people, were the 
primary objectives.
45
  Formulated by regional elites, Highland identity reflected elite 
agendas, allowing extravagant romanticism as grotesque as anything seen south of the 
Highland line.     
This does not mean that all expressions of Highland identity were elite 
constructions in which the poor were excluded.  The rank-and-file Highland soldier had a 
seminal impact in this process.  In the decades following the treaty of Paris in 1783, 
attempts by Highlander veterans to impose their own impression of themselves onto a 
wider Anglo-British mindset proceeded apace.  On a visit to Québec shortly before his 
death from rabies contracted from a fox bite in 1819, Charles Lennox, fourth Duke of 
Richmond, asked the aging veteran of the 1759 siege, James Thompson, what manner of 
corps the 78
th
 Foot had been.  Thompson‟s reply was that, while an honourable corps, 
they had been too impetuous and that they had hated drill for the reason that all knew 
from birth how to load and fire a musket.  Contemporary evidence from Simon Fraser 
reveals Thompson‟s claims to be utterly false, but, whether by engaging a pre-existing 
stereotype of the Highlander or creating it from scratch, Thompson was playing his own 
part as a veteran in the articulation of the image.  The accounts of men who served in the 
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Highland regiments during the Napoleonic Wars, including the Gaelic texts of Corporal 
Alexander Mackinnon of the 92
nd
 Foot, contained similar flourishes as the myths gained 
in popularity.
46
  Cultural imperialism was a two-way process. 
 
 
II   GAELIC AND EMPIRE 
Language was a vital determinant of civility in the period and a critical factor in the 
justification of cultural imperialism.  Imperial conquerors defined their own superiority 
through their language, deciding on the negative appellations with which to describe 
minorities.  The Gaelic language, it had long been thought by the 1740s, was a 
predominant mark of Highland savagery and, thus, a pillar of Jacobitism.  The post-
Culloden engineering of the Highlands saw explicit attempts to extirpate the Gaelic 
language as part of a wider imperial policy in the region.  As with virtue and military 
potency, however, Gaelic underwent a perceptible revival in the Highlands as a result of 
military service.  Despite the widespread acceptance that Gaelic endured an inextricable 
decline in the face of English cultural colonialism, the language itself was not excluded 
from the processes of regional identity-making. 
Gaelic confidence, expressed through the language, was underpinned by imperial 
military service.  While there was no context in which Gaelic was used in an official 
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way, unlike in SSPCK schools, there was no institutionalized ban on the use of Gaelic.  
Barrington‟s orders, that Gaelic-speakers from other regiments such as the Guards, were 
to form the NCO cadre of the new regiments in 1757, demonstrates an element of 
practicality in ministerial circles.  All instructions were given in English, but we can only 
surmise how bilingual Gaelic-speakers taught recruits, who had no English whatsoever.  
Some sources suggest that after two or three years in the army, some soldiers still had no 
knowledge of English.  There were even calls for the use of Gaelic in certain contexts as 
a means of improving the experience of military service for young Gaels.
47
  The official 
language of the regiments was unquestionably English, but Gaelic remained the primary 
language of the Highland soldier into the nineteenth century.  Captain John Macdonald 
of the 84
th
 Foot used Gaelic in a letter to refute the claims of a fellow officer, Ranald 
Mackinnon, about the fighting talents of his company, drawing on an older oral tradition 
of hunting nimble stags: 
 
Vogan a Voggan                                           
whreggan o Whreggan                                  
tobhar fihr Niske a Maddan                          
gach creigge-forma vreig                             
i vachagh ehd foho gonna Suillen                
forma whruoye                                             
i rachagh ehd foho gonna Glunien.
48
     
       
[From bog to bog from rock to rock well of pure water in the morning from rock to rock they‟d go down 
to their eyes from the bank they‟d go down to their knees.] 
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 More important than its use within the regiments was the utility of Gaelic in a 
wider setting.  The use of Gaelic in the regiments marked the loosening of cultural 
strictures on the Highlands in the interests of providing the army with recruits.  The 
notion that tartan and other instruments of warfare were a direct encouragement for 
young men to enlist should be heavily censured.  The language of the Gael, however, 
also engaged with a similarly broad pattern of the careful articulation of Highland 
culture, by Highland elites, for imperial or personal ends.  Lord John Murray, for 
example, initially wanted to recruit only those who spoke „Erse‟, a stipulation he was 
forced to drop the following year.  Of greater significance, Murray wanted the songs of 
his chaplain, James Maclagan, to be published, along with an English translation, „that 
their actions may be recorded to the latest posterity‟, an ambiguous phrase in which the 
assisting of recruiting was probably not far from Murray‟s thoughts.
49
  The potential for 
Gaelic writing to instil martial ideals into the young men who were to go to America, as 
representatives of the region, should be considered as an underlying rationale in their 
creation.  Indeed, figures such as Maclagan feared the disgrace of their culture if the 
recruits failed to emulate an impossibly high pseudo-historic benchmark as warriors.  
Just as there remained a metropolitan assumption that Gaelic and savagery were 
interconnected, many Gaels assumed that martial vitality was predicated on Gaelic 
culture.  If Gaelic participation in the British army offered the Highlands a central role 
in the triumphalist discourses of colonial expansion and triumph, Gaelic was inevitably 
centered, both as a beneficiary of Gaelic victories, but also as their underlying cause.  
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Gaelic was defended on the basis that it underpinned the „honour and heroism‟ for 
which the Gael was renowned.  Gaelic songs inculcated these values more effectively 
than the English language, which was not only considered effete, but was thought to 
lack an appreciable military emphasis in its popular culture.  Gaelic songs were the 
resistor of external intrusions, which: „extend their baneful operation to the remote 
highlands, decorating the outside, and undermining the internal heroic fabric of the 
mind  … [that] mind, or interior, ha[s] a cast of high elevation‟.
50
 
 „Civilisation, it is true‟, John Clark argued „[had] made great progress; but, in the 
course of its operations, it destroyed the virtues along with the rudeness of the human 
mind‟.
51
  Conversely, praise poetry and its panegyric code, the formulaic base for poetic 
structure in the period, instilled a set of values that were matched to the martial 
emphasis of the Highland regiments.  Among the factors which underpinned a martial 
reading of praise poetry in the code was the social contract between patron and soldier, 
the role of tradition in what was còir (proper) and ceart (just or right), the right to 
renown through service, the divine right of Gaelic triumph, and a vicious, and often 
explicit denunciation of enemies.
52
  The loss of Gaelic meant the loss of martial virtue.
53
 
Gaelic, therefore, was a critical component of the imperial specialization of the 
region, helping set the intellectual conditions for the employment of Highland 
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manpower.  It was, at the very least, a medium through which ministerial designs could 
be articulated.  Whether Gaelic songs had an instrumental role in the motivation for 
enlistment is open to debate.  It was, however, considered an intrinsic part of the region 
in ways that were inconsistent with a policy of total eradication.  The project by the 
SSPCK to publish a Gaelic version of the New Testament reveals the far from simplistic 
place of Gaelic in the management of empire.  The SSPCK, originally established in 
1709 with the aim of eradicating the language, was an imperial agency, designed to 
safeguard the imperium from the perceived symbiosis of Catholicism and Jacobitism.  
These twin threats underscore the claim that cultural and racial variations in the period 
were forged, in large part, on religious difference.
54
  During the Seven Years‟ War, 
however, a change occurred, partly brought about by the service of the regiments, which 
re-formulated the means, but not the ends, of SSPCK policy.  If imperial security was 
best formed on the basis of religious preference, could minority languages not, 
paradoxically, provide a means of British cohesion?  The swearing of Protestant oaths by 
Highland soldiers had revealed that the region might be usefully employed without the 
eradication of the Gaelic tongue.  Gaelic was the language overwhelmingly used by 
Presbyterian ministers in the region, a pre-existent pattern which linked language and 
religion.  Indeed, so common was this practice that the Gaelic New Testament was rarely 
used because of the preferred method of extemporary translation of the Bible from 
English that had occurred prior to 1767.
55
   The SSPCK remained an imperial agency, 
still tied to the mantra that strengthening religious knowledge would strengthen the 
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empire, only, after the 1760s, it accepted that religious knowledge was best articulated in 
the native language.  Ultimately, evangelicalism probably undermined the commitment 
of the region to soldiering, a fascinating link with the Gibbonian narrative.  The issue in 
1767, however, was not the possible outcome of evangelical Protestanism in the region, 
but the immediate imperial imperative.
56
  In this, the SSPCK was supported by such 
Gaels, who received stipends for preaching the language, as Robert Macpherson, former 
chaplain of the 78
th
 Foot.  The Gaelic Bible marked, perhaps, one of the most significant 
articulations of Britain‟s pre-1783 empire of liberty: an empire theoretically based on 
shared values in which ethnic variation was seconded to vitality, at least among 
„acceptable‟ ethnicities. 
If Gaelic underpinned the functionality of military service, it extended its 
influence into the popular culture of the region as a whole.  What the Gaelic writings of 
the 1760s-1790s attempted to create was a new heroic age in the history of the 
Gàidhealtachd.  Gaelic recruiting proclamations read like Homeric lists of great deeds, 
naming every battle the 42
nd
 Foot had engaged in since Fontenoy.  Engagements such as 
the raid on Fort l‟Orient in September 1746 and the siege of Hulst in April and May 
1747, European actions in which the 42
nd
 Foot participated, were probably better known 
in the late eighteenth-century Highlands than they are today.  At Fort l‟Orient and Hulst, 
as at Fontenoy, British defeat did not preclude the celebration of Gaelic martial virtue in 
the Highlands or its utility as a recruiting tool.
57
  John Gillies, who published a collection 
of songs in 1786, reproduced an extract written on the occasion of the Highland 
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regiments departing for North America in 1756.  To the departing soldiers, it advised 
them:  
 
Leomh‟ naidh gharg; a fhuil Albnach,  
Lean re‟r ‟n airm ‟s re‟r ‟n eideadh;            
Faghaibh taragaid eatrom bhall-bhuidh,      
Ghabhas dearg-thuadh Chaoilt-Mhach;  
‟S cuilbheir earr-bhuidh ‟n laimh gach sealgair      
Seoid air marbhadh chaoil-daimh;   
O‟s mighich d‟Albannaich dol a shealg,  
Air Francaich chealgach ‟s Coilt mhich.
58
  
    
[Fierce lions of Scottish descent, Be loyal to your arms and uniform, Get light brightly decorated shields, 
That will take the blows of tomahawks, A bright-ended musket in every hunter‟s hand, Gallant youths 
killing slim stags, Oh it is time for Scots to go hunting, After treacherous Frenchmen and Forest-folk.] 
 
Other songs written in the aftermath of the Seven Years‟ War were equally 
unrepentant in their praise for the Highland soldier.  It was important, in order to justify 
the celebratory tone of Gaelic poetic culture, that the Gael had a central role in imperial 
victories.  A song written by a soldier of the 78
th
 Foot in the aftermath of the battle of the 
Plains of Abraham in 1759 was positively ebullient in the defeat of the French:   
 
Bha na Frangaich cho dàna, 
An cridhe cruaidh mar an stàillin, 
Nuair a dh‟aithnich a‟ ghràisg‟ 
Nach robh sinn làidir gu gnìomh. 
Ach fuirich ort fhathast! 
Tha latha Chuibic ri labhairt. 
Fhuair na Frangaich an sgàthadh 
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[The French were imprudent, Their hard hearts like steel, When that rabble realized, That we had not the 
strength to fight. But wait a moment! The battle of Quebec is yet to be told. The French were destroyed, 
That will stay in their memories.] 
 
 
The triumph of a „Gaelic‟ victory at Québec began what became a wider 
celebration of the uniformed Gael across the British Empire.  Writers such as Kenneth 
Mackenzie continued to reference military service in North America as late as the 1790s.  
In Oran don Fhreiceadan Dubh or Song for the Black Watch, Mackenzie noted that, „In 
North America, Frequently were they heroic.‟  He continued:  
 
Bha na Gaidheil duineil riamh 
‟S tha ìad fiallaidh, ro thapaidh, 
‟S „nuair a theannadh ìad ri stri, 





[The Gael was ever manly They were generous and very bold, When they got into the fight, It is they who 
would not forsake the banner.] 
 
 
 This was imagery that was repeated throughout Mackenzie‟s creative writing. 
Mackenzie honoured the 42
nd
 Foot for its role in the doomed assault on Fort Carillon in 
1758, where he turned the reality of an abject defeat into an astonishing victory: 
 
Cho fad sa mhaireas Breatanach, 
Bi‟ dh clìu orr ann a ‟n èachraidheachd, 
O lìnn gu lìnn le taitneachas, 
A‟ cuir „an geill a ‟n tapachais, 
A ‟n Tiganderoga b‟ acuinneach;  
A gearradh chìnn o chraitichean, 
‟S cuir Fraingich as a‟m batraidhean.
61
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[As long as a Briton lives, They will be renowned in history, With enjoyment from generation to 
generation, elucidating their heroism, They were expert at Ticonderoga; Cutting heads from shoulders, 
Putting Frenchmen out of their batteries.] 
 
A central salient factor which emerged from these poetic contributions was pride in the 
Gaelic language.  This could also be fastened to notions of virtue and freedom that 
accompanied the wearing of military uniform and the carrying of military standards: 
 
‟S tha ‟n èididh fèin mar bhata dhoibh, 
‟S tha ‟n saorsainn mar sgiath àchlais, 
‟S thug nàduir dànachd fharsuing doibh, 
‟S tha Ghàilic mar bu chleachda dhi, 
Cuir feartan ann nam feoil.
62  
 
[It is their uniform which is their staff, It is freedom the shield upon their arm, Nature gave great 
expression to them, Gaelic was accustomed to it, It put virtue in their flesh.] 
 
 
 This new historic age was vital for the expression of Gaelic confidence which 
was expressed far beyond the limits of military service.  First, the attacks on the region 
promoted a collective strength which increasingly questioned what was being done to the 
language.  What had happened, Alasdair mac Mhaighstir Alasdair (Alexander 
Macdonald) asked when „in an age so happily distinguished from all others for freedom 
of thought, love of knowledge, and moderation, this people and this language should be 
alone persecuted and intolerated [sic] [?]‟.
63
  This feeling of persecution, rather than 
provoking sad lamentations of their ascribed marginality, provoked aggressive displays 
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of cultural security.  Alasdair mac Mhaighstir Alasdair‟s pamphlet Ais-eiridh na Seann 
Chaoin Albannaich [The Resurrection of the Old Scottish Tongue] (Edinburgh, 1751), in 
addition to being the first book of secular poetry published in Gaelic, was also a clarion 
call to Gaels to express themselves more vigorously.  It was certainly effective and many 
writers expressed a venomous hatred at the government‟s attitudes toward the region: 
„you, and all the great officers of state, are totally unacquainted with the language, 




 What was most evident, however, was an intense internal debate among writers in 
the Gàidhealtachd over the future of the language.  Samuel Johnson had been able to 
ascribe savagery to the Gael owing to the oral nature of Gaelic culture.  Without a strong 
tradition of vernacular writing, Johnson could not be convinced of the Gael having 
reverence for the past, having no written history, and, therefore, no history of which to 
speak.
65
  This was, of course, refuted by Gaelic scholars, but many Gaels shared 
Johnson‟s interpretive framework, at least in part.  Alasdair mac Mhaighstir Alasdair‟s 
Ais-eiridh na Seann Chaoin Albannaich, published more than twenty years before 
Johnson‟s Journey to the Western Islands, marked the beginnings of an internal debate 
which came to the same conclusion; the lack of printed Gaelic books made the language 
inferior in many respects and in danger of becoming extinct.  James Maclagan, for 
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example, doubted that four men in Scotland would spell one page of Gaelic in the same 
way.
66
   
These debates ensured that far from being the language of the church and God, a 
claim made by Dugald Buchanan, Gaelic could be used as a vibrant assertion of identity 
with immense political utility.
67
  Notable in this regard was the self-conscious linking of 
the language with ancient history, providing a powerful historic link with the present.  
William Shaw, who had attended the University of Glasgow, asserted that Gaelic „exists, 
at this day, one of the greatest living monuments of antiquity‟ and that an adequate 
appreciation of history was vital to understanding the Gael.  Alasdair mac Mhaighstir 
Alasdair‟s claim that from the Gaelic bosom – by which he probably meant the Celtic 
bosom more generally - had issued „the conquerors of Rome, the planters of Gaul, 
Britain, Ireland‟ was similarly suggestive.
68
  Print culture, just as it was central the 
political culture of Georgian Britain, was of immense consequence to the place of the 
Gael.  Gaelic scholars thought, just as Johnson did, that the importance of the Gael in 
Britain could only be asserted by the adherence of the language to the literary principles 
of a wider political nation.   
 The result was the exponential expansion of printed Gaelic material after the mid-
century.  Books published in Gaelic prior to this date had been confined largely to 
religious texts.  In 1741, the first book of vocabulary, Leabhar a Theagasc Ainminnin, 
written by Macdonald, was published in Edinburgh, followed by his book of songs in 
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1751.  The Rev. William Shaw provided the first book of grammar, Analysis of the 
Gaelic Language in 1778, and a poorly executed two volume dictionary in 1780.
69
  In 
addition, large numbers of books containing oral traditions were published, inspired by 
the fear that there was a perceptible declension in Gaelic oral culture as English became 
the language of commerce and non-familiar interactions.  Rev. John Stuart of Luss wrote 
down the songs composed and recited from memory by Donnchadh Bàn, which were 
published as Orain Ghaidhealach in 1768.  The „Eigg Collection‟, Comh-
Chruinneachidh Orannaigh Gaidhealach, was published in Edinburgh the same year as 
Edward Gibbon‟s Decline and Fall, being based on the songs and stories collected on 
Eigg by Macdonald, and published by his son Ranald.   The text John Gillies published 
in 1786, Sean Dain, agus orain Ghaidhealach; air an tabhairt o dhaoin uaisle, araid an 
Gaeltachd Alba or A Collection of Ancient and Modern Gaelic Poems (Perth, 1786), 
contained James Maclagan‟s tribute to the 42
nd
 Foot.  It was extremely popular, as was 
Kenneth Mackenzie‟s Orain Ghaidhealach (Edinburgh, 1792), which had a print run of 
over 1,000, of which at least seventeen survive.
70
  There were also translations of English 
works, notably Thomas Broughton‟s Christian Soldier, published as An Saighidear 
criosduidh no na Dleasnais iomchuidh chaum beatha dhiadhaidh chaithe air an 
sparradh air an armailt o eisempler chorncluis by Iain Moir in 1797.  In all, at least 200 
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Gaelic texts were published in the eighteenth century, the vast majority after 1750.
71
  
Most had strong martial overtones, or even directly referenced the Highland regiments.  
It raises the possibility that the Gaelic material of the period pre-empted the English 
language‟s ahistoric construction of the Highlands as an overwhelmingly martial society, 
based on disproportionate military service long after clanship had ceased to be. 
 The effects of Gaelic confidence and the desire of powerful landed elites to 
promote Gaelic were felt as the War of American Independence drew to a close.  
Donnachadh Bàn‟s poem, Moladh do‟n Ghaidhlig „s do‟n Phiob Mhoir, „s a‟ bhliadhna 
1781, concerning the Highland Society of London, suggests that while such societies 
were elite creations, they were being interpreted as huge strides forward in the history of 
the language: „Tha Lunnainn lan a nis, Ag ardachadh na Gaidhlige, A h-uile la mar thig 
[London just now hums, The Gaelic is elevated high, As every new days comes].‟
72
  It is 
worth noting that the Highland Society of London was also referred to as the „Gaelic 
Society of London‟.
73
  In 1789, the Highland Society of Scotland acquired £3,000 from 
the surplus budget of the forfeited estates for its work after the money was appropriated 
through an act of parliament (29 Geo. III, c. 28).  It was further evidence of the triumph 
of self-styled Highlanders in the trusted take-over of the administration of the Highlands 
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and out of the hands of strictly governmental agencies.
74
  Another change in this regard 
was the Disannexing Act (24 Geo. III, c. 57) which returned the forfeited estates to their 
owners‟ families in 1784.   
It might be questioned whether the use of Gaelic in this way differed much from 
the Gaelic elite‟s articulation of other forms of regional identity.  It was not until the 
early nineteenth century, for example, that vernacular Gaelic writing from the lower 
orders became the repository of political protest.  Nevertheless, Gaelic was genuinely a 
source of pride across the region.  An eighteen-year old French aristocrat, Alexandre de 
La Rochefoucauld, travelling through the Highlands in 1786, recognized how proud the 
Highlanders were of their language.
75
  Many of the language‟s advocates had not 
experienced defeat as Jacobites, but were, like many of the individuals connected with 
the regiments, firm Hanoverians.  In 1780, John Clark, in expressing his outrage at the 
attacks on the language, fell upon something that subsequent historians should 
acknowledge: „The favourite plan for annihilating the Galic [sic], and crushing the 
martial spirit … has not proved more destructive and oppressive … than it must certainly 
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III   EMBRACING IMPERIAL TAXONOMY 
The most explicit demonstration of confidence, however, emerged not from distinctly 
Gaelic conceptions of the imperial world, but from the regional adoption of pan-British 
principles.  This did not detract from a Highland identity, but marked the apex (or nadir) 
of Highland identification with the British Empire. 
 Gaels began to align themselves alongside their fellow Britons, a process only 
possible through a Highland role in one of the most vital institutions of the state.  The 
large numbers of Scots in its ranks, and the uniqueness of the pageantry and language 
that accompanied Highland regiments, gave the army a pan-British culture.  From Long 
Island in September 1778, the Gaelic chaplain James Maclagan described the troubles the 
„British army ... march[ing] about 8 miles in the greatest feat ever known here, their 
rear ... attacked by the rebels‟.  Alexander Macdonald similarly contrasted „all officers 
and men in the British army‟ with the „rebels‟ they were fighting, not always drawing 
explicit distinctions between Gaels and non-Gaels in uniform.
77
 
While we should not be uncritical of linear patterns of patriotic cohesion through 
warfare, it is clear that Highland elites experienced a distain for France which reflected 
the feelings generated by international rivalry.  „Britain will have nothing to fear from the 
Spaniard for some time‟, thought a relation of James Grant of Ballindalloch after he 
heard of the defeat of a Spanish force under General Alejandro O‟Reilly at Algiers in 
1775.
78
  Such confidence mirrored emotions at the beginning of the Seven Years‟ War.  
In 1756, a Highland officer told a relative he hoped for „a damned drubbing to the 
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French‟ in the coming campaign.  Anti-French sentiments were also seen in the material 
culture of the Highlands.  Lady Macintosh possessed an egg upon which a wit had 
painted „Beware of the French 1756‟.
79
   Old veterans of the 42
nd
 did sometimes speak of 
the battle of Fontenoy, comparing it with battles such as Carillon in 1758, suggesting 
there was at least a partial intellectual link between fighting against the French in 
Flanders in 1745 and against them in North America in 1758.
80
  There was, in addition, a 
perceptible anger that French and Spanish entry into the War of Independence had helped 
the colonists in their war against „Breatann an àigh [glorious Britain]‟:           
 
Mur deantadh le cairdeas ri Frangaich ‟nan cas 
‟S ri Spainntich dhubh lachdainn, 
bu ghrad bhiodh as sas 
Is Duidsich is Olandaich ‟dheimhneachadh graidh; 




[Had they not created an alliance with the French in their distress And with the dark, swarthy Spanish, 
They would have been in trouble right away And the Dutch and Hollanders assuring sympathy It is a 
good while since the hemp rope went around the throats of that rabble.] 
 
It was difficult for Gaels to avoid feelings of superiority when so many perceived 
national traits, outside constitutional and libertarian models, were based on the martial 
traits of its soldiery.  During his invasion of St Lucia in late 1778, James Grant reported 
that the French counter-attacks had been made „with the impetuosity of Frenchmen‟, but 
were turned back „by the determined bravery‟ of the British soldier.  A former surgeon of 
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the 71st Foot would write an entire treatise on how to conduct armies based almost 
entirely on perceived national traits.
82
  Perhaps most revealingly, there was a common 
perception, fully shared by Highland officers, that only the continuing interference of 
French agents could account for the resistance made by the Cherokee to the punitive 
expeditions of the British army in the 1760s.
83
    
The ranking of national traits through military performance was never more 
obvious than in Highland / British reactions to the American colonists.  The distain 
directed at American rebels, like the provincials of the Seven Years‟ War, bordered on 
the ridiculous.  Loyalist Alexander Campbell described what he had seen at Bunker Hill 
in 1775, along with a description of the „Barbarous cruel set‟ that inhabited New 
England‟:  „they are a Cowardly set that will not fight but when fenced by trees, houses 
or Trenches‟.  Campbell‟s namesake who remained in Scotland went as far as to cheer 
the death of Dr. Joseph Warren.  He reported to a relative that „one of our officers seeing 
the little son of a b__h running off from behind the trenches‟ shot him „like a wood-cock‟, 
before adding that he hoped the same fate awaited John Hancock, Sam Adams, and Israel 
Putnam.
84
  It was later recorded by an American observer that a captured rebel officer 
was insulted and laughed at by Scottish female camp followers after the capture of Fort 
Washington.
85
  The supposed cowardly actions of rebel soldiers, while consistently 
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disproved over the course of the war, were often repeated into the 1780s.
86
  There was an 
association of the army with salient national distinctions.  Lamentable perceptions of the 
American Loyalists despite their allegiances, was something Charles Cornwallis had to 
warn his troops to avoid during the southern campaign in 1781.
87
   
Some Highland officers evidently identified with the British state to a significant 
degree.  John Macpherson, a Badenoch officer serving in North America, informed his 
father on Christmas Day in 1776: „The campaign is ended – I think gloriously and I hope 
to the satisfaction of my friend John Bull.‟
88
  Macpherson was articulating something of 
importance.  Here was a positive identification with a strong symbol of British bellicosity 
and superiority.  The army, while it was a social and cultural body, as much defined by 
its own peculiarities, was centred on the political nation as the nation‟s primary means of 
defence.  While it cannot be said that the army was an all-encompassing vehicle for 
integration, it is interesting to note that two groups denied official recognition as part of 
the regular army, Irish Catholics and American colonists, were the same „Britons‟ with 
which the state had the most problematic relationship with in the late eighteenth century.  
There was nothing unique, compared with other mainland Britons, to these Highland 
identifications, but the potential for the region to be elevated, simply by association, was 
clear. 
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Identification with the army and the fiscal-military state, however, was less 
influential than the Gaelic identification with the world view of the British state.
89
  
Britishness was central to the inner-workings of the British imperial project.  Britishness, 
perhaps more appropriately Englishness, was defined by the traits of Protestantism, 
government by consent, the link of liberty with property, trial by jury, the right to a 
militia, and loyalty to parliamentary monarchy.  It was a conformist system and the direct 
targeting of cultural difference in the Highlands after 1746 was a result of an inherent 
connection between culture, loyalty, and Britishness.  Provincial interpretations of 
metropolitan ideologies were a vital part of the imperial process and an important means 
of confidence.  As „North Britons‟, Highland elites embraced an Anglo-British identity 
as a means of anglicizing Scottish institutions and bringing about progress in Scotland‟s 
political economy.
90
  It was thus, Allan Maclean of Torloisk, a man who placed huge 
stock in the Highland garb as a mark of Highland distinction, could refer to himself as an 
„English officer‟, a nomenclature favoured by other Highland elites.
91
  Scottish Whigs 
reacted in horror, just as American Whigs did, when they were rejected from the pursuit 
of these English, but, implicitly universalist political values.  While there is much debate 
on how closely Scots embraced English traits as a means of self-identification, it would 
be unfair to characterize this identification as Machiavellian and purely in the interests of 
self-protection against English cultural imperialism. Scottish-orientated patriotism 
through the medium of British values was entirely genuine.  There was no question, 
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however, that the intellectual climate of Scotland revolved around broadly similar values 
to the rest of the British world.  When Highlanders moved from a domestic context into 
an imperial one, it was these values they took with them. 
Many of the Highland elites who went to North America with the army had 
implemented improvements in the Highlands and sought to extend them in the new world.  
In reply to Sir Archibald Grant‟s advocacy of a scheme to colonize St John‟s Island in 
the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Sir James Grant of Grant replied that while tempting, his focus 
must be on „the improvement of my paternal estate, the establishing of a happy and 
affluent tenantry, the promotion of every public spirited scheme within the country‟.
92
  
While rebuffed, Archibald‟s scheme for St John‟s Island reveals that Highland 
identification with British principles were inseparable from imperial conflict.  Having 
secured St John‟s through the Treaty of Paris, large land grants were being offered on the 
island, some of which went to Simon Fraser for the 78
th
 Foot.  Archibald‟s plan extended 
the zealotry of Anglo-British progress to recently conquered French possessions, 
venturing to make the imperial project work as part of an improving ideology.  „I am 
daily more and more,‟ Archibald stated „confirmed in the opinion, that America will be 
the grand seat of empire.‟  Any expense or trouble caused by finding means for the initial 
land grants would easily be abrogated thought Archibald, and while some settlers would 
not prosper, those that did would „improve things for the mother country‟.
93
  The 
improvement of empire, therefore, served two functions: the improvement of the mother 
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country through the extension of the empire and a means through which Highlanders 
could assert their adherence to British values in both contexts.  
In the mid-eighteenth century, natural history emerged as a new way of narrating 
history and a system for classifying groups by taxonomy.
94
  The most explicit (and 
Scottish) product of this categorization was the conjectural stadial theory that all societies 
passed through stages from hunting and gathering to commercialism, via the intermediate 
stages of pastoralism and agriculture.  Francis Hutcheson, the leading theorist of moral 
philosophy in the first half of the century, emphasized moral sense as the mark of societal 
improvement, rejecting the negative view of human nature seen in the theories of 
Thomas Hobbes and Bernard de Mandeville.  The problem, for many theorists, was that 
moral sense theoretically offered moral equality to uncivilized peoples.  Part of the 
solution was the stadial theory, in which the moral sense was refined through the four 
stages, making moral benevolence dependent on social origins.  To the eighteenth-
century mind then, cultural traits, not ethnicity or race, defined where you fell in the 
taxonomy.
95
  If Highland elites displayed British cultural norms, they were elevated in 
status and consciously placed the Gael above other imperial peoples.   
Gaelic confidence was asserted by an increasingly pejorative view of other 
imperial minorities as a result.  It is important to appreciate that hierarchy implied 
superiority at all sub-levels and that the Gaels demonstrated ethnic conceit as powerful as 
any formed in English-speaking Britain.  Adam Ferguson, for example, formulated his 
ideas about Amerindian nations from European observers, making the Native American 
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as savage as European values dictated and the Highland Scot more sophisticated as a 
result.
96
  Supremacy was taken for granted and Highlanders were consummate and proud 
representatives of Britain‟s imperial project.  This was evidently tied to imperial 
expansion and war.  Colonial warfare and settlement brought even the lowliest 
Highlanders into contact with ethnic minorities.  A Loyalist who had formerly served as 
an ensign during the Seven Years‟ War, Samuel Mackay, epistemologically 
demonstrated the implicit divide between Europeans and Natives when he reported in 
1778 that he had been the member of a war party of „ten men and twenty savages‟.
97
    
Part of the reason articulated for the benefits of American settlement in the pre-
revolutionary period was the possibility of acquiring „Negroes‟ who would assist in the 
clearing of land for Highland settlement.
98
   
The supposedly inferior attributes of the nations with which Highland troops had 
contact were described in deliberately coloured terms in the Gaelic literature of the 
period.  Kenneth Mackenzie described the people of the Indian sub-continent as „Bu 
lion‟ar Innseneach, breun dubh [numerous, putrid, and black]‟.  Mackenzie also 
described Hyder Ali‟s people as „‟S iad bu ghile nan ròcas [whiter than the rook], a 
double entendre which mocked their fighting capacities, but the implied blackness of „‟S 
nìal na mara ‟s na mointich nan aoidh [the appearance of the marshy ground in their 
faces]‟ was a clear reference of colour and deceit.
99
  During the southern campaign in the 
rebellious colonies, enslaved Africans were painted with the number of the regiment for 
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which they worked.  In the brigade to which the 71
st
 and the 76
th
 belonged while in 
Virginia in 1781, there were reports that soldiers were using the enslaved to plunder local 
properties for them, and that far more than the one slave allotted by Lt. Col. York to each 
subaltern was being kept in the camp.
100
  The image of the number „71‟, painted in white, 
dripping from the bodies of black enslaved human beings should disavow anyone of the 
nonsense that Gaels, owing to their own experiences, engaged with the empire on a more 
sympathetic level.     
 Were there moments when „Highlanders and Indians reached across the cultural 
chasm and met each other as humans engaged in a common enterprise‟?
101
  It is possible; 
Robert Kirkwood of the 77
th
 Foot remembered a Shawnee warrior who „befriended me 
greatly‟.  Kirkwood was, however, in no doubt about the nature of the Native American, 
calling the massacre of Christian Indians at the Abenaki village of St. Francis in 1759 
„justly deserved ... the inhumanity of the savages was rewarded with a calamity‟.
102
  
There was consistently a political context to cultural exchanges which should not be 
ignored.  Captain Thomas Stirling‟s journal of an expedition by the 42
nd
 Foot into Illinois 
in 1765 demonstrates the importance of such exchanges.  As the commanding officer of 
the expedition, Stirling took the opportunity of a ceremony, whereby Iroquois and 
Delaware scouts conferred names upon the Highland officers, to remind his allies that 
their behaviour thus far had not become them as warriors and as men.  Their „sulky fits‟ 
had been, he said, detrimental to the expedition.  Stirling went further and attempted to 
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impress on them that British and Native nations, „should live henceforth as one family, 
cherished and protected by our father the Great King George‟.  Having received promises 
of improvement, the tribesmen proceeded to conduct a war dance, in which they were 
joined by several Highlanders.
103
  Diplomacy was a more powerful force in cultural 
exchange than a perceived shared heritage as ethnic warriors.   
There was nothing unique to these cultural views and they reflected the broad 
ideas for the successful management of the empire.  This interpretation could, however, 
elevate regional actors such as the Gaelic Scot and place him well above most other 
imperial peoples.  By asserting their adherence to British principles, Gaels positively 
asserted their own high status within the empire.  This could, of course, not offer parity 
with the English and did simultaneously re-inscribed Gaelic inferiority.  But in an 
imperially-situated reading of taxonomy, there were grounds for confidence, which might 
have appeared impossible in the domestic setting of the Highlands. 
 
 
IV   CONCLUSIONS 
War and empire had an unrivalled impact on Highland cultural definitions in this period.   
Military service offered the Gael the opportunity to reinvent themselves, not as the 
defeated relic of a feudal past, but as the spearhead of modern empire.  By entering an 
imperial sphere as soldiers, a category that allowed full licence to expressions of agency, 
martial identity, masculinity, and conquest of subordinate peoples, Gaels had just enough 
evidence falsely to convince themselves they were a superior race.  This did not amount 
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to a coherent imperial patriotism, but the imperial context defined an environment where 
pre-existing or developing patriotism could be explored without the problematic 
domestic structures of the British Isles. 
The British Empire did not fundamentally alter the nature of identity, but created 
an autonomous space, where confident Gaelic identities were allowed to emerge and 
develop, without much overt inconsistency.  This did not mean, however, that the 
imperial context was incidental.  Adjusting the internal points of reference for their own 
self-imagery was relatively simple, but Gaels were also extremely pro-active in the 
expansion of imperial authority and control over newly won territories.  This required not 
simply a re-moulding of self-imagery to a new imperial context; it required identification 
with the aims of the British Empire.  Indeed, Gaelic poetry was a linguistic variant on the 
triumphalist discourses that were common among the people of mainland Britain in this 
period.
104
  Gaels embraced a pan-British conception of human taxonomy, embracing it as 
a means of establishing superiority within an imperial environment.  Of course, this 
process also helped subordinate the Gael to the increasingly racialized hierarchies of 
English dominion.  It marked, however, the fullest expression of Gaelic Britishness: a 
fully adhered-to vision for governing imperial peoples, which would eventually find its 
expression in the Scottish contribution to nineteenth-century moral and religious 
„improvement‟ in the British Empire.     
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In the late eighteenth century, however, rather than being obscured by their 
imperial existence, for many Gaels it defined what they were becoming.  The Highlands 
were not reinvented by an external „other‟ because of cultural weakness; the 
Gàidhealtachd, or at least elements within the region, in the interests of identity, 






Imperial war in North America was utterly central to the Gaelic experience in the latter 
part of the eighteenth century.  It defined the place of the Highland region within a wider 
British polity.  It defined the region as a pool of manpower which could fund British 
expansion.  It overcame a number of the fears and prejudices which had emanated from 
England since the Jacobite rebellion.  As Geoffrey Plank puts it: „Highlanders would 
assert themselves and alter their reputation … after large numbers of Gaelic-speakers 
begun moving into distant, contested zones in North America during the Seven Years‟ 
War.‟
1
  It helped, ironically, to replace older fears of Jacobitism with a new fear, that 
Scots were orchestrating a takeover of English government and would subvert the 
constitution in order to secure the continuing privilege of themselves and their kinsmen.  
This particular fear is something which can be detected even today. 
Far more important, however, than all of these impacts, was that it defined how 
the Highlands, from the highest to lowest, viewed themselves and their place in the 
political world.  When historians talk of Highland integration, colonization, rehabilitation, 
atonement, and reputation, they have achieved brilliant insights.  They have also, 
however, utilized a framework which is entirely inappropriate for understanding the 
dynamics of eighteenth-century imperialism.  They have analysed the region from the 
perspective of the metropolitan centre, or influenced by selective Highland materials 
which support a pre-determined view of the region.  By highlighting the colonization of 
the Highlands and its subsequent rehabilitation in the eyes of the state, historians could 
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approach the region with a meta-narrative that explained pro-active imperial 
involvements while accounting for its disastrous consequences.  Scholars squared the 
circle by offering a one-dimensional interpretation of the Highland experience, one that 
emphasized the military occupation of the Highlands after 1746.
2
 
This thesis has offered an alternative view of the processes of British expansion 
in the mid-eighteenth century.  Still predicated on the importance of a centre / periphery 
analysis, it has forcefully argued that the British colonial enterprise must be understood 
from the periphery as well as the centre.  The success of imperialism by the final decades 
of the century was overwhelmingly based on what the state could offer local groups to 
secure their support of imperial rule.  In North America, the colonists‟ self-perception as 
Englishmen clashed with the monumental failure of the British state to offer them a 
means of imperial integration.  There are grounds for arguing that the fatal problem of 
colonial rule in British America lay not simply in freedoms, but in opportunities, or lack 
thereof.  Just how many sacred rights American colonists would have willingly 
surrendered for equality of opportunity, we will never know.  In India, while equal 
involvement in the management of empire was never offered, the Permanent Settlement, 
instituted as part of Cornwallis‟s reforms, held incentives as the fundamental principle 
behind the administration of India.  It commercialized landholding in Bengal, granting 
proprietorial rights to the Zamindars who had previously had little incentive to improve 
their lands.  Vitally, it offered Indian civil servants the opportunity to accrue small 
fortunes by buying up undervalued land from those Zamindars who could not pay the 
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heavy taxes associated with these proprietorial rights.  Through military service, large 
sections of Highland society were offered incentives which corresponded with the 
accepted worldview of Gaels.  Gaelic ambitions were successfully channelled into 
military service, not because it satisfied „traditional‟ militarism, but because it offered a 
decidedly contemporary solution to local problems and satisfied individual or familial 
security and status.   
What this thesis advocates, however, is an analysis of change from a cultural and 
political perspective, marking these processes as integral to the determining social and 
economic incentives.  Viewed in this way, the dynamics of state and empire-building are 
seen more clearly.  The army must be seen as a vital element of British state-building not 
because it infused Britishness into its soldiers.  Instead, it forged a direct link between its 
soldiers and central government, making the authorities of the state increasingly 
important in the satisfaction of continuing localized agenda.  The relationship between 
the region and the metropolis and, between the region and the empire, was largely 
constructed through the role of Highlanders in the military.  It meant that the military had 
a disproportionate impact in framing how many Highlanders viewed and experienced 
integration into a larger imperial polity.  It might be said that this thesis, as a result, re-
inscribes the association of the Highlands with militarism.  Perhaps, but this should not 
be read as a single causal phenomenon.  It was part, the most important part this work 
asserts, but only a part of the major changes in this period.  Furthermore, military 
associations were, for many upper and lower elites and poor in the region, entirely self-
chosen declarations of place and purpose. 
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There was an unmistakable duality to the empire, exemplified in Highland 
experiences.  On the one hand, imperial contacts reinforced traditional values of 
landownership, religion, hierarchy, and localized interactions.  Empire cemented the role 
of inequitable landownership in the Highland political economy.  There can be little 
question that the commitment of Highland elites to military service ensured the 
continuing viability, in economic and moral terms, of their control of the land.  Land 
reform made precious few inroads into the Highlands in the one hundred years after the 
War of American Independence and it was only through four acts in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries that Highland crofters gained some measure of security.  
Even then, they did so within a system which was a far cry from the radicalism seen in 
late imperial Ireland.
3
  That said, there was no unity within the Highland elite and the 
propensity of men to enter the army was due, in large part, to their need to find a place 
within an economic system in which they were increasingly obsolete and under pressure 
from senior landowners.  The Empire also sustained the Gaels‟ belief in their innate 
martial capabilities, which were deserving of recognition.  They believed themselves to 
be a distinct people, a view predicated on martial valour, in which the Gaelic language 
was a vital component. 
On the other hand, imperialism placed radically new demands on the region and 
its people, a modernity of ideas and identities which could not be fully understood within 
the boundaries of early modern identifications.  Pan-British ideologies made inroads into 
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the most intimate of Highland relations, offering alternative hierarchies which 
significantly complicated the relationship between elites and the rural poor.  Imperialism 
not only established itself on a core/periphery relationship between regions, but also 
within regions, on class, gender, or linguistic divides.
4
  When James Macpherson retired 
to the Highlands, he had a grand Georgian mansion built at the township of Raitts, 
construction of which was completed in 1790.  There could be few better examples of the 
assertions of the Gàidhealtachd than James Macpherson.  The name Macpherson gave to 
his house, however, was Belle Ville.  There could be few better examples of the way in 
which elite Gaels distinguished themselves as Highlanders, albeit elite ones, to be 
understood differently from the poor Gaels.  The Gaelicization of Belle Ville to Balavil, 
as it is known today, reminds us of the fluidity of identity, but also just how vital identity 
can be at any given time.  Cultural symbols, synonymous with Scottish or Highland 
„tradition‟ emerged in this period, not simply as declarations of cultural difference, but as 
modernist responses to the social climates of the time.  The uniform of the Highland 
regiments offered men a status unachievable in their civilian lives.  Alexander 
Macdonald demanded of his commanding officer in 1776 that plaids be sent, for the men 
were „Creasy [crazy] to appear at ... Assembly and shew their fine white thighs and 
knees‟.
5
  Local women were the main civilian attendees of parades and assemblies and 
such immodest dress established masculinity in a very contemporary context.  Highland 
soldiers sold their labour and became conscious of their rights within market conditions.  
The ideology of improvement filtered through large sections of Highland society and 
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evidence from Highland soldiers suggests that consumerism was limited only by the 
buying power of the rural poor.  Highland men became the assertive agents of a British 
imperial mission, fully embracing the taxonomy which inscribed the alleged inferiority 
of non-white actors.  This, and the Gaelic role in these processes, would be a mark of 
British imperialism until its demise in the twentieth century.  And the opportunities of 
empire were used to challenge the status quo of the region, significant enough in the 
early 1770s to include Highland emigration as one of the great crises of empire in that 
period.  It was the fluidity of people in the empire which marks the period out as 
significant.  Lacking the totality of later imperialism, the eighteenth-century empire 
created a contextual space in which many Gaels had the agency to decide what was 
worth their interest and commitments.  While it cannot be said that the „people‟, in a 
generic sense, determined the form of their world, the region as a whole made a declared 
commitment to the British Empire, deciding on the form that commitment would take. 
  One point requires careful elaboration.  The two wars fought in America 
between 1754 and 1783 did not mark the beginning or end of Highland interactions with 
the empire.  The American wars were only part of long-term processes of engagement 
and the formation of identity.  In the early nineteenth century, for example, it was the 






 Foot at the battle of Alexandria in 1801 that cemented the 
place of the Highland regiments in popular consciousness.  The Highland Society of 
London had bronze and silver medals cast for the soldiers of the 42
nd
 Foot.  Over a 
decade later, the battle was still being referred to as „a proud day for Caledonian valour‟.
6
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The triumphant return of the regiments following the campaign in Egypt was a seminal, 
but now largely forgotten, event.  Yet it predated Scott‟s tartan pageant by twenty years.  
Philip James de Loutherbourg‟s 1802 painting of the battle and the death of Sir Ralph 
Abercromby, borrowed heavily from Benjamin West and too featured a Highland soldier, 
informing the dying Abercromby of the French defeat. 
The period from 1756-1783, however, was the tipping point of a steady 
equilibrium which saw the region drawn into the British state.  Attempts to do so prior to 
this fell on the inadequacies of the state and, consequently, the limited resources the state 
had to draw on to include peripheral elites.
7
  Post-1756, there was a perceptible interest 
in furthering expansion which fitted regional needs, often with significant cultural 
overtones.  The Highlands would not have developed in the way it did without the 
military commitments of the Americans wars.  As the state could not control any people 
by force alone - the emergence of the United States proved this - the periphery had a 
dynamic role in the creation and interpretation of imperialism.  The cultural boundaries 
of imperialism were often built on the imperatives of individuals in its most intimate 
settings.  On 19 April 1761, for example, Chief Ustanaco of the Cherokee Nation told the 
British military commander in South Carolina, James Grant of Ballindalloch, that the 
conflict between the Cherokee and the colony had been caused by a renegade minority 
and that the nation wanted to live in peace: „For I am an English man myself‟, Ustanaco 
told Grant.  Ustanaco defined his Englishness through his loyalty, his literacy, and his 
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wishing to live „like brothers‟ in peace.  Similarly, Christian Huron, at the village of 
Loretto near Québec in the 1770s, made religious carvings of Christian events, but with 
Native American iconography: „[They] appear as savages in savage costume … I shall 
not readily forget good St Peter with his keys and his painted face.‟
8
  Peripheral 
emulation of English models, while easy to dismiss from a metropolitan perspective, 
were genuine and important to regional understandings of place. 
There is, therefore, an argument to be made that the bitterness of the Highland 
experience in the nineteenth century was not so much caused by regional defeat and 
forcible incorporation into the British state in the eighteenth century.  Instead, bitterness 
evolved over a long period of time as Gaels realized that the confidence they had gained 
in the empire was not being reciprocated.  In 1792, Bliadhna nan Caorach or Year of the 
Sheep, Highland troops of the 42
nd
 Foot helped suppress local attempts to drive sheep out 
of Sutherland and Easter Ross.  The spread of sheep farming in the area was largely the 
responsibility of Sir Hector Munro of Novar, who had accrued an enormous fortune from 
his imperial commitments.  Even ex-soldiers of the „lower orders‟ began to use sheep 
tracts to improve their economic standing, drawing a clear line between the attitudes of 
imperial Highlanders and those who were deeply concerned by these changes.  Elite 
interests, despite significant criticism in the southern press, were the order of the day for 
much of the period from the 1790s to the 1880s.
9
  Military service continued to serve as 
justification for the security of tenure by poor families into the nineteenth century, but 
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the realization of the ultimate unimportance of the rural poor was a bitter blow.
10
  To the 
horror of many Gaels, they realized that the identities created in the latter eighteenth 
century did not protect them against continuing social change, and the dire consequences 
of „improvements‟ in Highland landholding.  These were, nevertheless, nineteenth-
century developments.  We cannot attach a linear narrative of decline to the entirety of 
the Highland experience from 1745 to the victories of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act of 
2003, allowing community buy-outs of their lands, and the overall rise in population in 
the region over the past few decades.  The period of 1756-1783 was one such period in 
which Gaels asserted themselves in ways which entirely dispute the popular narrative of 
victimhood. 
This thesis, as I have highlighted throughout, should not, however, be read as a 
positive analysis of the processes of imperialism.  Even neglecting the inherent savagery 
of imperial expansion, war was a horrific experience.  A tour of the paintings and 
specimens of Sir Charles Bell, collected after the battle of Corunna in 1809 and held at 
the Surgeons‟ Hall Museum in Edinburgh, should be required for every person - historian, 
policy-maker, or politician - who has any connection with war.  Regional confidence was 
predicated on the misery of Gaels and non-Gaels alike.  Nevertheless, it is also fair to 
assert that from the distance of modern times and our perception of war in the early 
twenty-first century, it is easy to structure the experience of eighteenth-century warfare 
on the basis of empirical impacts, be they moral, physical, or financial.  This thesis has 
attempted to interpret the likely narrative of the Highland soldier as a definable group.  
Between the military deaths, the entrenchment of unsustainable landholding practises, 
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and the creation of a confidence which would prove insufficient to meet demands of the 
nineteenth century, America was a fatal land.   
The regiments, however, were made up of tens of thousands of individual 
experiences.  When Alexander Macdonald and Allan Macdonald stood in front of that 
table in Glasgow, in January 1778, the long-term was unknown.  They had come to that 
place to seek their own individual security, to embrace the new opportunities offered by 
imperial expansion, and even to improve themselves in an inequitable world.  It is these 
aspirations which are the greatest insight into the human agency of the Highland soldier, 
from highest to lowest, regardless of the fates which ultimately awaited them.  Allan 
Macdonald survived the War of American Independence and returned home.  He died, 
unmarried, at the age of thirty-seven, in 1793.  Alexander Macdonald was already a 
middle-aged veteran of the Seven Years‟ War when he enlisted in 1778.  He was most 
likely captured at Yorktown in 1781, after which, he disappears from the historical 
record.  Both men came from the very margins of the British Atlantic world, but, by their 
actions, placed themselves at the forefront of British expansion.  The periphery of the 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF HIGHLAND REGIMENTS, 1739-1784 
 
 
(Source: [Anon.], A List of General and Field Officers ... (London, 1757-84). 
 
The following provides a comprehensive list of the Highland regiments of the British 
army raised in the mid to late eighteenth century. 
Regiments marked with a * served in the North American theatre.   








 Foot:    Am Freiceadan Dubh 1739-2010.  
Description:   Established regiment of the line. 
CO:    Lord John Murray (1745-1787). 
Actions:  Flanders (1745); Jacobite Rebellion, limited role (1745-1746); 
Ticonderoga (Jul. 1758); Montreal (Sept. 1760); West Indies (Oct. 
1761-Aug. 1762); Pennsylvania/Ohio (Jun.-Nov. 1764); New York 
(Aug.-Nov. 1776); New Jersey (Jan.-Apr. 1777); Brandywine 
(Sept. 1777); Paoli (Sept. 1777); Monmouth Court House (Jun. 





 Foot:  Loudoun‟s Highlanders 1745-1748 
Description:   Regiment of the line. 
CO:   John Campbell, 4
th
 Earl of Loudoun (1745-48). 
Actions:  Jacobite rebellion, Prestonpans and Culloden (1745-1746);   








 Foot:  1759-1763. 
Description:   Second battalion. 
OC:    Francis Grant (1759-62); battalions then combined. 
Actions:   Montreal (Sept. 1760); West Indies (Oct. 1761-Aug. 1762); 
Pennsylvania/Ohio (Jun.-Nov. 1764). 







 Foot:   Montgomery‟s (62nd Foot until 1758) 1757-1763. 
Description:   Regiment of the line. 
CO & OC:   Archibald Montgomery (1757-1763). 
Actions:   Fort Duquesne (Sept. 1758); Anglo-Cherokee War (1759-1760);   
West Indies (Apr. 1761-Aug. 1762); Pennsylvania (Jun.-Aug. 
1763). 





 Foot:   Fraser‟s (63rd Foot until 1758) 1757-1763. 
Description:   Regiment of the line. 
CO & OC:   Simon Fraser of Lovat (1757-1763). 
Actions:  Louisbourg (Jun.-Jul. 1758); Québec (Sept. 1759); Sainte Foy 
(Apr. 1760); Signal Hill (Sept. 1762).  





 Foot:  Keith‟s 1759-1763. 
Description:  Regiment of the line.  
CO & OC:  Sir Robert Murray Keith (1759-1763).  
Actions:  Warburg (Jul. 1760); Kloster Kampen (Oct. 1760); Vellinghausen 
(Jul. 1761); Wilhelmstahl (Jun. 1762).  





 Foot:  Campbell‟s 1759-1763. 
Description:  Regiment of the line.  
CO & OC:  John Campbell of Dunoon (1759-1763).  
Actions:  Warburg (Jul. 1760); Kloster Kampen (Oct. 1760); Vellinghausen 
(Jul. 1761); Wilhelmstahl (Jun. 1762).  





 Foot:  Duke of Gordon‟s 1759-1765. 
Description:  Regiment of the line.  
OC:   Staats Long Morris (1762-1765).  
Actions:  Wandiwash (Jan. 1760); Siege of Pondicherry (Sept. 1760-Jan. 
1761).  





 Foot:  Kilberry‟s 1761-1763. 
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Description:  Regiment of the line.  
CO & OC:  John Campbell of Kilberry (1761-1763).  
Actions:  West Indies (1762-1763).  





 Foot:  Johnstone‟s 1760-1763. 
Description:  Regiment of the line.  
CO & OC:  James Johnston (1760-1763).  
Actions:  Never deployed.  





 Foot:  Queen‟s Own Royal Highlanders 1761-1764. 
Description:  Regiment of the line, raised from recruits for 42
nd
 Foot.  
OC:   David Graeme of Gorthie (1761-1764).  
Actions:  Ireland.  





 Foot:  Royal Highland Volunteers 1761-1763. 
Description:  Regiment of the line.  
CO & OC:  Sir Allan Maclean of Torloisk (1761-1764).  
Actions:  Never deployed.  










 Foot:  1779-1786. 
Description:  Second battalion, CO: Lord John Murray.  
OC:   Norman Macleod of Macleod (1779-1786).  
Actions:  Negapatan (Oct.-Nov. 1781); Cuddalore (Jun.-Jul. 1783).    
Disbanded:  Renamed 73
rd





 Foot:   Fraser‟s 1776-1784. 





:  Sir William Erskine (1776-1778); John Maitland (1778-
1779); Alexander Macdonald (1779-1780); Duncan Macpherson 
(1780-1781); Sir Thomas Stirling (1781-1784). 
2/71
st
:  Archibald Campbell (1776-1780); Archibald McArthur 
(1780-1782); Alexander Lindsay, 6
th
 Earl of Balcarres (1782-1784). 
Actions: New York (Aug.-Nov. 1776); Brandywine (Sept. 1777); Savannah 
(Dec. 1778); Briar Creek (Mar. 1779); Stono Ferry (Jun. 1779); 
Stoney Point (Jul. 1779); Savannah (Oct. 1779); Charleston (Apr.-
May 1780); Camden (Aug. 1780); Fishing creek (Aug. 1780); 
Cowpens (Jan. 1781); Guildford Court House (Mar. 1781); 
Yorktown (Oct. 1781). 





 Foot:   Lord Macleod‟s (Earl of Cromarty) Highlanders 1778-1786. 
Description:  Two battalion regiment of the line. 
OC: James Crawford (William Dalrymple after 1783) & George 
Mackenzie (1778-1786).    
Actions: 1/73
rd











 Foot:   Argyll Highlanders 1778-1783. 
Description:  Regiment of the line. 
CO & OC: John Campbell of Barbreck (1778-1783).    
Actions: Penobscot Bay (Jun.-Aug. 1779). 





 Foot:   Macdonnell‟s 1778-1784. 
Description:  Regiment of the line. 
OC:  John Macdonnell of Lochgarry (1778-1784) though led by Major 
John Sinclair, 11
th
 Earl of Caithness (1778-1779); Francis 
Needham, 1
st
 Earl of Kilmorey (1779-1781); Sir Robert Stuart 
(1781-1784).    
Actions: Green Springs (Jul. 1781); Yorktown (Oct. 1781). 





 Foot:   James Murray, 4th Duke of Atholl‟s Highlanders 1778-1783. 
Description:  Regiment of the line. 
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OC: Charles Gordon (1779-1783); John Hutchison (1783).    
Actions: Never deployed. 





 Foot:   Lord Seaforth‟s 1778-1786. 
Description:  Regiment of the line. 
CO & OC: Kenneth Mackenzie (1778-1779); Thomas Humberston (1779-86).  
Actions: Cuddalore (Jun.-Jul. 1783). 
Disbanded:  Renamed 72
nd





 Foot:   Royal Highland Emigrants 1775-1784. 
Description:  Two battalion provincial unit, established in 1778. CO: Sir Henry 
Clinton then Guy Carleton. 
OC: 1/84
th
: Sir Allan Maclean of Torloisk; 2/84
th:
 John Small (1776-
1784).    
Actions: Québec (Dec. 1775); Moore‟s Creek (Feb. 1776); Eutaw Springs 
(Sept. 1781). 
Disbanded: Upper & Lower Canada (1784). 
 
 
*Caledonian Volunteers:  North British 1776-1778. 
Description:    New York Loyalists, eighty in total. 
OC:    Captain Sutherland    
Disbanded:     Amalgamated into the Cathcart‟s American Legion. 
 
 
*Royal NC Highlanders:  1780-1782    
Description: Forty commissioned North Carolina Provincials 
and no rank-and-file. 







Independent Companies: Including Argyle Militia. Organized and led by 
various Highland grandees (1745-1746). 
 




Argyle Fencibles:     Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll (1759-63). 
 
Sutherland Regiment:    William, 18th Earl of Sutherland (1759-63). 
 
Argyle (Western) Fencibles:   Lord Frederick Campbell (1778-83).  
 


































APPENDIX B:  SELECTION OF HIGHLAND OFFICERS IN 1757 
 
The following is a list of the officers of the two newly-raised Highland battalions sent to 
America in 1757, as well as Allan Maclean of Torloisk‟s 114
th
 Foot, raised in 1761.  It 
serves to demonstrate the lack of importance attached to the rehabilitation of Jacobites.  
It would appear that patronage, Whig sympathies, recruiting abilities, and relative 
military experience were the deciding factors in officer selection. 
NB: The affiliations given are not absolutes and, where there is ambiguity, have been left 
blank. It should also be noted that even in records dating to the same year and, even in 
the same handwriting, some details referring to particular officers differ.  Duncan Bayne 
of the 77
th
 Foot, for example, is variously marked as having served in the Scots-Dutch, or 






















Lt. Col. 1757 36
th





Earl of Eglinton. 
  
James Grant Major 1757 1
st
 Foot  32 16 (W) Son of William 







 Foot 27 12 (W) Son to Alexander 
Cambell of 
Barcaldine of the 
forfeited estates. 
 
John Sinclair Captain 1747 Scots-
Dutch 
(SD) 














Argyllshire elite.  
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John Gordon Captain 1757 1
st














25 10   
William 
Macdonald 
Captain 1757 - 18 0 (W) By Archibald 
Montgomery and 




George Munro Captain 1757 42
nd
 Foot 36 15 
surgeon 





Roy Cameron in a 
revenge attack on 
government 
forces, for the 
murder of his 
brother and other 
Jacobite 
Camerons, in 
1746. Two of 
George Munro‟s 
uncles (brothers 
to Sir George) 
also died in 
government 











ed him, was 





















































Foot. Friends in 
Scotland raised 
his 30 men for 
him. 
   
Archibald 
Robertson 























James Grant Lt. 1757 36
th
 Foot 24 2  
surgeon 







 Foot 29 10  „Has carried arms 
for several years‟. 
 




Robert Grant Lt. 1757 - 25 0 (W) „a Gentleman 
who is thought 






Lt. 1757 - 20 0 (W) By Lord Adam 






John Mcnab Lt. 1757 - 22 0 (W) Brother to the 
Laird of Mcnab 







of the battalion. 
Hugh Gordon Lt. 1757 - 16 0 (W) Variously marked 








burned by rebels‟. 
Donald 
Macdonald 
Lt. 1757 - 21 0 (J) By Sir James 
Macdonald of 
Sleat. Donald‟s 
father is recorded 
as having served 















 Earl of 
Seaforth. Brother 
to a Captain of 
the Royal Navy. 
    
Roderick 
Mackenzie 





Henry Munro Lt. 1757 - 30 0 (W) By Sir Harry 














Lt. 1757 - 16 0 (W) Son to Campbell 
of Balnabie, Islay. 
 





















Ensign 1757 - 17 0 (W) Marked as being 







Sources: HL, LO6695, General returns, 18 Sept. 1757; LoC, M 2267, reel 48, p. 32, List 
of officers, [1757]. 
 
 
James Grant Ensign 1757 - 19 0 (W) Cousin to John 










Earl of Eglinton, 
father to Lt. Col. 
Archibald 
Montgomery. 







Ensign 1757 - 20 0 (J) Son of John Dubh 
Mackinnon. 
 
George Munro Ensign 1757 - 24 0 (W) By Sir Harry 






Ensign 1757 - 18 0   





























By Dr. Fordyce, 
former surgeon of 
3
rd
 Foot and SD. 
 
George Mcrae Surgeon 
Mate 




















Lt. Col. 1757 - 30 0 (W/J) Son of Simon 
Fraser, 11th Lord 
Lovat, executed 
for treason in 
1747. Assisted in 
the prosecution 
and judicial 
murder of James 
Stewart of 
Aucharn, for the 










Major 1748 SD c. 54 >17 (W) By his brother-in-
law, Hugh Rose 













Captain 1747 SD 48 >10 (J) Younger brother 
of Ewan 
Macpherson of 
Cluny. By Simon 




























 Foot 25 1 (J) Younger brother 
of Charles Fraser, 












Captain 1757 Royal 
Ecossais 






Undertook to raise 
100 men for his 
commission. 
Appealed to the 






Captain 1757 Royal 
Ecossais 






















35 17 (W) By William Kerr, 
3
rd
 Marquis of 
Lothian, Lord 
Clerk Register, 
whose son, Sir 
























chief of the 
Macdonnell‟s of 













Lt. 1757 - 27 0 (J/W) Son of Alexander 
Macdonell of 
Boisdale, and 




















John Campbell of 
Danna, and the 
Duke of Argyll, 
against his father‟s 
will. Never joined. 
   
James 
Fraser 



































Brother to James 
Murray of the 55
th
 
Foot. Nephew to 





the Duke of 
Argyll. 
 






Lt. 1757 - c. 27 0  Son of Alexander 
Macdonnell of 
boisdale and, thus, 





Lt. 1757 - ? 0  By the Duke of 
Argyll on the basis 









Lt. 1757 - 29 1 (J) Atholl 
Brigade 






Lt. 1757 - ? 0  Brother to the 





Lt. ? Royal 
Ecossais 


































































   
John Fraser Ensign 1757 - 23 0  Son of Angus 




Ensign 1757 - c. 17 0  Brother to the 
Laird of Chisholm. 
 





 Foot (Royal Highland Volunteers) [1761]: 
 















Major 1761 NY Ind. 
Regimen
t and SD 





























Captain Pre-1761 SD     
Alex 
Davison 
Capt. Lt 1761 14
th






Lt. 1745 Argyll 
militia 










 Foot   (W) By James Hay, 















































Lt. 1761      
Simon 
Fraser 
















    
Peter 
McArthur 





















Source: HL, YO582, List of officers, [1761]. 
 
 
